MedWorm.com provides a medical RSS filtering service. Over 6000 RSS medical sources are combined and output via different filters. This feed contains the latest items from the 'Mind and Language' source. Thu, 09 Feb 2012 02:32:16 +0100 http://www.medworm.com/index.php?rid=5586390&cid=s_27189_36_f&fid=27189&url=http%3A%2F%2Fdx.doi.org%2F10.1111%252Fj.1468-0017.2011.01436.x Do self‐monitoring accounts, a dominant account of the positive symptoms of schizophrenia, explain auditory verbal hallucination? In this essay, I argue that the account fails to answer crucial questions any explanation of auditory verbal hallucination must address. Where the account provides a plausible answer, I make the case for an alternative explanation: auditory verbal hallucination is not the result of a failed control mechanism, namely failed self‐monitoring, but, rather, of the persistent automaticity of auditory experience of a voice. My argument emphasizes the importance of careful examination of phenomenology as providing substantive constraints on causal models of the positive symptoms in schizophrenia. (Source: Mind and Language) Mind and Language journals http://www.medworm.com/rss/comments.php?id=5586390 Sat, 14 Jan 2012 18:28:26 +0100 5586390 http://www.medworm.com/index.php?rid=5586389&cid=s_27189_36_f&fid=27189&url=http%3A%2F%2Fdx.doi.org%2F10.1111%252Fj.1468-0017.2011.01435.x We describe the relevant theoretical notions in some detail and provide experimental evidence that these factors do indeed affect speakers' interpretation of counterfactuals. (Source: Mind and Language) Mind and Language journals http://www.medworm.com/rss/comments.php?id=5586389 Sat, 14 Jan 2012 18:28:24 +0100 5586389 http://www.medworm.com/index.php?rid=5586388&cid=s_27189_36_f&fid=27189&url=http%3A%2F%2Fdx.doi.org%2F10.1111%252Fj.1468-0017.2011.01434.x We present a minimalist, Non‐Conceptualist approach in opposition to this view, but one that also exists in clear contrast to the kind of minimalism (‘episodic‐like’) espoused by Clayton and Dickinson (1998) with regard to memory in food‐caching birds. While emphasising the nonconceptual elements of episodic memory (in common with the ‘episodic‐like’ approach) we also insist on the essentially phenomenological nature of the memory (as does the Conceptualist approach). We propose the third year of life as a plausible onset period. Our view is rooted in Kantian assumptions about the spatiotemporal content of experience (and thus of re‐experience) and about the synthetic unity of experience—and thus of re‐experience. We answer two objections to this position. (Source: Mi... Mind and Language journals http://www.medworm.com/rss/comments.php?id=5586388 Sat, 14 Jan 2012 18:28:22 +0100 5586388 http://www.medworm.com/index.php?rid=5586387&cid=s_27189_36_f&fid=27189&url=http%3A%2F%2Fdx.doi.org%2F10.1111%252Fj.1468-0017.2011.01433.x Pragmatic deficits of persons with autism spectrum disorders [ASDs] are often traced back to a dysfunction in Theory of Mind. However, the exact nature of the link between pragmatics and mindreading in autism is unclear. Pragmatic deficits in ASDs are not homogenous: in particular, while inter‐subjective dimensions are affected, some other pragmatic capacities seem to be relatively preserved. Moreover, failure on classical false‐belief tasks stems from executive problems that go beyond belief attribution; false‐belief tasks require taking an alternative perspective on the reality. While this capacity is functional in typically developing young children, it is impaired in ASDs. Typically developing children are capable of taking their interlocutor's perspective into account when commu... Mind and Language journals http://www.medworm.com/rss/comments.php?id=5586387 Sat, 14 Jan 2012 18:28:21 +0100 5586387 http://www.medworm.com/index.php?rid=5367969&cid=s_27189_36_f&fid=27189&url=http%3A%2F%2Fdx.doi.org%2F10.1111%252Fj.1468-0017.2011.01432.x The imperviousness of delusions to counter‐evidence makes it tempting to classify them as imaginings. Bayne and Pacherie argue that adopting a dispositional account of belief can secure the doxastic status of delusions. But dispositionalism can only secure genuinely doxastic status for mental states by giving folk‐psychological norms a significant role in the individuation of attitudes. When such norms individuate belief, deluded subjects will not count as believing their delusions. In general, dispositionalism won't confer genuinely doxastic status more often than do competing accounts of belief. (Source: Mind and Language) Mind and Language journals http://www.medworm.com/rss/comments.php?id=5367969 Tue, 01 Nov 2011 04:00:00 +0100 5367969 http://www.medworm.com/index.php?rid=5367968&cid=s_27189_36_f&fid=27189&url=http%3A%2F%2Fdx.doi.org%2F10.1111%252Fj.1468-0017.2011.01431.x I modify Grice's theory of conversational implicature so as to accommodate acts of implicating propositions by asking questions, acts of implicating questions by asserting propositions, and acts of implicating questions by asking questions. I describe the relations between a declarative sentence's semantic content (the proposition it semantically expresses), on the one hand, and the propositions that a speaker locutes, asserts, and implicates by uttering that sentence, on the other. I discuss analogous relations between an interrogative sentence's semantic content (the question it semantically expresses), and the questions that a speaker locutes, asks, and implicates by uttering that sentence. (Source: Mind and Language) Mind and Language journals http://www.medworm.com/rss/comments.php?id=5367968 Tue, 01 Nov 2011 04:00:00 +0100 5367968 http://www.medworm.com/index.php?rid=5367967&cid=s_27189_36_f&fid=27189&url=http%3A%2F%2Fdx.doi.org%2F10.1111%252Fj.1468-0017.2011.01430.x Although arguments for and against competing theories of vagueness often appeal to claims about the use of vague predicates by ordinary speakers, such claims are rarely tested. An exception is Bonini et al. (1999), who report empirical results on the use of vague predicates by Italian speakers, and take the results to count in favor of epistemicism. Yet several methodological difficulties mar their experiments; we outline these problems and devise revised experiments that do not show the same results. We then describe three additional empirical studies that investigate further claims in the literature on vagueness: the hypothesis that speakers confuse ‘P’ with ‘definitely P’, the relative persuasiveness of different formulations of the inductive premise of the Sorites, and the inte... Mind and Language journals http://www.medworm.com/rss/comments.php?id=5367967 Tue, 01 Nov 2011 04:00:00 +0100 5367967 http://www.medworm.com/index.php?rid=5367966&cid=s_27189_36_f&fid=27189&url=http%3A%2F%2Fdx.doi.org%2F10.1111%252Fj.1468-0017.2011.01429.x In LOT 2: The Language of Thought Revisited, Jerry Fodor argues that concept learning of any kind—even for complex concepts—is simply impossible. In order to avoid the conclusion that all concepts, primitive and complex, are innate, he argues that concept acquisition depends on purely noncognitive biological processes. In this paper, we show (1) that Fodor fails to establish that concept learning is impossible, (2) that his own biological account of concept acquisition is unworkable, and (3) that there are in fact many promising general models for explaining how concepts are learned. (Source: Mind and Language) Mind and Language journals http://www.medworm.com/rss/comments.php?id=5367966 Tue, 01 Nov 2011 04:00:00 +0100 5367966 http://www.medworm.com/index.php?rid=5198841&cid=s_27189_36_f&fid=27189&url=http%3A%2F%2Fdx.doi.org%2F10.1111%252Fj.1468-0017.2011.01428.x It has often been suggested that people's ordinary understanding of morality involves a belief in objective moral truths and a rejection of moral relativism. The results of six studies call this claim into question. Participants did offer apparently objectivist moral intuitions when considering individuals from their own culture, but they offered increasingly relativist intuitions considering individuals from increasingly different cultures or ways of life. The authors hypothesize that people do not have a fixed commitment to moral objectivism but instead tend to adopt different views depending on the degree to which they consider radically different perspectives on moral questions. (Source: Mind and Language) Mind and Language journals http://www.medworm.com/rss/comments.php?id=5198841 Wed, 31 Aug 2011 23:00:00 +0100 5198841 http://www.medworm.com/index.php?rid=5198840&cid=s_27189_36_f&fid=27189&url=http%3A%2F%2Fdx.doi.org%2F10.1111%252Fj.1468-0017.2011.01427.x How should we react to the contention that there is empirical evidence showing that many judge Gettier cases to be cases of knowledge, contrary to the verdict of most analytical philosophers about these cases? I argue that there is no single answer to this question. The discussion is set inside a view about how to view the role and significance of intuitive responses to some of philosophy's famous thought experiments. One take‐home message is that experimental philosophy and conceptual analysis are not as far apart as is often thought. (Source: Mind and Language) Mind and Language journals http://www.medworm.com/rss/comments.php?id=5198840 Wed, 31 Aug 2011 23:00:00 +0100 5198840 http://www.medworm.com/index.php?rid=5198839&cid=s_27189_36_f&fid=27189&url=http%3A%2F%2Fdx.doi.org%2F10.1111%252Fj.1468-0017.2011.01426.x This paper takes up the critique of armchair philosophy drawn by some experimental philosophers from survey results. It also takes up a more recent development with increased methodological sophistication. The argument based on disagreement among respondents suggests a much more serious problem for armchair philosophy and puts in question the standing of our would‐be discipline. (Source: Mind and Language) Mind and Language journals http://www.medworm.com/rss/comments.php?id=5198839 Wed, 31 Aug 2011 23:00:00 +0100 5198839 http://www.medworm.com/index.php?rid=5198838&cid=s_27189_36_f&fid=27189&url=http%3A%2F%2Fdx.doi.org%2F10.1111%252Fj.1468-0017.2011.01425.x (Source: Mind and Language) Mind and Language journals http://www.medworm.com/rss/comments.php?id=5198838 Wed, 31 Aug 2011 23:00:00 +0100 5198838 http://www.medworm.com/index.php?rid=5198837&cid=s_27189_36_f&fid=27189&url=http%3A%2F%2Fdx.doi.org%2F10.1111%252Fj.1468-0017.2011.01424.x What do we see when we look at someone's expression of fear? I argue that one of the things that we see is fear itself. I support this view by developing a theory of affect perception. The theory involves two claims. One is that expressions are patterns of facial changes that carry information about affects. The other is that the visual system extracts and processes such information. In particular, I argue that the visual system functions to detect the affects of others when they are expressed in the face. I develop my theory by drawing on empirical data from psychology and brain science. Finally, I outline a theory of the semantics of affect perception. (Source: Mind and Language) Mind and Language journals http://www.medworm.com/rss/comments.php?id=5198837 Wed, 31 Aug 2011 23:00:00 +0100 5198837 http://www.medworm.com/index.php?rid=5198836&cid=s_27189_36_f&fid=27189&url=http%3A%2F%2Fdx.doi.org%2F10.1111%252Fj.1468-0017.2011.01423.x This article explores some consequences of trying to repair the formal definitions. (Source: Mind and Language) Mind and Language journals http://www.medworm.com/rss/comments.php?id=5198836 Wed, 31 Aug 2011 23:00:00 +0100 5198836 http://www.medworm.com/index.php?rid=5198835&cid=s_27189_36_f&fid=27189&url=http%3A%2F%2Fdx.doi.org%2F10.1111%252Fj.1468-0017.2011.01422.x Philosophers have lately seized upon Sperling's partial report technique and subsequent work on iconic memory in support of controversial claims about perceptual experience, in particular that phenomenology overflows cognitive access. Drawing on mounting evidence concerning postdictive perception, I offer an interpretation of Sperling's data in terms of cue‐sensitive experience which fails to support any such claims. Arguments for overflow based on change‐detection paradigms (e.g. Landman et al., 2003; Sligte et al., 2008) cannot be blocked in this way. However, such paradigms are fundamentally different from Sperling's and, for rather different reasons, equally fail to establish controversial claims about perceptual experience. (Source: Mind and Language) Mind and Language journals http://www.medworm.com/rss/comments.php?id=5198835 Wed, 31 Aug 2011 23:00:00 +0100 5198835 http://www.medworm.com/index.php?rid=4888136&cid=s_27189_36_f&fid=27189&url=http%3A%2F%2Fdx.doi.org%2F10.1111%252Fj.1468-0017.2011.01421.x Recently, a number of philosophers have advanced a surprising conclusion: people's judgments about whether an agent brought about an outcome intentionally are pervasively influenced by normative considerations. In this paper, we investigate the ‘Chairman case’, an influential case from this literature and disagree with this conclusion. Using a statistical method called structural path modeling, we show that people's attributions of intentional action to an agent are driven not by normative assessments, but rather by attributions of underlying values and characterological dispositions to the agent. In a second study, we examined people's judgments about what they think drives asymmetric intuitions in the Chairman case and found that people are highly inaccurate in identifying which feat... Mind and Language journals http://www.medworm.com/rss/comments.php?id=4888136 Tue, 31 May 2011 23:00:00 +0100 4888136 http://www.medworm.com/index.php?rid=4888135&cid=s_27189_36_f&fid=27189&url=http%3A%2F%2Fdx.doi.org%2F10.1111%252Fj.1468-0017.2011.01420.x This paper proposes the ‘AGENCY model’ of conscious state attribution, according to which an entity's displaying certain relatively simple features (e.g. eyes, distinctive motions, interactive behavior) automatically triggers a disposition to attribute conscious states to that entity. To test the model's predictions, participants completed a speeded object/attribution task, in which they responded positively or negatively to attributions of mental properties (including conscious and non‐conscious states) to different sorts of entities (insects, plants, artifacts, etc.). As predicted, participants responded positively to conscious state attributions only for those entities that typically display the simple features identified in the AGENCY model (eyes, distinctive motion, interaction)... Mind and Language journals http://www.medworm.com/rss/comments.php?id=4888135 Tue, 31 May 2011 23:00:00 +0100 4888135 http://www.medworm.com/index.php?rid=4888134&cid=s_27189_36_f&fid=27189&url=http%3A%2F%2Fdx.doi.org%2F10.1111%252Fj.1468-0017.2011.01419.x We present yet more experimental evidence that supports gap theories, and argue for a semantic/pragmatic alternative that unifies the gappy supervaluationary approach together with its glutty relative, the subvaluationary approach. (Source: Mind and Language) Mind and Language journals http://www.medworm.com/rss/comments.php?id=4888134 Tue, 31 May 2011 23:00:00 +0100 4888134 http://www.medworm.com/index.php?rid=4888133&cid=s_27189_36_f&fid=27189&url=http%3A%2F%2Fdx.doi.org%2F10.1111%252Fj.1468-0017.2011.01418.x There is surprising evidence that introspection of our phenomenal states varies greatly between individuals and within the same individual over time. This puts pressure on the notion that introspection gives reliable access to our own phenomenology: introspective unreliability would explain the variability, while assuming that the underlying phenomenology is stable. I appeal to a body of neurocomputational, Bayesian theory and neuroimaging findings to provide an alternative explanation of the evidence: though some limited testing conditions can cause introspection to be unreliable, mostly it is our phenomenology itself that is variable. With this account of phenomenal variability, the occurrence of the surprising evidence can be explained while generally retaining introspective reliability... Mind and Language journals http://www.medworm.com/rss/comments.php?id=4888133 Tue, 31 May 2011 23:00:00 +0100 4888133 http://www.medworm.com/index.php?rid=4585669&cid=s_27189_36_f&fid=27189&url=http%3A%2F%2Fdx.doi.org%2F10.1111%252Fj.1468-0017.2011.01417.x Do lexical items have internal structure that contributes to, or determines, the stable interpretation of their potential hosts? One argument in favour of the claim that lexical items are so structured is that certain putative verbs appear to be ‘impossible’, where the intended interpretation of them is apparently precluded by the character of their internal structure. The adequacy of such reasoning has recently been debated by Fodor and Lepore and Johnson, but to no apparent resolution. The present paper argues that such ‘impossible word arguments' for internal lexical structure, although not apodictic, do constitute inferences to the best explanation for such structure. Alternative explanations for the ‘impossible words' are considered and rejected. (Source: Mind and Language) Mind and Language journals http://www.medworm.com/rss/comments.php?id=4585669 Tue, 15 Mar 2011 18:07:32 +0100 4585669 http://www.medworm.com/index.php?rid=4585668&cid=s_27189_36_f&fid=27189&url=http%3A%2F%2Fdx.doi.org%2F10.1111%252Fj.1468-0017.2011.01416.x Means‐based harms are frequently seen as forbidden, even when they lead to a greater good. But, are there mitigating factors? Results from five experiments show that judgments about means‐based harms are modulated by: 1) Pareto considerations (was the harmed person made worse off?), 2) the directness of physical contact, and 3) the source of the threat (e.g. mechanical, human, or natural). Pareto harms are more permissible than non‐Pareto harms, Pareto harms requiring direct physical contact are less permissible than those that do not, and harming someone who faces a mechanical threat is less permissible than harming someone who faces a non‐mechanical threat. These results provide insight into the rich representational structure underlying folk‐moral computations, including both ... Mind and Language journals http://www.medworm.com/rss/comments.php?id=4585668 Tue, 15 Mar 2011 18:07:32 +0100 4585668 http://www.medworm.com/index.php?rid=4585667&cid=s_27189_36_f&fid=27189&url=http%3A%2F%2Fdx.doi.org%2F10.1111%252Fj.1468-0017.2011.01415.x In his book Language in Context, Jason Stanley provides a novel solution to certain interpretational puzzles (Stanley, 2007). The aphonic approach, as we call it, hangs upon a substantial syntactic thesis. Here, we provide theoretical and empirical arguments against this particular syntactic thesis. Moreover, we demonstrate that the interpretational puzzles under question admit of a better solution under the explicit approach. (Source: Mind and Language) Mind and Language journals http://www.medworm.com/rss/comments.php?id=4585667 Tue, 15 Mar 2011 18:07:31 +0100 4585667 http://www.medworm.com/index.php?rid=4585666&cid=s_27189_36_f&fid=27189&url=http%3A%2F%2Fdx.doi.org%2F10.1111%252Fj.1468-0017.2011.01414.x I propose a new argument showing that conscious vision sometimes depends constitutively on conscious attention. I criticise traditional arguments for this constitutive connection, on the basis that they fail adequately to dissociate evidence about visual consciousness from evidence about attention. On the same basis, I criticise Ned Block's recent counterargument that conscious vision is independent of one sort of attention (‘cognitive access'). Block appears to achieve the dissociation only because he underestimates the indeterminacy of visual consciousness. I then appeal to empirical work on the interaction between visual indeterminacy and attention, to argue for the constitutive connection. (Source: Mind and Language) Mind and Language journals http://www.medworm.com/rss/comments.php?id=4585666 Tue, 15 Mar 2011 18:07:31 +0100 4585666 http://www.medworm.com/index.php?rid=4585665&cid=s_27189_36_f&fid=27189&url=http%3A%2F%2Fdx.doi.org%2F10.1111%252Fj.1468-0017.2011.01413.x Most instantiations of the inference ‘y; so if x, y’ seem intuitively odd, a phenomenon known as one of the paradoxes of the material conditional. A common explanation of the oddity, endorsed by Mental Model theory, is based on the intuition that the conclusion of the inference throws away semantic information. We build on this explanation to identify two joint conditions under which the inference becomes acceptable: (a) the truth of x has bearings on the relevance of asserting y; and (b) the speaker can reasonably be expected not to be in a position to assume that x is false. We show that this dual pragmatic criterion makes accurate predictions, and contrast it with the criterion defined by the mental model theory of conditionals, which we show to be inadequate. (Source: Mind and Lang... Mind and Language journals http://www.medworm.com/rss/comments.php?id=4585665 Tue, 15 Mar 2011 18:07:30 +0100 4585665 http://www.medworm.com/index.php?rid=4346873&cid=s_27189_36_f&fid=27189&url=http%3A%2F%2Fdx.doi.org%2F10.1111%252Fj.1468-0017.2010.01412.x Experimental philosophers have gathered impressive evidence for the surprising conclusion that philosophers' intuitions are out of step with those of the folk. As a result, many argue that philosophers' intuitions are unreliable. Focusing on the Knobe Effect, a leading finding of experimental philosophy, we defend traditional philosophy against this conclusion. Our key premise relies on experiments we conducted which indicate that judgments of the folk elicited under higher quality cognitive or epistemic conditions are more likely to resemble those of the philosopher. We end by showing how our experimental findings can help us better understand the Knobe Effect. (Source: Mind and Language) Mind and Language journals http://www.medworm.com/rss/comments.php?id=4346873 Fri, 14 Jan 2011 20:12:53 +0100 4346873 http://www.medworm.com/index.php?rid=4346872&cid=s_27189_36_f&fid=27189&url=http%3A%2F%2Fdx.doi.org%2F10.1111%252Fj.1468-0017.2010.01411.x We propose a view of embodied representations that is alternative to both symbolic/linguistic approaches and purely sensorimotor views of cognition, and can account for procedural and declarative knowledge manipulation. In accordance with recent evidence in cognitive neuroscience and psychology, we argue that anticipatory and simulative mechanisms, which arose during evolution for action control and not for cognition, determined the first form of representational content and were exapted for increasingly sophisticated cognitive uses. In particular, procedural and declarative forms of knowledge can be explained, respectively, in terms of on‐line sensorimotor anticipation and off‐line simulations of potential actions, which can give access to tacit knowledge and make it explicit. That is... Mind and Language journals http://www.medworm.com/rss/comments.php?id=4346872 Fri, 14 Jan 2011 20:12:53 +0100 4346872 http://www.medworm.com/index.php?rid=4346871&cid=s_27189_36_f&fid=27189&url=http%3A%2F%2Fdx.doi.org%2F10.1111%252Fj.1468-0017.2010.01410.x We offer an empirical assessment of description theories of proper names. We examine empirical evidence on lexical and cognitive development, memory, and aphasia, to see whether it supports Descriptivism. We show that description theories demand much more, in terms of psychological assumptions, than what the data suggest; hence, they lack empirical support. We argue that this problem undermines their success as philosophical theories for proper names in natural languages. We conclude by presenting and defending a preliminary alternative account of reference from a developmental perspective. (Source: Mind and Language) Mind and Language journals http://www.medworm.com/rss/comments.php?id=4346871 Fri, 14 Jan 2011 20:12:52 +0100 4346871 http://www.medworm.com/index.php?rid=4346870&cid=s_27189_36_f&fid=27189&url=http%3A%2F%2Fdx.doi.org%2F10.1111%252Fj.1468-0017.2010.01409.x We describe six experiments that compare judgements for causal paths that involve a mechanism, i.e. a continuous process of transmission or exchange from cause to effect, against paths that involve no mechanism yet a change in the cause nevertheless brings about a change in the effect. Our results show that people prefer to attribute cause when a mechanism links cause to effect. In contrast, prevention is sensitive both to the presence of an interruption to a causal mechanism and to a change in the outcome in the absence of a mechanism. In this sense, ‘prevent’ means something different than ‘cause not'. We discuss the implications of our results for existing theories of causation. (Source: Mind and Language) Mind and Language journals http://www.medworm.com/rss/comments.php?id=4346870 Fri, 14 Jan 2011 20:12:52 +0100 4346870 http://www.medworm.com/index.php?rid=4346869&cid=s_27189_36_f&fid=27189&url=http%3A%2F%2Fdx.doi.org%2F10.1111%252Fj.1468-0017.2010.01408.x Ape species‐specific communication is grounded on the present, possesses some referential qualities and is mostly used to request objects or actions from others. Artificial systems of communication borrowed from humans transform apes' communicative exchanges by freeing them from the present (i.e. displaced reference) although requests still predominate as the main reason for communicating with others. Symbol use appears to enhance apes' relational abilities and their inhibitory control. Despite these substantial changes, it is concluded that even though artificial communication enhances thought and enables its expression more openly, it does not create it or modify the motivation behind communicative exchanges. (Source: Mind and Language) Mind and Language journals http://www.medworm.com/rss/comments.php?id=4346869 Fri, 14 Jan 2011 20:12:51 +0100 4346869 http://www.medworm.com/index.php?rid=4080064&cid=s_27189_36_f&fid=27189&url=http%3A%2F%2Fdx.doi.org%2F10.1111%252Fj.1468-0017.2010.01406.x In this response to Malt's and Prinz's commentaries, I argue that neo‐empiricist hypotheses fail to threaten the argument for the elimination of ‘concept’ because they are unlikely to be true of all concepts, if they are true at all. I also defend the hypothesis that we possess bodies of knowledge retrieved by default from long‐term memory, and I argue that prototypes, exemplars, and theories form genuinely distinct concepts. (Source: Mind and Language) Mind and Language journals http://www.medworm.com/rss/comments.php?id=4080064 Tue, 19 Oct 2010 16:42:22 +0100 4080064 http://www.medworm.com/index.php?rid=4080063&cid=s_27189_36_f&fid=27189&url=http%3A%2F%2Fdx.doi.org%2F10.1111%252Fj.1468-0017.2010.01405.x Machery (2009) has proposed that the notion of ‘concept’ ought to be eliminated from the theoretical vocabulary of psychology. I raise three questions about his argument: (1) Is there a meaningful distinction between concepts and background knowledge? (2) Do we need to discard the hybrid view? (3) Are there really categories of things in the world that are the basis for concepts? Although I argue that the answer to all three is ‘no’, I agree with Machery's conclusion that seeking a single characterization of concepts will not be fruitful for understanding cognitive representations and processes. (Source: Mind and Language) Mind and Language journals http://www.medworm.com/rss/comments.php?id=4080063 Tue, 19 Oct 2010 16:42:22 +0100 4080063 http://www.medworm.com/index.php?rid=4080062&cid=s_27189_36_f&fid=27189&url=http%3A%2F%2Fdx.doi.org%2F10.1111%252Fj.1468-0017.2010.01404.x In this commentary, I focus on Machery's criticism of Neo‐Empiricism. I argue that Neo‐Empiricism can survive Machery's critique, and I show that there is an empiricist strategy for forestalling eliminativism. (Source: Mind and Language) Mind and Language journals http://www.medworm.com/rss/comments.php?id=4080062 Tue, 19 Oct 2010 16:42:21 +0100 4080062 http://www.medworm.com/index.php?rid=4080061&cid=s_27189_36_f&fid=27189&url=http%3A%2F%2Fdx.doi.org%2F10.1111%252Fj.1468-0017.2010.01403.x In this précis, I review the main points and arguments developed at greater length in Doing without Concepts (Source: Mind and Language) Mind and Language journals http://www.medworm.com/rss/comments.php?id=4080061 Tue, 19 Oct 2010 16:42:21 +0100 4080061 http://www.medworm.com/index.php?rid=4080060&cid=s_27189_36_f&fid=27189&url=http%3A%2F%2Fdx.doi.org%2F10.1111%252Fj.1468-0017.2010.01402.x No semantic theory is complete without an account of context sensitivity. But there is little agreement over its scope and limits even though everyone invokes intuition about an expression's behavior in context to determine its context sensitivity. Minimalists like Cappelen and Lepore identify a range of tests which isolate clear cases of context sensitive expressions, such as ‘I’, ‘here’, and ‘now’, to the exclusion of all others. Contextualists try to discredit the tests and supplant them with ones friendlier to their positions. In this paper we will explore and evaluate Cappelen and Hawthorne's recent attempts to discredit Cappelen and Lepore's tests and replace them with others. We will argue they have failed to provide sufficient reason to abandon minimalism. If we are rig... Mind and Language journals http://www.medworm.com/rss/comments.php?id=4080060 Tue, 19 Oct 2010 16:42:20 +0100 4080060 http://www.medworm.com/index.php?rid=4080059&cid=s_27189_36_f&fid=27189&url=http%3A%2F%2Fdx.doi.org%2F10.1111%252Fj.1468-0017.2010.01401.x Neuroscience and psychology have recently turned their attention to the study of the subpersonal underpinnings of moral judgment. In this article we critically examine an influential strand of research originating in Greene's neuroimaging studies of ‘utilitarian’ and ‘non‐utilitarian’ moral judgement. We argue that given that the explananda of this research are specific personal‐level states—moral judgments with certain propositional contents—its methodology has to be sensitive to criteria for ascribing states with such contents to subjects. We argue that current research has often failed to meet this constraint by failing to correctly ‘fix’ key aspects of moral judgment, criticism we support by detailed examples from the scientific literature. (Source: Mind and Languag... Mind and Language journals http://www.medworm.com/rss/comments.php?id=4080059 Tue, 19 Oct 2010 16:42:20 +0100 4080059 http://www.medworm.com/index.php?rid=4080058&cid=s_27189_36_f&fid=27189&url=http%3A%2F%2Fdx.doi.org%2F10.1111%252Fj.1468-0017.2010.01400.x The Argument from Disagreement (AD) (Mackie, 1977 (Source: Mind and Language) Mind and Language journals http://www.medworm.com/rss/comments.php?id=4080058 Tue, 19 Oct 2010 16:42:19 +0100 4080058 http://www.medworm.com/index.php?rid=4080057&cid=s_27189_36_f&fid=27189&url=http%3A%2F%2Fdx.doi.org%2F10.1111%252Fj.1468-0017.2010.01399.x The paper makes three points about the role of double dissociation in cognitive neuropsychology. First, arguments from double dissociation to separate modules work by inference to the best, not the only possible, explanation. Second, in the development of computational cognitive neuropsychology, the contribution of connectionist cognitive science has been to broaden the range of potential explanations of double dissociation. As a result, the competition between explanations, and the characteristic features of the assessment of theories against the criteria of probability and explanatory value, are more visible. Third, cognitive neuropsychology is a division of cognitive psychology but the practice of cognitive neuropsychology proceeds on assumptions that go beyond the subject matter of cog... Mind and Language journals http://www.medworm.com/rss/comments.php?id=4080057 Tue, 19 Oct 2010 16:42:19 +0100 4080057 http://www.medworm.com/index.php?rid=4080056&cid=s_27189_36_f&fid=27189&url=http%3A%2F%2Fdx.doi.org%2F10.1111%252Fj.1468-0017.2010.01407.x (Source: Mind and Language) Mind and Language journals http://www.medworm.com/rss/comments.php?id=4080056 Tue, 19 Oct 2010 16:42:18 +0100 4080056 http://www.medworm.com/index.php?rid=3887479&cid=s_27189_36_f&fid=27189&url=http%3A%2F%2Fdx.doi.org%2F10.1111%252Fj.1468-0017.2010.01398.x Knobe (2003a, 2003b, 2004b) and others have demonstrated the surprising fact that the valence of a side‐effect action can affect intuitions about whether that action was performed intentionally. Here we report the results of an experiment that extends these findings by testing for an analogous effect regarding knowledge attributions. Our results suggest that subjects are less likely to find that an agent knows an action will bring about a side‐effect when the effect is good than when it is bad. It is further argued that these findings, while preliminary, have important implications for recent debates within epistemology about the relationship between knowledge and action. (Source: Mind and Language) Mind and Language journals http://www.medworm.com/rss/comments.php?id=3887479 Sat, 21 Aug 2010 07:36:47 +0100 3887479 http://www.medworm.com/index.php?rid=3887478&cid=s_27189_36_f&fid=27189&url=http%3A%2F%2Fdx.doi.org%2F10.1111%252Fj.1468-0017.2010.01397.x In this paper I will give an analysis of what I call ‘generalizing detached self‐reference’ within a general account of reference to the first person. With generalizing detached self‐reference an agent attributes properties to a range of individuals by putting himself into their shoes, or simulating them. I will show that generalizing detached self‐reference plays an important role in the semantics of natural language, in particular in the English generic one (Source: Mind and Language) Mind and Language journals http://www.medworm.com/rss/comments.php?id=3887478 Sat, 21 Aug 2010 07:36:47 +0100 3887478 http://www.medworm.com/index.php?rid=3887477&cid=s_27189_36_f&fid=27189&url=http%3A%2F%2Fdx.doi.org%2F10.1111%252Fj.1468-0017.2010.01396.x In his recent book The Measure of Mind (Source: Mind and Language) Mind and Language journals http://www.medworm.com/rss/comments.php?id=3887477 Sat, 21 Aug 2010 07:36:46 +0100 3887477 http://www.medworm.com/index.php?rid=3887476&cid=s_27189_36_f&fid=27189&url=http%3A%2F%2Fdx.doi.org%2F10.1111%252Fj.1468-0017.2010.01395.x It is clear that visual imagery is somehow significantly visual. Some theorists, like Kosslyn, claim that the visual nature of visualisations derives from features of the neural processes which underlie those episodes. Pylyshyn claims, however, that it may merely reflect special features of the contents which we grasp when we visualise things. This paper discusses and rejects Pylyshyn's own attempts to identify the respects in which the contents of visualisations are notably visual. It then offers a novel and very different account of what is distinctively sensory about the contents of sensory images. The paper's alternative account is used in explaining various pieces of phenomenological and behavioural data concerning visualisation. Finally, it is tentatively suggested that the proposed ... Mind and Language journals http://www.medworm.com/rss/comments.php?id=3887476 Sat, 21 Aug 2010 07:36:46 +0100 3887476 http://www.medworm.com/index.php?rid=3887475&cid=s_27189_36_f&fid=27189&url=http%3A%2F%2Fdx.doi.org%2F10.1111%252Fj.1468-0017.2010.01394.x Humans massively depend on communication with others, but this leaves them open to the risk of being accidentally or intentionally misinformed. To ensure that, despite this risk, communication remains advantageous, humans have, we claim, a suite of cognitive mechanisms for epistemic vigilance. Here we outline this claim and consider some of the ways in which epistemic vigilance works in mental and social life by surveying issues, research and theories in different domains of philosophy, linguistics, cognitive psychology and the social sciences. (Source: Mind and Language) Mind and Language journals http://www.medworm.com/rss/comments.php?id=3887475 Sat, 21 Aug 2010 07:36:45 +0100 3887475 http://www.medworm.com/index.php?rid=3838855&cid=s_27189_36_f&fid=27189&url=http%3A%2F%2Fdx.doi.org%2F10.1111%252Fj.1468-0017.2010.01391.x Jill de Villiers has argued that children's mastery of sentential complements plays a crucial role in enabling them to succeed at false‐belief tasks. Josef Perner has disputed that and has argued that mastery of false‐belief tasks requires an understanding of the multiplicity of perspectives. This paper attempts to resolve the debate by explicating attributions of desires and beliefs as extensions of the linguistic practices of making commands and assertions, respectively. In terms of these linguistic practices one can explain why desire‐talk will precede belief‐talk and why even older children will have difficulty attributing incompatible desires. (Source: Mind and Language) Mind and Language journals http://www.medworm.com/rss/comments.php?id=3838855 Mon, 31 May 2010 23:00:00 +0100 3838855 http://www.medworm.com/index.php?rid=3597876&cid=s_27189_36_f&fid=27189&url=http%3A%2F%2Fdx.doi.org%2F10.1111%252Fj.1468-0017.2010.01389.x I argue that linguistic meanings are instructions to build monadic concepts that lie between lexicalizable concepts and truth-evaluable judgments. In acquiring words, humans use concepts of various adicities to introduce concepts that can be fetched and systematically combined via certain conjunctive operations, which require monadic inputs. These concepts do not have Tarskian satisfaction conditions. But they provide bases for refinements and elaborations that can yield truth-evaluable judgments. Constructing mental sentences that are true or false requires cognitive work, not just an exercise of basic linguistic capacities. (Source: Mind and Language) Mind and Language journals http://www.medworm.com/rss/comments.php?id=3597876 Wed, 26 May 2010 14:07:51 +0100 3597876 http://www.medworm.com/index.php?rid=3597880&cid=s_27189_36_f&fid=27189&url=http%3A%2F%2Fdx.doi.org%2F10.1111%252Fj.1468-0017.2010.01393.x Recent experimental research has revealed surprising patterns in people's intuitions about free will and moral responsibility. One limitation of this research, however, is that it has been conducted exclusively on people from Western cultures. The present paper extends previous research by presenting a cross-cultural study examining intuitions about free will and moral responsibility in subjects from the United States, Hong Kong, India and Colombia. The results revealed a striking degree of cross-cultural convergence. In all four cultural groups, the majority of participants said that (a) our universe is indeterministic and (b) moral responsibility is not compatible with determinism. (Source: Mind and Language) Mind and Language journals http://www.medworm.com/rss/comments.php?id=3597880 Mon, 24 May 2010 23:00:00 +0100 3597880 http://www.medworm.com/index.php?rid=3597879&cid=s_27189_36_f&fid=27189&url=http%3A%2F%2Fdx.doi.org%2F10.1111%252Fj.1468-0017.2010.01392.x This essay defends an analysis of malapropisms consistent with the Simple Picture of communication, namely the view that speakers communicate that P by employing expressions associated with P by the regularities appropriate for the linguistic community to which they belong. My analysis, grounded on the distinction between traces, shapes, and forms, is consistent with an intuitive assessment of the contents conveyed by instances of malapropisms, and with a standard, 'fully articulated' approach to semantic interpretation. (Source: Mind and Language) Mind and Language journals http://www.medworm.com/rss/comments.php?id=3597879 Mon, 24 May 2010 23:00:00 +0100 3597879 http://www.medworm.com/index.php?rid=3597878&cid=s_27189_36_f&fid=27189&url=http%3A%2F%2Fdx.doi.org%2F10.1111%252Fj.1468-0017.2010.01391.x Jill de Villiers has argued that children's mastery of sentential complements plays a crucial role in enabling them to succeed at false-belief tasks. Josef Perner has disputed that and has argued that mastery of false-belief tasks requires an understanding of the multiplicity of perspectives. This paper attempts to resolve the debate by explicating attributions of desires and beliefs as extensions of the linguistic practices of making commands and assertions, respectively. In terms of these linguistic practices one can explain why desire-talk will precede belief-talk and why even older children will have difficulty attributing incompatible desires. (Source: Mind and Language) Mind and Language journals http://www.medworm.com/rss/comments.php?id=3597878 Mon, 24 May 2010 23:00:00 +0100 3597878 http://www.medworm.com/index.php?rid=3597877&cid=s_27189_36_f&fid=27189&url=http%3A%2F%2Fdx.doi.org%2F10.1111%252Fj.1468-0017.2010.01390.x In the last few years, nativist, modular views of moral cognition have been influential. This paper shares the view that normative cognition develops robustly, and is probably an adaptation. But it develops an alternative view of the developmental basis of moral cognition, based on the idea that adults scaffold moral development by organising the learning environment of the next generation. In addition, I argue that the modular nativist picture has no plausible account of the role of explicit moral judgement, and that no persuasive version of the 'poverty of the stimulus' applies to moral cognition. (Source: Mind and Language) Mind and Language journals http://www.medworm.com/rss/comments.php?id=3597877 Mon, 24 May 2010 23:00:00 +0100 3597877 http://www.medworm.com/index.php?rid=3368639&cid=s_27189_36_f&fid=27189&url=http%3A%2F%2Fdx.doi.org%2F10.1111%252Fj.1468-0017.2009.01384.x I make three related proposals concerning the development of receptive communication in human infants. First, I propose that the presence of communicative intentions can be recognized in others' behaviour before the content of these intentions is accessed or inferred. Second, I claim that such recognition can be achieved by decoding specialized ostensive signals. Third, I argue on empirical bases that, by decoding ostensive signals, human infants are capable of recognizing communicative intentions addressed to them. Thus, learning about actual modes of communication benefits from, and is guided by, infants' preparedness to detect infant-directed ostensive communication. (Source: Mind and Language) Mind and Language journals http://www.medworm.com/rss/comments.php?id=3368639 Tue, 16 Mar 2010 16:42:22 +0100 3368639 http://www.medworm.com/index.php?rid=3368643&cid=s_27189_36_f&fid=27189&url=http%3A%2F%2Fdx.doi.org%2F10.1111%252Fj.1468-0017.2009.01388.x (Source: Mind and Language) Mind and Language journals http://www.medworm.com/rss/comments.php?id=3368643 Mon, 15 Mar 2010 00:00:00 +0100 3368643 http://www.medworm.com/index.php?rid=3368642&cid=s_27189_36_f&fid=27189&url=http%3A%2F%2Fdx.doi.org%2F10.1111%252Fj.1468-0017.2009.01387.x In this paper I show how the way experience presents things to us can be treated without attributing a representational content to experience. The basic claim that experience can present us with more things than the range of things available to us in thought is neutral with respect to the choice between a content account of experience and a naïve content-free account. I show how Meyer's theory of expectations in accounting for our experience of music supports the naïve account. Expectations provide an account of the conditions that enable things to be salient in experience as targets for attention. Expectations do not provide a content to experience. (Source: Mind and Language) Mind and Language journals http://www.medworm.com/rss/comments.php?id=3368642 Mon, 15 Mar 2010 00:00:00 +0100 3368642 http://www.medworm.com/index.php?rid=3368641&cid=s_27189_36_f&fid=27189&url=http%3A%2F%2Fdx.doi.org%2F10.1111%252Fj.1468-0017.2009.01386.x The pattern of impairments exhibited by some individuals on the autism spectrum appears to challenge the relevance-theoretic account of metaphor (Carston, 1996, 2002; Sperber and Wilson, 2002; Sperber and Wilson, 2008). A subset of people on the autism spectrum have near-normal syntactic, phonological, and semantic abilities while having severe difficulties with the interpretation of metaphor, irony, conversational implicature, and other pragmatic phenomena. However, Relevance Theory treats metaphor as importantly unlike phenomena such as conversational implicature or irony and like instances of ordinary literal speech. In this paper, I show how Relevance Theory can account for the prima facie incongruity between its treatment of metaphor and the case of individuals with autism. (Source: M... Mind and Language journals http://www.medworm.com/rss/comments.php?id=3368641 Mon, 15 Mar 2010 00:00:00 +0100 3368641 http://www.medworm.com/index.php?rid=3368640&cid=s_27189_36_f&fid=27189&url=http%3A%2F%2Fdx.doi.org%2F10.1111%252Fj.1468-0017.2009.01385.x In this paper I propose a model of demonstrative thought. I distinguish token-demonstratives, that pick out individuals, from type-demonstratives, that pick out kinds, or properties, and provide a similar treatment for both. I argue that it follows from my model of demonstrative thought, as well as from independent considerations, that demonstration, as a mental act, operates directly on mental representations, not external objects. That is, though the relation between a demonstrative and the object or property demonstrated is semantically direct, the mechanism by which a demonstrative acquires its referent involves mediation by a perceptual representation. Finally, I argue that so-called 'demonstrative concepts'[mdash]which I treat as type-demonstratives[mdash]cannot perform the various p... Mind and Language journals http://www.medworm.com/rss/comments.php?id=3368640 Mon, 15 Mar 2010 00:00:00 +0100 3368640 http://www.medworm.com/index.php?rid=3184234&cid=s_27189_36_f&fid=27189&url=http%3A%2F%2Fdx.doi.org%2F10.1111%252Fj.1468-0017.2009.01383.x Recently, philosophers and psychologists defending the embodied cognition research program have offered arguments against mindreading as a general model of our social understanding. The embodied cognition arguments are of two kinds: those that challenge the developmental picture of mindreading and those that challenge the alleged ubiquity of mindreading. Together, these two kinds of arguments, if successful, would present a serious challenge to the standard account of human social understanding. In this paper, I examine the strongest of these embodied cognition arguments and argue that mindreading approaches can withstand the best of these arguments from embodied cognition. (Source: Mind and Language) Mind and Language journals http://www.medworm.com/rss/comments.php?id=3184234 Mon, 18 Jan 2010 00:00:00 +0100 3184234 http://www.medworm.com/index.php?rid=3184233&cid=s_27189_36_f&fid=27189&url=http%3A%2F%2Fdx.doi.org%2F10.1111%252Fj.1468-0017.2009.01382.x This paper defends a reference-based approach to concept individuation against the objection that such an approach is unable to make sense of concepts that fail to refer. The main line of thought pursued involves clarifying how the referentialist should construe the relationship between a concept's (referential) content and its role in mental processes. While the central goal of the paper is to defend a view aptly titled Concept Referentialism, broader morals are drawn regarding reference-based approaches in general. The paper closes by calling for a shift in the current debate between referentialists and their opponents. (Source: Mind and Language) Mind and Language journals http://www.medworm.com/rss/comments.php?id=3184233 Mon, 18 Jan 2010 00:00:00 +0100 3184233 http://www.medworm.com/index.php?rid=3184232&cid=s_27189_36_f&fid=27189&url=http%3A%2F%2Fdx.doi.org%2F10.1111%252Fj.1468-0017.2009.01381.x I offer an account of thought insertion based on a certain model of self-knowledge. I propose that subjects with thought insertion do not experience being committed to some of their own beliefs. A hypothesis about self-knowledge explains why. According to it, we form beliefs about our own beliefs on the basis of our evidence for them. First, I will argue that this hypothesis explains the fact that we feel committed to those beliefs which we are aware of. Then, I will point to one feature of schizophrenia that suggests that subjects with thought insertion may not be able to know their own beliefs in that way. (Source: Mind and Language) Mind and Language journals http://www.medworm.com/rss/comments.php?id=3184232 Mon, 18 Jan 2010 00:00:00 +0100 3184232 http://www.medworm.com/index.php?rid=3184231&cid=s_27189_36_f&fid=27189&url=http%3A%2F%2Fdx.doi.org%2F10.1111%252Fj.1468-0017.2009.01380.x We present a series of arguments for logical nativism, focusing mainly on the meaning of disjunction in human languages. We propose that all human languages are logical in the sense that the meaning of linguistic expressions corresponding to disjunction (e.g. English or, Chinese huozhe, Japanese ka) conform to the meaning of the logical operator in classical logic, inclusive- or. It is highly implausible, we argue, that children acquire the (logical) meaning of disjunction by observing how adults use disjunction. Findings from studies of child language acquisition and from cross-linguistic research invite the conclusion that children do not learn to be logical[mdash]it comes naturally to them. (Source: Mind and Language) Mind and Language journals http://www.medworm.com/rss/comments.php?id=3184231 Mon, 18 Jan 2010 00:00:00 +0100 3184231 http://www.medworm.com/index.php?rid=3184230&cid=s_27189_36_f&fid=27189&url=http%3A%2F%2Fdx.doi.org%2F10.1111%252Fj.1468-0017.2009.01379.x What is the role of language in social interaction? What does language bring to social encounters? We argue that language can be conceived of as a tool for interacting minds, enabling especially effective and flexible forms of social coordination, perspective-taking and joint action. In a review of evidence from a broad range of disciplines, we pursue elaborations of the language-as-a-tool metaphor, exploring four ways in which language is employed in facilitation of social interaction. We argue that language dramatically extends the possibility-space for interaction, facilitates the profiling and navigation of joint attentional scenes, enables the sharing of situation models and action plans, and mediates the cultural shaping of interacting minds. (Source: Mind and Language) Mind and Language journals http://www.medworm.com/rss/comments.php?id=3184230 Mon, 18 Jan 2010 00:00:00 +0100 3184230 http://www.medworm.com/index.php?rid=3184229&cid=s_27189_36_f&fid=27189&url=http%3A%2F%2Fdx.doi.org%2F10.1111%252Fj.1468-0017.2009.01378.x (Source: Mind and Language) Mind and Language journals http://www.medworm.com/rss/comments.php?id=3184229 Sun, 01 Nov 2009 00:00:00 +0100 3184229 http://www.medworm.com/index.php?rid=2929586&cid=s_27189_36_f&fid=27189&url=http%3A%2F%2Fdx.doi.org%2F10.1111%252Fj.1468-0017.2009.01372.x It is a common assumption among both philosophers and psychologists that having accurate beliefs about ourselves and the world around us is always the epistemic gold standard. However, there is gathering data from social psychology that suggest that illusions are quite prevalent in our everyday thinking and that some of these illusions may even be conducive to our overall well being. In this paper, we explore the relevance of these so-called 'positive illusions' to the free will debate. More specifically, we use the literature on positive illusions as a springboard for examining Saul Smilansky's so-called 'free will illusionism'. At the end of the day, we will use data from both social and developmental psychology concerning perceived control to try to show that his view is on shaky empiri... Mind and Language journals http://www.medworm.com/rss/comments.php?id=2929586 Tue, 27 Oct 2009 15:11:35 +0100 2929586 http://www.medworm.com/index.php?rid=2929591&cid=s_27189_36_f&fid=27189&url=http%3A%2F%2Fdx.doi.org%2F10.1111%252Fj.1468-0017.2009.index_1.x (Source: Mind and Language) Mind and Language journals http://www.medworm.com/rss/comments.php?id=2929591 Mon, 26 Oct 2009 00:00:00 +0100 2929591 http://www.medworm.com/index.php?rid=2929590&cid=s_27189_36_f&fid=27189&url=http%3A%2F%2Fdx.doi.org%2F10.1111%252Fj.1468-0017.2009.01376.x The proposal that the concept of innateness expresses a 'folk biological' theory of the 'inner natures' of organisms was tested by examining the response of biologically naive participants to a series of realistic scenarios concerning the development of birdsong. Our results explain the intuitive appeal of existing philosophical analyses of the innateness concept. They simultaneously explain why these analyses are subject to compelling counterexamples. We argue that this explanation undermines the appeal of these analyses, whether understood as analyses of the vernacular concept or as explications of that concept for the purposes of science. (Source: Mind and Language) Mind and Language journals http://www.medworm.com/rss/comments.php?id=2929590 Mon, 26 Oct 2009 00:00:00 +0100 2929590 http://www.medworm.com/index.php?rid=2929589&cid=s_27189_36_f&fid=27189&url=http%3A%2F%2Fdx.doi.org%2F10.1111%252Fj.1468-0017.2009.01375.x A series of recent studies have shown that people's moral judgments can affect their intuitions as to whether or not a behavior was performed intentionally. Prior attempts to explain this effect can be divided into two broad families. Some researchers suggest that the effect is due to some peculiar feature of the concept of intentional action in particular, while others suggest that the effect is a reflection of a more general tendency whereby moral judgments exert a pervasive influence on folk psychology. The present paper argues in favor of the latter hypothesis by showing that the very same effect that has been observed for intentionally also arises for deciding, in favor of, opposed to, and advocating. (Source: Mind and Language) Mind and Language journals http://www.medworm.com/rss/comments.php?id=2929589 Mon, 26 Oct 2009 00:00:00 +0100 2929589 http://www.medworm.com/index.php?rid=2929588&cid=s_27189_36_f&fid=27189&url=http%3A%2F%2Fdx.doi.org%2F10.1111%252Fj.1468-0017.2009.01374.x The meaning of 'most' can be described in many ways. We offer a framework for distinguishing semantic descriptions, interpreted as psychological hypotheses that go beyond claims about sentential truth conditions, and an experiment that tells against an attractive idea: 'most' is understood in terms of one-to-one correspondence. Adults evaluated 'Most of the dots are yellow', as true or false, on many trials in which yellow dots and blue dots were displayed for 200 ms. Displays manipulated the ease of using a 'one-to-one with remainder' strategy, and a strategy of using the Approximate Number System to compare of (approximations of) cardinalities. Interpreting such data requires care in thinking about how meaning is related to verification. But the results suggest that 'most' is understood ... Mind and Language journals http://www.medworm.com/rss/comments.php?id=2929588 Mon, 26 Oct 2009 00:00:00 +0100 2929588 http://www.medworm.com/index.php?rid=2929587&cid=s_27189_36_f&fid=27189&url=http%3A%2F%2Fdx.doi.org%2F10.1111%252Fj.1468-0017.2009.01373.x The core of the language of thought program is the claim that thinking is the manipulation of symbols according to rules. Yet LOT has said little about symbol natures, and existing accounts are highly controversial. This is a major flaw at the heart of the LOT program: LOT requires an account of symbol natures to naturalize intentionality, to determine whether the brain even engages in symbol manipulations, and to understand how symbols relate to lower-level neurocomputational states. This paper provides the much-needed theory of symbols, and in doing so, alters the LOT program in significant respects. (Source: Mind and Language) Mind and Language journals http://www.medworm.com/rss/comments.php?id=2929587 Mon, 26 Oct 2009 00:00:00 +0100 2929587 http://www.medworm.com/index.php?rid=2732640&cid=s_27189_36_f&fid=27189&url=http%3A%2F%2Fdx.doi.org%2F10.1111%252Fj.1468-0017.2009.01366.x The difference between common and proper names seems to derive from specific semantic characteristics of proper names. In particular, proper names refer to specific individual entities or events, and unlike common names, rarely map onto more general semantic characteristics (attributes, concepts, categories). This fact makes the link proper names have with their reference particularly fragile. Processing proper names seems, as a consequence, to require special cognitive and neural resources. Neuropsychological findings show that proper names and common names follow functionally distinct processing pathways. These pathways are neurally distinct and differently sensitive to focal or generalized brain damage, cognitive changes with age or lack of organic resources. Their precise location, dep... Mind and Language journals http://www.medworm.com/rss/comments.php?id=2732640 Wed, 26 Aug 2009 12:45:40 +0100 2732640 http://www.medworm.com/index.php?rid=2732645&cid=s_27189_36_f&fid=27189&url=http%3A%2F%2Fdx.doi.org%2F10.1111%252Fj.1468-0017.2009.01371.x We discuss the challenge to truth-conditional semantics presented by apparent shifts in extension of predicates such as 'red'. We propose an explicit indexical semantics for 'red' and argue that our account is preferable to the alternatives on conceptual and empirical grounds. (Source: Mind and Language) Mind and Language journals http://www.medworm.com/rss/comments.php?id=2732645 Tue, 25 Aug 2009 23:00:00 +0100 2732645 http://www.medworm.com/index.php?rid=2732644&cid=s_27189_36_f&fid=27189&url=http%3A%2F%2Fdx.doi.org%2F10.1111%252Fj.1468-0017.2009.01370.x It is argued on a variety of grounds that recent results in 'experimental philosophy of language', which appear to show that there are significant cross-cultural differences in intuitions about the reference of proper names, do not pose a threat to a more traditional mode of philosophizing about reference. Some of these same grounds justify a complaint about experimental philosophy as a whole. (Source: Mind and Language) Mind and Language journals http://www.medworm.com/rss/comments.php?id=2732644 Tue, 25 Aug 2009 23:00:00 +0100 2732644 http://www.medworm.com/index.php?rid=2732643&cid=s_27189_36_f&fid=27189&url=http%3A%2F%2Fdx.doi.org%2F10.1111%252Fj.1468-0017.2009.01369.x A strictly Millian approach to proper names is defended, i.e. one in which expressions when used properly ('onymically') refer directly, i.e. without the semantic intermediaryship of the words that appear to comprise them. The approach may appear self-evident for names which appear to have no component parts (in current English) but less so for others. Two modes of reference are distinguished for potentially ambiguous expressions such as The Long Island. A consequence of this distinction is to allow a speculative neurolinguistics of proper ('onymic') and semantic ('non-onymic') reference. A further consequence is that translation of onymically referring expressions is impossible (since they have no semantic content), and some apparently self-evident objections to this view are met by insis... Mind and Language journals http://www.medworm.com/rss/comments.php?id=2732643 Tue, 25 Aug 2009 23:00:00 +0100 2732643 http://www.medworm.com/index.php?rid=2732642&cid=s_27189_36_f&fid=27189&url=http%3A%2F%2Fdx.doi.org%2F10.1111%252Fj.1468-0017.2009.01368.x There is evidence that children learn both proper names and count nouns from the outset of lexical development. Furthermore, children's first proper names are typically words for people, whereas their first count nouns are commonly terms for other objects, including artifacts. I argue that these facts represent a challenge for two well-known theoretical accounts of object word learning. I defend an alternative account, which credits young children with conceptual resources to acquire words for both individual objects and object categories, and conceptual biases to construe some objects (notably people) as individuals in their own right and most other objects as instances of their category. (Source: Mind and Language) Mind and Language journals http://www.medworm.com/rss/comments.php?id=2732642 Tue, 25 Aug 2009 23:00:00 +0100 2732642 http://www.medworm.com/index.php?rid=2732641&cid=s_27189_36_f&fid=27189&url=http%3A%2F%2Fdx.doi.org%2F10.1111%252Fj.1468-0017.2009.01367.x As a class of terms and mental representations, proper names and mental names possess an important function that outstrips their semantic and psycho-semantic functions as common, rigid devices of direct reference and singular mental representations of their referents, respectively. They also function as abstract linguistic markers that signal and underscore their referents' individuality. I promote this thesis to explain why we give proper names to certain particulars, but not others; to account for the transfer of singular thought via communication with proper names; and, more generally, to support a cognitivist, not acquaintance or instrumentalist, theory of singular thought. (Source: Mind and Language) Mind and Language journals http://www.medworm.com/rss/comments.php?id=2732641 Tue, 25 Aug 2009 23:00:00 +0100 2732641 http://www.medworm.com/index.php?rid=2466569&cid=s_27189_36_f&fid=27189&url=http%3A%2F%2Fdx.doi.org%2F10.1111%252Fj.1468-0017.2009.01365.x Various researchers have suggested that below 7 years of age children do not recognize that they are the authority on knowledge about themselves, a suggestion that seems counter-intuitive because it raises the possibility that children do not appreciate their privileged first-person access to their own minds. Unlike previous research, children in the current investigation quantified knowledge and even 5-year-olds tended to assign relatively more to themselves than to an adult (Studies 1 and 2). Indeed, children's estimations were different from ratings made by their mothers: Their mothers sometimes rated themselves as knowing more about their child than they rated their child as knowing (Study 2). While previous research seemed to suggest that children shift from viewing their mother to vi... Mind and Language journals http://www.medworm.com/rss/comments.php?id=2466569 Mon, 08 Jun 2009 04:00:00 +0100 2466569 http://www.medworm.com/index.php?rid=2466568&cid=s_27189_36_f&fid=27189&url=http%3A%2F%2Fdx.doi.org%2F10.1111%252Fj.1468-0017.2009.01364.x Today, many philosophers think that perceptual experiences are conscious mental states with representational content and phenomenal character. Subscribers to this view often go on to construe experience more precisely as a propositional attitude sui generis ascribing sensible properties to ordinary material objects. I argue that experience is better construed as a kind of belief ascribing 'phenomenal' properties to such objects. A belief theory of this kind deals as well with the traditional arguments against doxastic accounts as the sui generis view. Moreover, in contrast to sui generis views, it can quite easily account for the rational or reason providing role of experience. (Source: Mind and Language) Mind and Language journals http://www.medworm.com/rss/comments.php?id=2466568 Mon, 08 Jun 2009 04:00:00 +0100 2466568 http://www.medworm.com/index.php?rid=2466567&cid=s_27189_36_f&fid=27189&url=http%3A%2F%2Fdx.doi.org%2F10.1111%252Fj.1468-0017.2009.01363.x The manifest dissociation between our capacity to make moral judgments and our ability to provide justifications for them, a phenomenon labeled Moral Dumbfounding, has important implications for the theory and practice of moral psychology. I articulate and develop the Linguistic Analogy as a robust alternative to existing sentimentalist models of moral judgment inspired by this phenomenon. The Linguistic Analogy motivates a crucial distinction between moral acceptability and moral permissibility judgments, and thereby calls into question prevailing methods used in the study of moral judgment. Indeed, the judgments that are the focus of most current empirical work in moral psychology are not proper targets of scientific study. (Source: Mind and Language) Mind and Language journals http://www.medworm.com/rss/comments.php?id=2466567 Mon, 08 Jun 2009 04:00:00 +0100 2466567 http://www.medworm.com/index.php?rid=2466566&cid=s_27189_36_f&fid=27189&url=http%3A%2F%2Fdx.doi.org%2F10.1111%252Fj.1468-0017.2009.01362.x Why ever assert clarity? If It is clear that p is true, then saying so should be at best superfluous. Barker and Taranto (2003) and Taranto (2006) suggest that asserting clarity reveals information about the beliefs of the discourse participants, specifically, that they both believe that p. However, mutual belief is not sufficient to guarantee clarity (It is clear that God exists). I propose instead that It is clear that p means instead (roughly) 'the publicly available evidence justifies concluding that p'. Then what asserting clarity reveals is information concerning the prevailing epistemic standard that determines whether a body of evidence is sufficient to justify a claim. If so, the semantics of clarity constitutes a grammatical window into the discourse dynamics of inference and ske... Mind and Language journals http://www.medworm.com/rss/comments.php?id=2466566 Mon, 01 Jun 2009 04:00:00 +0100 2466566 http://www.medworm.com/index.php?rid=2316486&cid=s_27189_36_f&fid=27189&url=http%3A%2F%2Fdx.doi.org%2F10.1111%252Fj.1468-0017.2008.01357.x Abstract: One oft-cited feature of speech acts is their expressive character: Assertion expresses belief, apology regret, promise intention. Yet expression, or at least sincere expression, is as I argue a form of showing: A sincere expression shows whatever is the state that is the sincerity condition of the expressive act. How, then, can a speech act show a speaker's state of thought or feeling? To answer this question I consider three varieties of showing, and argue that only one of them is suited to help us answer our question. I also argue that concepts from the evolutionary biology of communication provide one source of insight into how speech acts enable one to show, and thereby express, a psychological state. (Source: Mind and Language) Mind and Language journals http://www.medworm.com/rss/comments.php?id=2316486 Wed, 01 Apr 2009 04:00:00 +0100 2316486 http://www.medworm.com/index.php?rid=2316490&cid=s_27189_36_f&fid=27189&url=http%3A%2F%2Fdx.doi.org%2F10.1111%252Fj.1468-0017.2008.01361.x Abstract: Pierre Jacob (2008) raises several problems for the alleged link between mirroring and mindreading. This response argues that the best mirroring-mindreading thesis would claim that mirror processes cause, rather than constitute, selected acts of mindreading. Second, the best current evidence for mirror-based mindreading is not found in the motoric domain but in the domains of emotion and sensation, where the evidence (ignored by Jacob) is substantial. Finally, simulation theory should distinguish low-level simulation (mirroring) and high-level simulation (involving pretense or imagination). Jacob implies that bi-level simulationism creates an unbridgeable 'gap' in intention reading, but this is not a compelling challenge. (Source: Mind and Language) Mind and Language journals http://www.medworm.com/rss/comments.php?id=2316490 Mon, 30 Mar 2009 04:00:00 +0100 2316490 http://www.medworm.com/index.php?rid=2316489&cid=s_27189_36_f&fid=27189&url=http%3A%2F%2Fdx.doi.org%2F10.1111%252Fj.1468-0017.2008.01360.x This article challenges their interpretation of the data. It does so by explicating some methodological problems in the Turiel tradition that Kelly et al. themselves in a way inherit and by drawing on new evidence coming from a partial replication of their research. (Source: Mind and Language) Mind and Language journals http://www.medworm.com/rss/comments.php?id=2316489 Mon, 30 Mar 2009 04:00:00 +0100 2316489 http://www.medworm.com/index.php?rid=2316488&cid=s_27189_36_f&fid=27189&url=http%3A%2F%2Fdx.doi.org%2F10.1111%252Fj.1468-0017.2008.01359.x Abstract: There has recently been controversy over the existence of 'multiple realization' in addition to some confusion between different conceptions of its nature. To resolve these problems, we focus on concrete examples from the sciences to provide precise accounts of the scientific concepts of 'realization' and 'multiple realization' that have played key roles in recent debates in the philosophy of science and philosophy of psychology. We illustrate the advantages of our view over a prominent rival account (Shapiro, 2000 and 2004) and use our work to rebut recent objections to the long-standing claim that psychological properties are multiply realized. For we use scientific evidence, in combination with our more precise theoretical framework, to show that we have strong reason to belie... Mind and Language journals http://www.medworm.com/rss/comments.php?id=2316488 Mon, 30 Mar 2009 04:00:00 +0100 2316488 http://www.medworm.com/index.php?rid=2316487&cid=s_27189_36_f&fid=27189&url=http%3A%2F%2Fdx.doi.org%2F10.1111%252Fj.1468-0017.2008.01358.x Abstract: Recently, the experimental philosopher Joshua Knobe has shown that the folk are more inclined to describe side effects as intentional actions when they bring about bad results. Edouard Machery has offered an intriguing new explanation of Knobe's work[mdash]the 'trade-off hypothesis'[mdash]which denies that moral considerations explain folk applications of the concept of intentional action. We critique Machery's hypothesis and offer empirical evidence against it. We also evaluate the current state of the debate concerning the concept of intentionality, and argue that, given the number of variables at play, any parsimonious account of the relevant data is implausible. (Source: Mind and Language) Mind and Language journals http://www.medworm.com/rss/comments.php?id=2316487 Mon, 30 Mar 2009 04:00:00 +0100 2316487 http://www.medworm.com/index.php?rid=2123888&cid=s_27189_36_f&fid=27189&url=http%3A%2F%2Fdx.doi.org%2F10.1111%252Fj.1468-0017.2008.01351.x Abstract: In the free will literature, some compatibilists and some incompatibilists claim that their views best capture ordinary intuitions concerning free will and moral responsibility. One goal of researchers working in the field of experimental philosophy has been to probe ordinary intuitions in a controlled and systematic way to help resolve these kinds of intuitional stalemates. We contribute to this debate by presenting new data about folk intuitions concerning freedom and responsibility that correct for some of the shortcomings of previous studies. These studies also illustrate some problems that pertain to all of the studies that have been run thus far. (Source: Mind and Language) Mind and Language journals http://www.medworm.com/rss/comments.php?id=2123888 Fri, 23 Jan 2009 03:48:55 +0100 2123888 http://www.medworm.com/index.php?rid=2123893&cid=s_27189_36_f&fid=27189&url=http%3A%2F%2Fdx.doi.org%2F10.1111%252Fj.1468-0017.2008.01356.x Abstract: A psychologically plausible analysis of the way we assign illocutionary forces to utterances is formulated using a 'contextualist' analysis of what is said. The account offered makes use of J. L. Austin's distinction between phatic acts (sentence meaning), locutionary acts (contextually determined what is said), illocutionary acts, and perolocutionary acts. In order to avoid the conflation between illocutionary and perlocutionary levels, assertive, directive and commissive illocutionary forces are defined in terms of inferential potential with respect to the common ground. Illocutionary forces are conceived as automatic but optional components of the process of interpretation. (Source: Mind and Language) Mind and Language journals http://www.medworm.com/rss/comments.php?id=2123893 Wed, 21 Jan 2009 05:00:00 +0100 2123893 http://www.medworm.com/index.php?rid=2123892&cid=s_27189_36_f&fid=27189&url=http%3A%2F%2Fdx.doi.org%2F10.1111%252Fj.1468-0017.2008.01355.x Abstract: What is it like to dream? On an orthodox view, dreams involve misleading sensations and false beliefs. I argue, on philosophical, psychological, and neurophysiological grounds, that orthodoxy about dreaming should be rejected in favor of an imagination model of dreaming. I am thus in partial agreement with Colin McGinn, who has argued that we do not have misleading sensory experiences while dreaming, and partially in agreement with Ernest Sosa, who has argued that we do not form false beliefs while dreaming. Rather, on my view, dreams involve mental imagery and propositional imagination. I defend the imagination model of dreaming from objections. (Source: Mind and Language) Mind and Language journals http://www.medworm.com/rss/comments.php?id=2123892 Wed, 21 Jan 2009 05:00:00 +0100 2123892 http://www.medworm.com/index.php?rid=2123891&cid=s_27189_36_f&fid=27189&url=http%3A%2F%2Fdx.doi.org%2F10.1111%252Fj.1468-0017.2008.01354.x Abstract: The paper begins with the assumption that psychological event tokens are identical to or constituted from physical events. It then articulates a familiar apparent problem concerning the causal role of psychological properties. If they do not reduce to physical properties, then either they must be epiphenomenal or any effects they cause must also be caused by physical properties, and hence be overdetermined. It then argues that both epiphenomenalism and over-determinationism are prima facie perfectly reasonable and relatively unproblematic views. The paper proceeds to argue against Kim's (Kim, 2000, 2005) attempt to articulate a plausible version of reductionism. It is then argued that psychological properties, along with paradigmatically causally efficacious macro-properties, suc... Mind and Language journals http://www.medworm.com/rss/comments.php?id=2123891 Wed, 21 Jan 2009 05:00:00 +0100 2123891 http://www.medworm.com/index.php?rid=2123890&cid=s_27189_36_f&fid=27189&url=http%3A%2F%2Fdx.doi.org%2F10.1111%252Fj.1468-0017.2008.01353.x Abstract: The Gricean theory of conversational implicature has always been plagued by data suggesting that what would seem to be conversational inferences may occur within the scope of operators like believe, for example; which for bona fide implicatures should be an impossibility. Concentrating my attention on scalar implicatures, I argue that, for the most part, such observations can be accounted for within a Gricean framework, and without resorting to local pragmatic inferences of any kind. However, there remains a small class of marked cases that cannot be treated as conversational implicatures, and they do require a local mode of pragmatic interpretation. (Source: Mind and Language) Mind and Language journals http://www.medworm.com/rss/comments.php?id=2123890 Wed, 21 Jan 2009 05:00:00 +0100 2123890 http://www.medworm.com/index.php?rid=2123889&cid=s_27189_36_f&fid=27189&url=http%3A%2F%2Fdx.doi.org%2F10.1111%252Fj.1468-0017.2008.01352.x We present the results of several new studies that provide empirical evidence in support of this account while disconfirming various currently prominent alternative accounts. We end by discussing some implications of this account for folk psychology. (Source: Mind and Language) Mind and Language journals http://www.medworm.com/rss/comments.php?id=2123889 Wed, 21 Jan 2009 05:00:00 +0100 2123889 http://www.medworm.com/index.php?rid=1872049&cid=s_27189_36_f&fid=27189&url=http%3A%2F%2Fdx.doi.org%2F10.1111%252Fj.1468-0017.2008.00357.x Abstract: Focusing on early child pretend play from the perspective of developmental psychology, this article puts forward and presents evidence for two claims. First, such play constitutes an area of remarkable individual intentionality of second-order intentionality (or 'theory of mind'): in pretence with others, young children grasp the basic intentional structure of pretending as a non-serious fictional form of action. Second, early social pretend play embodies shared or collective we-intentionality. Pretending with others is one of the ontogenetically primary instances of truly cooperative actions. And it is a, perhaps the, primordial form of cooperative action with rudimentary rule-governed, institutional structure: in joint pretence games, children are aware that objects collectivel... Mind and Language journals http://www.medworm.com/rss/comments.php?id=1872049 Tue, 14 Oct 2008 07:27:17 +0100 1872049 http://www.medworm.com/index.php?rid=1872055&cid=s_27189_36_f&fid=27189&url=http%3A%2F%2Fdx.doi.org%2F10.1111%252Fj.1468-0017.2008.00358.x (Source: Mind and Language) Mind and Language journals http://www.medworm.com/rss/comments.php?id=1872055 Mon, 13 Oct 2008 04:00:00 +0100 1872055 http://www.medworm.com/index.php?rid=1872054&cid=s_27189_36_f&fid=27189&url=http%3A%2F%2Fdx.doi.org%2F10.1111%252Fj.1468-0017.2008.00355.x Abstract: Chomsky (1986) has claimed that the prima facie incompatibility between descriptive linguistics and semantic externalism proves that an externalist semantics is impossible. Although it is true that a strong form of externalism does not cohere with descriptive linguistics, sociolinguistic theory can unify the two approaches. The resulting two-level theory reconciles descriptivism, mentalism, and externalism by construing community languages as a function of social identification. This approach allows a fresh look at names and definite descriptions while also responding to Chomsky's (1993, 1995) challenge to articulate an externalist theory of meaning that can be used in the scientific investigation of language. (Source: Mind and Language) Mind and Language journals http://www.medworm.com/rss/comments.php?id=1872054 Mon, 13 Oct 2008 04:00:00 +0100 1872054 http://www.medworm.com/index.php?rid=1872053&cid=s_27189_36_f&fid=27189&url=http%3A%2F%2Fdx.doi.org%2F10.1111%252Fj.1468-0017.2008.00353.x Abstract: I address the issue of how pretence emerged in evolution by reviewing the (mostly negative) evidence about pretend behaviour in non-human primates, and proposing a model of the type of information processing abilities that humans had to evolve in order to be able to pretend. Non-human primates do not typically pretend: there are just a few examples of potential pretend actions mostly produced by apes. The best, but still rare, examples are produced by so-called 'enculturated' apes (reared by humans) and among them specially those that have been systematically trained to use symbols (so-called 'linguistic' apes). A hypothesis that would explain the lack of pretence in apes is that they lack the mentalistic ability of theory of mind. However, in the last years apes have been demons... Mind and Language journals http://www.medworm.com/rss/comments.php?id=1872053 Mon, 13 Oct 2008 04:00:00 +0100 1872053 http://www.medworm.com/index.php?rid=1872052&cid=s_27189_36_f&fid=27189&url=http%3A%2F%2Fdx.doi.org%2F10.1111%252Fj.1468-0017.2008.00352.x Abstract: I introduce and argue for the importance of a cognitive state that I call alief. An alief is, to a reasonable approximation, an innate or habitual propensity to respond to an apparent stimulus in a particular way. Recognizing the role that alief plays in our cognitive repertoire provides a framework for understanding reactions that are governed by non-conscious or automatic mechanisms, which in turn brings into proper relief the role played by reactions that are subject to conscious regulation and deliberate control. (Source: Mind and Language) Mind and Language journals http://www.medworm.com/rss/comments.php?id=1872052 Mon, 13 Oct 2008 04:00:00 +0100 1872052 http://www.medworm.com/index.php?rid=1872051&cid=s_27189_36_f&fid=27189&url=http%3A%2F%2Fdx.doi.org%2F10.1111%252Fj.1468-0017.2008.00354.x Abstract: William James argued that we ordinarily think of the objects that we can observe[mdash]things that belong to 'the world of sense'[mdash]as having an unquestioned reality. However, young children also assert the existence of entities that they cannot ordinarily observe. For example, they assert the existence of germs and souls. The belief in the existence of such unobservable entities is likely to be based on children's broader trust in other people's testimony about objects and situations that they cannot directly observe for themselves. (Source: Mind and Language) Mind and Language journals http://www.medworm.com/rss/comments.php?id=1872051 Mon, 13 Oct 2008 04:00:00 +0100 1872051 http://www.medworm.com/index.php?rid=1872050&cid=s_27189_36_f&fid=27189&url=http%3A%2F%2Fdx.doi.org%2F10.1111%252Fj.1468-0017.2008.00356.x Abstract: Thought experiments about the self seem to lead to deeply conflicting intuitions about the self. Cases imagined from the 3rd person perspective seem to provoke different responses than cases imagined from the 1st person perspective. This paper argues that recent cognitive theories of the imagination, coupled with standard views about indexical concepts, help explain our reactions in the 1st person cases. The explanation helps identify intuitions that should not be trusted as a guide to the metaphysics of the self. (Source: Mind and Language) Mind and Language journals http://www.medworm.com/rss/comments.php?id=1872050 Mon, 13 Oct 2008 04:00:00 +0100 1872050 http://www.medworm.com/index.php?rid=1732165&cid=s_27189_36_f&fid=27189&url=http%3A%2F%2Fdx.doi.org%2F10.1111%252Fj.1468-0017.2008.00348.x Abstract: How it is that one's own thoughts can seem to be someone else's? After noting some common missteps of other approaches to this puzzle, I develop a novel cognitive solution, drawing on and critiquing theories that understand inserted thoughts and auditory verbal hallucinations in schizophrenia as stemming from mismatches between predicted and actual sensory feedback. Considerable attention is paid to forging links between the first-person phenomenology of thought insertion and the posits (e.g. efference copy, corollary discharge) of current cognitive theories. I show how deficits in the subconscious mechanisms regulating inner speech may lead to a 'fractured phenomenology' responsible for schizophrenic patients' reports of inserted thoughts and auditory verbal hallucinations. Supp... Mind and Language journals http://www.medworm.com/rss/comments.php?id=1732165 Wed, 27 Aug 2008 06:42:31 +0100 1732165 http://www.medworm.com/index.php?rid=1732168&cid=s_27189_36_f&fid=27189&url=http%3A%2F%2Fdx.doi.org%2F10.1111%252Fj.1468-0017.2008.00351.x Abstract: In this paper, I critically assess the enactive account of visual perception recently defended by Alva Noë (2004). I argue inter alia that the enactive account falsely identifies an object's apparent shape with its 2D perspectival shape; that it mistakenly assimilates visual shape perception and volumetric object recognition; and that it seriously misrepresents the constitutive role of bodily action in visual awareness. I argue further that noticing an object's perspectival shape involves a hybrid experience combining both perceptual and imaginative elements[mdash]an act of what I call 'make-perceive'. (Source: Mind and Language) Mind and Language journals http://www.medworm.com/rss/comments.php?id=1732168 Mon, 25 Aug 2008 04:00:00 +0100 1732168 http://www.medworm.com/index.php?rid=1732167&cid=s_27189_36_f&fid=27189&url=http%3A%2F%2Fdx.doi.org%2F10.1111%252Fj.1468-0017.2008.00350.x Abstract: A current debate in semantics and pragmatics is whether all contextual effects on truth-conditional content can be traced to logical form, or 'unarticulated constituents' can be supplied by the pragmatic process of free enrichment. In this paper, I defend the latter position. The main objection to this view is that free enrichment appears to overgenerate, not predicting where context cannot affect truth conditions, so that a systematic account is unlikely (Stanley, 2002a). I first examine the semantic alternative proposed by Stanley and others, which assumes extensive hidden structure acting as a linguistic trigger for pragmatic processes, so that all truth-conditional effects of context turn out to be instances of saturation. I show that there are cases of optional pragmatic con... Mind and Language journals http://www.medworm.com/rss/comments.php?id=1732167 Mon, 25 Aug 2008 04:00:00 +0100 1732167 http://www.medworm.com/index.php?rid=1732166&cid=s_27189_36_f&fid=27189&url=http%3A%2F%2Fdx.doi.org%2F10.1111%252Fj.1468-0017.2008.00349.x Abstract: Type-B materialism is the thesis that though phenomenal states are necessarily identical with physical states, phenomenal concepts have no a priori connections to physical or functional concepts. Though type-B materialists have invoked this conceptual independence to counter a number of well-known arguments against physicalism (e.g. the conceivability of zombies, the ignorance of Mary, the existence of an 'explanatory gap'), anti-physicalists have raised objections to this strategy. My aim here is to defend type-B materialism against these objections, by arguing that they share the common problem of not taking the central features of the view sufficiently seriously. However, I will end by noting that type-B materialism raises other questions, and suggesting that what stands in th... Mind and Language journals http://www.medworm.com/rss/comments.php?id=1732166 Mon, 25 Aug 2008 04:00:00 +0100 1732166 http://www.medworm.com/index.php?rid=1612342&cid=s_27189_36_f&fid=27189&url=http%3A%2F%2Fdx.doi.org%2F10.1111%252Fj.1468-0017.2008.00340.x This article outlines the main themes and motivations of Carruthers, 2006. Its purpose is to provide some background for the critical commentaries of Cowie, Machery, and Wilson (this volume). (Source: Mind and Language) Mind and Language journals http://www.medworm.com/rss/comments.php?id=1612342 Sun, 01 Jun 2008 04:00:00 +0100 1612342 http://www.medworm.com/index.php?rid=1441162&cid=s_27189_36_f&fid=27189&url=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.blackwell-synergy.com%2Fdoi%2Fabs%2F10.1111%2Fj.1468-0017.2008.00340.x%3Fai%3D2gz%26mi%3D4mpuw%26af%3DR This article outlines the main themes and motivations of Carruthers, 2006. Its purpose is to provide some background for the critical commentaries of Cowie, Machery, and Wilson (this volume). (Source: Mind and Language) Mind and Language journals http://www.medworm.com/rss/comments.php?id=1441162 Wed, 14 May 2008 18:37:46 +0100 1441162 http://www.medworm.com/index.php?rid=1441169&cid=s_27189_36_f&fid=27189&url=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.blackwell-synergy.com%2Fdoi%2Fabs%2F10.1111%2Fj.1468-0017.2008.00347.x%3Fai%3D2gz%26mi%3D4mpuw%26af%3DR Mind & Language, Volume 23, Issue 3, Page 359-367, June 2008. (Source: Mind and Language) Mind and Language journals http://www.medworm.com/rss/comments.php?id=1441169 Wed, 14 May 2008 17:18:53 +0100 1441169 http://www.medworm.com/index.php?rid=1441165&cid=s_27189_36_f&fid=27189&url=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.blackwell-synergy.com%2Fdoi%2Fabs%2F10.1111%2Fj.1468-0017.2008.00342.x%3Fai%3D2gz%26mi%3D4mpuw%26af%3DR Mind & Language, Volume 23, Issue 3, Page 284-292, June 2008. Abstract:  The Architecture of Mind is an ambitious and informative work, surveying an impressive range of empirical literature and arguing that the mind is massively modular. However, it suffers from two major theoretical flaws. First, Carruthers’ concept ... (Source: Mind and Language) Mind and Language journals http://www.medworm.com/rss/comments.php?id=1441165 Wed, 14 May 2008 17:18:53 +0100 1441165 http://www.medworm.com/index.php?rid=1441168&cid=s_27189_36_f&fid=27189&url=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.blackwell-synergy.com%2Fdoi%2Fabs%2F10.1111%2Fj.1468-0017.2008.00346.x%3Fai%3D2gz%26mi%3D4mpuw%26af%3DR Mind & Language, Volume 23, Issue 3, Page 329-358, June 2008. Abstract:  I argue that our experience of expressive properties (such as the joyfulness or sadness of a piece of music) essentially involves the sensuous imagination (through simulation) of an emotion-guided process which would result in the production of ... (Source: Mind and Language) Mind and Language journals http://www.medworm.com/rss/comments.php?id=1441168 Wed, 14 May 2008 17:18:50 +0100 1441168 http://www.medworm.com/index.php?rid=1441167&cid=s_27189_36_f&fid=27189&url=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.blackwell-synergy.com%2Fdoi%2Fabs%2F10.1111%2Fj.1468-0017.2008.00345.x%3Fai%3D2gz%26mi%3D4mpuw%26af%3DR Mind & Language, Volume 23, Issue 3, Page 304-328, June 2008. Abstract:  The purpose of the present paper is to develop and defend an account of narrow content that would neutralize the commonplace charge that narrow content ‘is not real content’. On the account I offer, a concept’s narrow content consists in its ... (Source: Mind and Language) Mind and Language journals http://www.medworm.com/rss/comments.php?id=1441167 Wed, 14 May 2008 17:18:48 +0100 1441167 http://www.medworm.com/index.php?rid=1441163&cid=s_27189_36_f&fid=27189&url=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.blackwell-synergy.com%2Fdoi%2Fabs%2F10.1111%2Fj.1468-0017.2008.00341.x%3Fai%3D2gz%26mi%3D4mpuw%26af%3DR Mind & Language, Volume 23, Issue 3, Page 263-272, June 2008. Abstract:  In The Architecture of the Mind, Carruthers proposes a new and detailed explanation for how human cognition could be both flexible and massively modular. The combinatorial nature of our linguistic faculty and our capacity to engage in inner ... (Source: Mind and Language) Mind and Language journals http://www.medworm.com/rss/comments.php?id=1441163 Wed, 14 May 2008 17:18:48 +0100 1441163 http://www.medworm.com/index.php?rid=1441164&cid=s_27189_36_f&fid=27189&url=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.blackwell-synergy.com%2Fdoi%2Fabs%2F10.1111%2Fj.1468-0017.2008.00343.x%3Fai%3D2gz%26mi%3D4mpuw%26af%3DR Mind & Language, Volume 23, Issue 3, Page 273-283, June 2008. Abstract:  The Architecture of the Mind is itself built on foundations that deserve probing. In this brief commentary I focus on these foundations—Carruthers’ conception of modularity, his arguments for thinking that the mind is massively modular in ... (Source: Mind and Language) Mind and Language journals http://www.medworm.com/rss/comments.php?id=1441164 Wed, 14 May 2008 17:18:47 +0100 1441164 http://www.medworm.com/index.php?rid=1441166&cid=s_27189_36_f&fid=27189&url=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.blackwell-synergy.com%2Fdoi%2Fabs%2F10.1111%2Fj.1468-0017.2008.00344.x%3Fai%3D2gz%26mi%3D4mpuw%26af%3DR Mind & Language, Volume 23, Issue 3, Page 293-303, June 2008. Abstract:  This paper argues that two of my critics (Cowie and Wilson) have become fixated on Fodor’s notion of modularity, both to their own detriment and to the detriment of their understanding of Carruthers, 2006. The paper then focuses on the supposed ... (Source: Mind and Language) Mind and Language journals http://www.medworm.com/rss/comments.php?id=1441166 Wed, 14 May 2008 17:18:46 +0100 1441166 http://www.medworm.com/index.php?rid=1296640&cid=s_27189_36_f&fid=27189&url=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.blackwell-synergy.com%2Fdoi%2Fabs%2F10.1111%2Fj.1468-0017.2007.00335.x%3Fai%3D2gz%26mi%3D4mpuw%26af%3DR Mind & Language, Volume 23, Issue 2, Page 145-164, April 2008. Abstract:  In debates about the proper analysis of demonstrative expressions, ostensive gestures and speaker intentions are often seen as competing for primary importance in securing reference. Underlying some of these debates is the mistaken assumption ... (Source: Mind and Language) Mind and Language journals http://www.medworm.com/rss/comments.php?id=1296640 Wed, 12 Mar 2008 18:54:54 +0100 1296640 http://www.medworm.com/index.php?rid=1296644&cid=s_27189_36_f&fid=27189&url=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.blackwell-synergy.com%2Fdoi%2Fabs%2F10.1111%2Fj.1468-0017.2007.00339.x%3Fai%3D2gz%26mi%3D4mpuw%26af%3DR Mind & Language, Volume 23, Issue 2, Page 247-255, April 2008. Abstract:  Recent work by Joshua Knobe has established that people are more likely to describe bad but foreseen side-effects as intentionally performed than good but foreseen side-effects (this is sometimes called the ‘Knobe effect’ or the ‘side-effect ... (Source: Mind and Language) Mind and Language journals http://www.medworm.com/rss/comments.php?id=1296644 Wed, 12 Mar 2008 15:45:27 +0100 1296644 http://www.medworm.com/index.php?rid=1296641&cid=s_27189_36_f&fid=27189&url=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.blackwell-synergy.com%2Fdoi%2Fabs%2F10.1111%2Fj.1468-0017.2007.00336.x%3Fai%3D2gz%26mi%3D4mpuw%26af%3DR Mind & Language, Volume 23, Issue 2, Page 165-189, April 2008. Abstract:  Recent experimental findings by Knobe and others (Knobe, 2003; Nadelhoffer, 2006b; Nichols and Ulatowski, 2007) have been at the center of a controversy about the nature of the folk concept of intentional action. I argue that the significance of ... (Source: Mind and Language) Mind and Language journals http://www.medworm.com/rss/comments.php?id=1296641 Wed, 12 Mar 2008 15:45:01 +0100 1296641 http://www.medworm.com/index.php?rid=1296642&cid=s_27189_36_f&fid=27189&url=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.blackwell-synergy.com%2Fdoi%2Fabs%2F10.1111%2Fj.1468-0017.2007.00337.x%3Fai%3D2gz%26mi%3D4mpuw%26af%3DR Mind & Language, Volume 23, Issue 2, Page 190-223, April 2008. Abstract:  According to an influential view, one function of mirror neurons (MNs), first discovered in the brain of monkeys, is to underlie third-person mindreading. This view relies on two assumptions: the activity of MNs in an observer’s brain matches (... (Source: Mind and Language) Mind and Language journals http://www.medworm.com/rss/comments.php?id=1296642 Wed, 12 Mar 2008 15:44:35 +0100 1296642 http://www.medworm.com/index.php?rid=1296643&cid=s_27189_36_f&fid=27189&url=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.blackwell-synergy.com%2Fdoi%2Fabs%2F10.1111%2Fj.1468-0017.2007.00338.x%3Fai%3D2gz%26mi%3D4mpuw%26af%3DR Mind & Language, Volume 23, Issue 2, Page 224-246, April 2008. Abstract:  Morgan’s Canon is a very widely endorsed methodological principle in animal psychology, believed to be vital for a rigorous, scientific approach to the study of animal cognition. In contrast I argue that Morgan’s Canon is unjustified, pernicious ... (Source: Mind and Language) Mind and Language journals http://www.medworm.com/rss/comments.php?id=1296643 Wed, 12 Mar 2008 15:43:55 +0100 1296643 http://www.medworm.com/index.php?rid=1148599&cid=s_27189_36_f&fid=27189&url=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.blackwell-synergy.com%2Fdoi%2Fabs%2F10.1111%2Fj.1468-0017.2007.00324.x%3Fai%3D2gz%26mi%3D4mpuw%26af%3DR Mind & Language, Volume 23, Issue 1, Page 1-24, February 2008. Abstract:  Darwinism consists of two parts: a phylogenesis of biological species (ours included) and the claim that the primary mechanism of the evolution of phenotypes is natural selection. I assume that Darwin’s account of phylogeny is essentially ... (Source: Mind and Language) Mind and Language journals http://www.medworm.com/rss/comments.php?id=1148599 Mon, 14 Jan 2008 19:19:34 +0100 1148599 http://www.medworm.com/index.php?rid=1148607&cid=s_27189_36_f&fid=27189&url=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.blackwell-synergy.com%2Fdoi%2Fabs%2F10.1111%2Fj.1468-0017.2007.00332.x%3Fai%3D2gz%26mi%3D4mpuw%26af%3DR Mind & Language, Volume 23, Issue 1, Page 123-143, February 2008. Abstract:  In The Mind Doesn’t Work that Way, Jerry Fodor argues that mental representations have context sensitive features relevant to cognition, and that, therefore, the Classical Computational Theory of Mind (CTM) is mistaken. We call this the ... (Source: Mind and Language) Mind and Language journals http://www.medworm.com/rss/comments.php?id=1148607 Mon, 14 Jan 2008 12:39:20 +0100 1148607 http://www.medworm.com/index.php?rid=1148602&cid=s_27189_36_f&fid=27189&url=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.blackwell-synergy.com%2Fdoi%2Fabs%2F10.1111%2Fj.1468-0017.2007.00327.x%3Fai%3D2gz%26mi%3D4mpuw%26af%3DR Mind & Language, Volume 23, Issue 1, Page 42-49, February 2008. (Source: Mind and Language) Mind and Language journals http://www.medworm.com/rss/comments.php?id=1148602 Mon, 14 Jan 2008 12:39:20 +0100 1148602 http://www.medworm.com/index.php?rid=1148601&cid=s_27189_36_f&fid=27189&url=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.blackwell-synergy.com%2Fdoi%2Fabs%2F10.1111%2Fj.1468-0017.2007.00326.x%3Fai%3D2gz%26mi%3D4mpuw%26af%3DR Mind & Language, Volume 23, Issue 1, Page 32-41, February 2008. (Source: Mind and Language) Mind and Language journals http://www.medworm.com/rss/comments.php?id=1148601 Mon, 14 Jan 2008 12:39:20 +0100 1148601 http://www.medworm.com/index.php?rid=1148600&cid=s_27189_36_f&fid=27189&url=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.blackwell-synergy.com%2Fdoi%2Fabs%2F10.1111%2Fj.1468-0017.2007.00325.x%3Fai%3D2gz%26mi%3D4mpuw%26af%3DR Mind & Language, Volume 23, Issue 1, Page 25-31, February 2008. (Source: Mind and Language) Mind and Language journals http://www.medworm.com/rss/comments.php?id=1148600 Mon, 14 Jan 2008 12:39:19 +0100 1148600 http://www.medworm.com/index.php?rid=1148605&cid=s_27189_36_f&fid=27189&url=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.blackwell-synergy.com%2Fdoi%2Fabs%2F10.1111%2Fj.1468-0017.2007.00330.x%3Fai%3D2gz%26mi%3D4mpuw%26af%3DR Mind & Language, Volume 23, Issue 1, Page 90-106, February 2008. Abstract:  The traditional philosophical doctrine of double effect claims that agents’ intentions affect whether acts are morally wrong. Our behavioral study reveals that agents’ intentions do affect whether acts are judged morally wrong, whereas the ... (Source: Mind and Language) Mind and Language journals http://www.medworm.com/rss/comments.php?id=1148605 Mon, 14 Jan 2008 12:39:18 +0100 1148605 http://www.medworm.com/index.php?rid=1148604&cid=s_27189_36_f&fid=27189&url=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.blackwell-synergy.com%2Fdoi%2Fabs%2F10.1111%2Fj.1468-0017.2007.00329.x%3Fai%3D2gz%26mi%3D4mpuw%26af%3DR Mind & Language, Volume 23, Issue 1, Page 58-89, February 2008. Abstract:  This paper examines the recent literature on meta-cognitive processes in non-human animals, arguing that in each case the data admit of a simpler, purely first-order, explanation. The topics discussed include the alleged monitoring of states of ... (Source: Mind and Language) Mind and Language journals http://www.medworm.com/rss/comments.php?id=1148604 Mon, 14 Jan 2008 12:39:17 +0100 1148604 http://www.medworm.com/index.php?rid=1148606&cid=s_27189_36_f&fid=27189&url=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.blackwell-synergy.com%2Fdoi%2Fabs%2F10.1111%2Fj.1468-0017.2007.00331.x%3Fai%3D2gz%26mi%3D4mpuw%26af%3DR Mind & Language, Volume 23, Issue 1, Page 107-122, February 2008. Abstract:  Some linguistic phenomena can occur in uses of language in thought, whereas others only occur in uses of language in communication. I argue that this distinction can be used as a test for whether a linguistic phenomenon can be explained via ... (Source: Mind and Language) Mind and Language journals http://www.medworm.com/rss/comments.php?id=1148606 Mon, 14 Jan 2008 12:39:12 +0100 1148606 http://www.medworm.com/index.php?rid=1148603&cid=s_27189_36_f&fid=27189&url=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.blackwell-synergy.com%2Fdoi%2Fabs%2F10.1111%2Fj.1468-0017.2007.00328.x%3Fai%3D2gz%26mi%3D4mpuw%26af%3DR Mind & Language, Volume 23, Issue 1, Page 50-57, February 2008. (Source: Mind and Language) Mind and Language journals http://www.medworm.com/rss/comments.php?id=1148603 Mon, 14 Jan 2008 12:39:12 +0100 1148603 http://www.medworm.com/index.php?rid=987686&cid=s_27189_36_f&fid=27189&url=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.blackwell-synergy.com%2Fdoi%2Fabs%2F10.1111%2Fj.1468-0017.2007.00317.x%3Fai%3D2gz%26mi%3D4mpuw%26af%3DR Mind & Language, Volume 22, Issue 5, Page 475-513, November 2007. Abstract:  Our objectives in this article are to bring some theoretical order into developmental sequences and simultaneities in children’s ability to appreciate multiple labels for single objects, to reason with identity statements, to reason ... (Source: Mind and Language) Mind and Language journals http://www.medworm.com/rss/comments.php?id=987686 Mon, 29 Oct 2007 18:39:55 +0100 987686 http://www.medworm.com/index.php?rid=987691&cid=s_27189_36_f&fid=27189&url=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.blackwell-synergy.com%2Fdoi%2Fabs%2F10.1111%2Fj.1468-0017.2007.00322.x%3Fai%3D2gz%26mi%3D4mpuw%26af%3DR Mind & Language, Volume 22, Issue 5, Page 592-623, November 2007. Abstract:  The exploration of the mechanisms of cultural heredity has often been regarded as the key to explicating human uniqueness. Particularly early imitative learning, which is explained as a kind of simulation that rests on the infant’s ... (Source: Mind and Language) Mind and Language journals http://www.medworm.com/rss/comments.php?id=987691 Mon, 29 Oct 2007 15:07:09 +0100 987691 http://www.medworm.com/index.php?rid=987690&cid=s_27189_36_f&fid=27189&url=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.blackwell-synergy.com%2Fdoi%2Fabs%2F10.1111%2Fj.1468-0017.2007.00321.x%3Fai%3D2gz%26mi%3D4mpuw%26af%3DR Mind & Language, Volume 22, Issue 5, Page 563-591, November 2007. Abstract:  What makes an object the same persisting individual over time? Philosophers and psychologists have both grappled with this question, but from different perspectives—philosophers conceptually analyzing the criteria for object persistence, and ... (Source: Mind and Language) Mind and Language journals http://www.medworm.com/rss/comments.php?id=987690 Mon, 29 Oct 2007 15:07:09 +0100 987690 http://www.medworm.com/index.php?rid=987687&cid=s_27189_36_f&fid=27189&url=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.blackwell-synergy.com%2Fdoi%2Fabs%2F10.1111%2Fj.1468-0017.2007.00318.x%3Fai%3D2gz%26mi%3D4mpuw%26af%3DR Mind & Language, Volume 22, Issue 5, Page 514-533, November 2007. Abstract:  It has long been debated whether objects are ‘sortally’ individuated. This paper begins by clarifying some of the key terms in play—in particular, ‘sortal’, ‘individuation’, and ‘object’. The term ‘individuation’ is taken to have both a ... (Source: Mind and Language) Mind and Language journals http://www.medworm.com/rss/comments.php?id=987687 Mon, 29 Oct 2007 15:07:09 +0100 987687 http://www.medworm.com/index.php?rid=987692&cid=s_27189_36_f&fid=27189&url=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.blackwell-synergy.com%2Fdoi%2Fabs%2F10.1111%2Fj.1468-0017.2007.00323.x%3Fai%3D2gz%26mi%3D4mpuw%26af%3DR Mind & Language, Volume 22, Issue 5, Page 624-627, November 2007. (Source: Mind and Language) Mind and Language journals http://www.medworm.com/rss/comments.php?id=987692 Mon, 29 Oct 2007 15:07:08 +0100 987692 http://www.medworm.com/index.php?rid=987689&cid=s_27189_36_f&fid=27189&url=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.blackwell-synergy.com%2Fdoi%2Fabs%2F10.1111%2Fj.1468-0017.2007.00320.x%3Fai%3D2gz%26mi%3D4mpuw%26af%3DR Mind & Language, Volume 22, Issue 5, Page 548-562, November 2007. Abstract:  I set out two theses. The first is Lynn Robertson’s: (a) spatial awareness is a cause of object perception. A natural counterpoint is: (b) spatial awareness is a cause of your ability to make accurate verbal reports about a perceived object. ... (Source: Mind and Language) Mind and Language journals http://www.medworm.com/rss/comments.php?id=987689 Mon, 29 Oct 2007 15:07:08 +0100 987689 http://www.medworm.com/index.php?rid=987688&cid=s_27189_36_f&fid=27189&url=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.blackwell-synergy.com%2Fdoi%2Fabs%2F10.1111%2Fj.1468-0017.2007.00319.x%3Fai%3D2gz%26mi%3D4mpuw%26af%3DR We present work demonstrating that the nature of an object for our visual system depends on the actions we are programming and on the presence of action relations between stimuli. For example, patients who show visual extinction are more likely ... (Source: Mind and Language) Mind and Language journals http://www.medworm.com/rss/comments.php?id=987688 Mon, 29 Oct 2007 15:07:08 +0100 987688 http://www.medworm.com/index.php?rid=796252&cid=s_27189_36_f&fid=27189&url=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.blackwell-synergy.com%2Fdoi%2Fabs%2F10.1111%2Fj.1468-0017.2007.00311.x%3Fai%3D2gz%26mi%3D4mpuw%26af%3DR Mind & Language Volume 22, Issue 4, Page 317-345, Sep 2007. Abstract:  A similarity space is a hyperspace in which the dimensions represent various dimensions on which objects may differ. The similarity space theory of concepts is the thesis that concepts are regions of similarity spaces that are somehow realized in... (Source: Mind and Language) Mind and Language journals http://www.medworm.com/rss/comments.php?id=796252 Mon, 13 Aug 2007 18:46:03 +0100 796252 http://www.medworm.com/index.php?rid=796254&cid=s_27189_36_f&fid=27189&url=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.blackwell-synergy.com%2Fdoi%2Fabs%2F10.1111%2Fj.1468-0017.2007.00313.x%3Fai%3D2gz%26mi%3D4mpuw%26af%3DR Mind & Language Volume 22, Issue 4, Page 366-401, Sep 2007. Abstract:  Methodological dualism in linguistics occurs when its theories are subjected to standards that are inappropriate for them qua scientific theories. Despite much opposition, methodological dualism abounds in contemporary thinking. In this paper, I ... (Source: Mind and Language) Mind and Language journals http://www.medworm.com/rss/comments.php?id=796254 Mon, 13 Aug 2007 13:54:06 +0100 796254 http://www.medworm.com/index.php?rid=796257&cid=s_27189_36_f&fid=27189&url=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.blackwell-synergy.com%2Fdoi%2Fabs%2F10.1111%2Fj.1468-0017.2007.00316.x%3Fai%3D2gz%26mi%3D4mpuw%26af%3DR Mind & Language Volume 22, Issue 4, Page 450-473, Sep 2007. Abstract:  Modules are widely held to play a central role in explaining mental development and in accounts of the mind generally. But there is much disagreement about what modules are, which shows that we do not adequately understand modularity. This paper ... (Source: Mind and Language) Mind and Language journals http://www.medworm.com/rss/comments.php?id=796257 Mon, 13 Aug 2007 13:54:05 +0100 796257 http://www.medworm.com/index.php?rid=796256&cid=s_27189_36_f&fid=27189&url=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.blackwell-synergy.com%2Fdoi%2Fabs%2F10.1111%2Fj.1468-0017.2007.00315.x%3Fai%3D2gz%26mi%3D4mpuw%26af%3DR Mind & Language Volume 22, Issue 4, Page 427-449, Sep 2007. Abstract:  What grounds my experience of my body as my own? The body that one experiences is always one’s own, but it does not follow that one always experiences it as one’s own. One might even feel that a body part does not belong to oneself despite feelin... (Source: Mind and Language) Mind and Language journals http://www.medworm.com/rss/comments.php?id=796256 Mon, 13 Aug 2007 13:54:05 +0100 796256 http://www.medworm.com/index.php?rid=796255&cid=s_27189_36_f&fid=27189&url=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.blackwell-synergy.com%2Fdoi%2Fabs%2F10.1111%2Fj.1468-0017.2007.00314.x%3Fai%3D2gz%26mi%3D4mpuw%26af%3DR Mind & Language Volume 22, Issue 4, Page 402-426, Sep 2007. Abstract:  A number of authors in favor of a unitary account of singular descriptions have alleged that the unitary account can be extrapolated to account for plural definite descriptions. In this paper I take a closer look at this suggestion. I argue that ... (Source: Mind and Language) Mind and Language journals http://www.medworm.com/rss/comments.php?id=796255 Mon, 13 Aug 2007 13:54:05 +0100 796255 http://www.medworm.com/index.php?rid=796253&cid=s_27189_36_f&fid=27189&url=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.blackwell-synergy.com%2Fdoi%2Fabs%2F10.1111%2Fj.1468-0017.2007.00312.x%3Fai%3D2gz%26mi%3D4mpuw%26af%3DR Mind & Language Volume 22, Issue 4, Page 346-365, Sep 2007. Abstract:  Recent work by Joshua Knobe indicates that people’s intuition about whether an action was intentional depends on whether the outcome is good or bad. This paper argues that part of the explanation for this effect is that there are stable individua... (Source: Mind and Language) Mind and Language journals http://www.medworm.com/rss/comments.php?id=796253 Mon, 13 Aug 2007 13:54:05 +0100 796253 http://www.medworm.com/index.php?rid=616939&cid=s_27189_36_f&fid=27189&url=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.blackwell-synergy.com%2Fdoi%2Fabs%2F10.1111%2Fj.1468-0017.2007.00307.x%3Fai%3D2gz%26mi%3D4mpuw%26af%3DR Mind & Language Volume 22, Issue 3, Page 215-245, Jun 2007. (Source: Mind and Language) Mind and Language journals http://www.medworm.com/rss/comments.php?id=616939 Fri, 11 May 2007 18:20:02 +0100 616939 http://www.medworm.com/index.php?rid=616942&cid=s_27189_36_f&fid=27189&url=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.blackwell-synergy.com%2Fdoi%2Fabs%2F10.1111%2Fj.1468-0017.2007.00310.x%3Fai%3D2gz%26mi%3D4mpuw%26af%3DR Mind & Language Volume 22, Issue 3, Page 297-316, Jun 2007. (Source: Mind and Language) Mind and Language journals http://www.medworm.com/rss/comments.php?id=616942 Thu, 10 May 2007 16:25:09 +0100 616942 http://www.medworm.com/index.php?rid=616941&cid=s_27189_36_f&fid=27189&url=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.blackwell-synergy.com%2Fdoi%2Fabs%2F10.1111%2Fj.1468-0017.2007.00309.x%3Fai%3D2gz%26mi%3D4mpuw%26af%3DR Mind & Language Volume 22, Issue 3, Page 270-296, Jun 2007. (Source: Mind and Language) Mind and Language journals http://www.medworm.com/rss/comments.php?id=616941 Thu, 10 May 2007 16:25:09 +0100 616941 http://www.medworm.com/index.php?rid=616940&cid=s_27189_36_f&fid=27189&url=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.blackwell-synergy.com%2Fdoi%2Fabs%2F10.1111%2Fj.1468-0017.2007.00308.x%3Fai%3D2gz%26mi%3D4mpuw%26af%3DR Mind & Language Volume 22, Issue 3, Page 246-269, Jun 2007. (Source: Mind and Language) Mind and Language journals http://www.medworm.com/rss/comments.php?id=616940 Thu, 10 May 2007 16:25:09 +0100 616940 http://www.medworm.com/index.php?rid=505571&cid=s_27189_36_f&fid=27189&url=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.blackwell-synergy.com%2Fdoi%2Fabs%2F10.1111%2Fj.1468-0017.2007.00302.x%3Fai%3D2gz%26mi%3D4mpuw%26af%3DR Mind & Language Volume 22, Issue 2, Page 117-131, Apr 2007. (Source: Mind and Language) Mind and Language journals http://www.medworm.com/rss/comments.php?id=505571 Tue, 27 Mar 2007 18:59:45 +0100 505571 http://www.medworm.com/index.php?rid=505576&cid=s_27189_36_f&fid=27189&url=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.blackwell-synergy.com%2Fdoi%2Fabs%2F10.1111%2Fj.1468-0017.2007.00306.x%3Fai%3D2gz%26mi%3D4mpuw%26af%3DR Mind & Language Volume 22, Issue 2, Page 207-213, Apr 2007. (Source: Mind and Language) Mind and Language journals http://www.medworm.com/rss/comments.php?id=505576 Fri, 23 Mar 2007 11:00:07 +0100 505576 http://www.medworm.com/index.php?rid=505573&cid=s_27189_36_f&fid=27189&url=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.blackwell-synergy.com%2Fdoi%2Fabs%2F10.1111%2Fj.1468-0017.2007.00304.x%3Fai%3D2gz%26mi%3D4mpuw%26af%3DR Mind & Language Volume 22, Issue 2, Page 150-172, Apr 2007. (Source: Mind and Language) Mind and Language journals http://www.medworm.com/rss/comments.php?id=505573 Fri, 23 Mar 2007 11:00:06 +0100 505573 http://www.medworm.com/index.php?rid=505574&cid=s_27189_36_f&fid=27189&url=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.blackwell-synergy.com%2Fdoi%2Fabs%2F10.1111%2Fj.1468-0017.2007.00305.x%3Fai%3D2gz%26mi%3D4mpuw%26af%3DR Mind & Language Volume 22, Issue 2, Page 173-206, Apr 2007. (Source: Mind and Language) Mind and Language journals http://www.medworm.com/rss/comments.php?id=505574 Fri, 23 Mar 2007 10:59:53 +0100 505574 http://www.medworm.com/index.php?rid=505572&cid=s_27189_36_f&fid=27189&url=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.blackwell-synergy.com%2Fdoi%2Fabs%2F10.1111%2Fj.1468-0017.2007.00303.x%3Fai%3D2gz%26mi%3D4mpuw%26af%3DR Mind & Language Volume 22, Issue 2, Page 132-149, Apr 2007. (Source: Mind and Language) Mind and Language journals http://www.medworm.com/rss/comments.php?id=505572 Fri, 23 Mar 2007 10:59:53 +0100 505572 http://www.medworm.com/index.php?rid=391363&cid=s_27189_36_f&fid=27189&url=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.blackwell-synergy.com%2Fdoi%2Fabs%2F10.1111%2Fj.1468-0017.2006.00297.x%3Fai%3D2gz%26mi%3D4mpuw%26af%3DR Mind & Language Volume 22, Issue 1, Page 1-21, Feb 2007. (Source: Mind and Language) Mind and Language journals http://www.medworm.com/rss/comments.php?id=391363 Wed, 31 Jan 2007 19:10:39 +0100 391363 http://www.medworm.com/index.php?rid=391367&cid=s_27189_36_f&fid=27189&url=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.blackwell-synergy.com%2Fdoi%2Fabs%2F10.1111%2Fj.1468-0017.2006.00301.x%3Fai%3D2gz%26mi%3D4mpuw%26af%3DR Mind & Language Volume 22, Issue 1, Page 92-115, Feb 2007. (Source: Mind and Language) Mind and Language journals http://www.medworm.com/rss/comments.php?id=391367 Wed, 31 Jan 2007 08:18:50 +0100 391367 http://www.medworm.com/index.php?rid=391364&cid=s_27189_36_f&fid=27189&url=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.blackwell-synergy.com%2Fdoi%2Fabs%2F10.1111%2Fj.1468-0017.2006.00298.x%3Fai%3D2gz%26mi%3D4mpuw%26af%3DR Mind & Language Volume 22, Issue 1, Page 22-43, Feb 2007. (Source: Mind and Language) Mind and Language journals http://www.medworm.com/rss/comments.php?id=391364 Wed, 31 Jan 2007 08:18:48 +0100 391364 http://www.medworm.com/index.php?rid=391366&cid=s_27189_36_f&fid=27189&url=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.blackwell-synergy.com%2Fdoi%2Fabs%2F10.1111%2Fj.1468-0017.2006.00300.x%3Fai%3D2gz%26mi%3D4mpuw%26af%3DR Mind & Language Volume 22, Issue 1, Page 68-91, Feb 2007. (Source: Mind and Language) Mind and Language journals http://www.medworm.com/rss/comments.php?id=391366 Wed, 31 Jan 2007 08:18:34 +0100 391366 http://www.medworm.com/index.php?rid=391365&cid=s_27189_36_f&fid=27189&url=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.blackwell-synergy.com%2Fdoi%2Fabs%2F10.1111%2Fj.1468-0017.2006.00299.x%3Fai%3D2gz%26mi%3D4mpuw%26af%3DR Mind & Language Volume 22, Issue 1, Page 44-67, Feb 2007. (Source: Mind and Language) Mind and Language journals http://www.medworm.com/rss/comments.php?id=391365 Wed, 31 Jan 2007 08:18:19 +0100 391365 http://www.medworm.com/index.php?rid=256030&cid=s_27189_36_f&fid=27189&url=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.blackwell-synergy.com%2Fdoi%2Fabs%2F10.1111%2Fj.1468-0017.2006.00294.x%3Fai%3D2gz%26mi%3D4mpuw%26af%3DR Mind & Language Volume 21, Issue 5, Page 541-552, Nov 2006. (Source: Mind and Language) Mind and Language journals http://www.medworm.com/rss/comments.php?id=256030 Wed, 01 Nov 2006 01:52:01 +0100 256030 http://www.medworm.com/index.php?rid=256032&cid=s_27189_36_f&fid=27189&url=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.blackwell-synergy.com%2Fdoi%2Fabs%2F10.1111%2Fj.1468-0017.2006.00292.x%3Fai%3D2gz%26mi%3D4mpuw%26af%3DR Mind & Language Volume 21, Issue 5, Page 565-586, Nov 2006. (Source: Mind and Language) Mind and Language journals http://www.medworm.com/rss/comments.php?id=256032 Mon, 30 Oct 2006 09:51:06 +0100 256032