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        <title>The Behavioral and Brain Sciences via MedWorm.com</title>
        <description>MedWorm.com provides a medical RSS filtering service. Over 6000 RSS medical sources are combined and output via different filters. This feed contains the latest items from the 'The Behavioral and Brain Sciences' source.</description>
        <link><![CDATA[http://www.medworm.com/rss/search.php?qu=The+Behavioral+and+Brain+Sciences&t=The+Behavioral+and+Brain+Sciences&s=Search&f=source]]></link>
        <lastBuildDate>Tue, 07 Feb 2012 07:05:48 +0100</lastBuildDate>
        <item>
            <title>Reciprocity: Weak or strong? What punishment experiments do (and do not) demonstrate.</title>
            <link>http://www.medworm.com/index.php?rid=5659017&amp;cid=s_36932_168_f&amp;fid=36932&amp;url=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov%2Fentrez%2Fquery.fcgi%3Ftmpl%3DNoSidebarfile%26db%3DPubMed%26cmd%3DRetrieve%26list_uids%3D22289303%26dopt%3DAbstract</link>
            <description>Authors: Guala F
    Abstract
    Economists and biologists have proposed a distinction between two mechanisms - &quot;strong&quot; and &quot;weak&quot; reciprocity - that may explain the evolution of human sociality. Weak reciprocity theorists emphasize the benefits of long-term cooperation and the use of low-cost strategies to deter free-riders. Strong reciprocity theorists, in contrast, claim that cooperation in social dilemma games can be sustained by costly punishment mechanisms, even in one-shot and finitely repeated games. To support this claim, they have generated a large body of evidence concerning the willingness of experimental subjects to punish uncooperative free-riders at a cost to themselves. In this article, I distinguish between a &quot;narrow&quot; and a &quot;wide&quot; reading of the experimental evidence. Un...</description>
            <author>The Behavioral and Brain Sciences</author>
            <type>journals</type>
        <comments>http://www.medworm.com/rss/comments.php?id=5659017</comments>
            <pubDate>Wed, 01 Feb 2012 05:00:00 +0100</pubDate>
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        <item>
            <title>The social and psychological costs of punishing.</title>
            <link>http://www.medworm.com/index.php?rid=5659016&amp;cid=s_36932_168_f&amp;fid=36932&amp;url=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov%2Fentrez%2Fquery.fcgi%3Ftmpl%3DNoSidebarfile%26db%3DPubMed%26cmd%3DRetrieve%26list_uids%3D22289304%26dopt%3DAbstract</link>
            <description>Authors: Adams GS, Mullen E
    Abstract
    We review evidence of the psychological and social costs associated with punishing. We propose that these psychological and social costs should be considered (in addition to material costs) when searching for evidence of costly punishment &quot;in the wild.&quot;
    PMID: 22289304 [PubMed - in process] (Source: The Behavioral and Brain Sciences)</description>
            <author>The Behavioral and Brain Sciences</author>
            <type>journals</type>
        <comments>http://www.medworm.com/rss/comments.php?id=5659016</comments>
            <pubDate>Wed, 01 Feb 2012 05:00:00 +0100</pubDate>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">5659016</guid>        </item>
        <item>
            <title>Proximate and ultimate causes of punishment and strong reciprocity.</title>
            <link>http://www.medworm.com/index.php?rid=5659015&amp;cid=s_36932_168_f&amp;fid=36932&amp;url=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov%2Fentrez%2Fquery.fcgi%3Ftmpl%3DNoSidebarfile%26db%3DPubMed%26cmd%3DRetrieve%26list_uids%3D22289305%26dopt%3DAbstract</link>
            <description>Authors: Barclay P
    Abstract
    While admirable, Guala's discussion of reciprocity suffers from a confusion between proximate causes (psychological mechanisms triggering behaviour) and ultimate causes (evolved function of those psychological mechanisms). Because much work on &quot;strong reciprocity&quot; commits this error, I clarify the difference between proximate and ultimate causes of cooperation and punishment. I also caution against hasty rejections of &quot;wide readings&quot; of experimental evidence.
    PMID: 22289305 [PubMed - in process] (Source: The Behavioral and Brain Sciences)</description>
            <author>The Behavioral and Brain Sciences</author>
            <type>journals</type>
        <comments>http://www.medworm.com/rss/comments.php?id=5659015</comments>
            <pubDate>Wed, 01 Feb 2012 05:00:00 +0100</pubDate>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">5659015</guid>        </item>
        <item>
            <title>The restorative logic of punishment: Another argument in favor of weak selection.</title>
            <link>http://www.medworm.com/index.php?rid=5659014&amp;cid=s_36932_168_f&amp;fid=36932&amp;url=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov%2Fentrez%2Fquery.fcgi%3Ftmpl%3DNoSidebarfile%26db%3DPubMed%26cmd%3DRetrieve%26list_uids%3D22289306%26dopt%3DAbstract</link>
            <description>Authors: Baumard N
    Abstract
    Strong reciprocity theorists claim that punishment has evolved to promote the good of the group and to deter cheating. By contrast, weak reciprocity suggests that punishment aims to restore justice (i.e., reciprocity) between the criminal and his victim. Experimental evidences as well as field observations suggest that humans punish criminals to restore fairness rather than to support group cooperation.
    PMID: 22289306 [PubMed - in process] (Source: The Behavioral and Brain Sciences)</description>
            <author>The Behavioral and Brain Sciences</author>
            <type>journals</type>
        <comments>http://www.medworm.com/rss/comments.php?id=5659014</comments>
            <pubDate>Wed, 01 Feb 2012 05:00:00 +0100</pubDate>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">5659014</guid>        </item>
        <item>
            <title>Reciprocity and uncertainty.</title>
            <link>http://www.medworm.com/index.php?rid=5659013&amp;cid=s_36932_168_f&amp;fid=36932&amp;url=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov%2Fentrez%2Fquery.fcgi%3Ftmpl%3DNoSidebarfile%26db%3DPubMed%26cmd%3DRetrieve%26list_uids%3D22289307%26dopt%3DAbstract</link>
            <description>Authors: Bereby-Meyer Y
    Abstract
    Guala points to a discrepancy between strong negative reciprocity observed in the lab and the way cooperation is sustained &quot;in the wild.&quot; This commentary suggests that in lab experiments, strong negative reciprocity is limited when uncertainty exists regarding the players' actions and the intentions. Thus, costly punishment is indeed a limited mechanism for sustaining cooperation in an uncertain environment.
    PMID: 22289307 [PubMed - in process] (Source: The Behavioral and Brain Sciences)</description>
            <author>The Behavioral and Brain Sciences</author>
            <type>journals</type>
        <comments>http://www.medworm.com/rss/comments.php?id=5659013</comments>
            <pubDate>Wed, 01 Feb 2012 05:00:00 +0100</pubDate>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">5659013</guid>        </item>
        <item>
            <title>Costs and benefits in hunter-gatherer punishment.</title>
            <link>http://www.medworm.com/index.php?rid=5659012&amp;cid=s_36932_168_f&amp;fid=36932&amp;url=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov%2Fentrez%2Fquery.fcgi%3Ftmpl%3DNoSidebarfile%26db%3DPubMed%26cmd%3DRetrieve%26list_uids%3D22289308%26dopt%3DAbstract</link>
            <description>Authors: Boehm C
    Abstract
    Hunter-gatherer punishment involves costs and benefits to individuals and groups, but the costs do not necessarily fit with the assumptions made in models that consider punishment to be altruistic - which brings in the free-rider problem and the problem of second-order free-riders. In this commentary, I present foragers' capital punishment patterns ethnographically, in the interest of establishing whether such punishment is likely to be costly; and I suggest that in many cases abstentions from punishment that might be taken as defections by free-riders are actually caused by social-structural considerations rather than being an effect of free-rider genes. This presentation of data supplements the ethnographic analysis provided by Guala.
    PMID: 22289308 ...</description>
            <author>The Behavioral and Brain Sciences</author>
            <type>journals</type>
        <comments>http://www.medworm.com/rss/comments.php?id=5659012</comments>
            <pubDate>Wed, 01 Feb 2012 05:00:00 +0100</pubDate>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">5659012</guid>        </item>
        <item>
            <title>The punishment that sustains cooperation is often coordinated and costly.</title>
            <link>http://www.medworm.com/index.php?rid=5659011&amp;cid=s_36932_168_f&amp;fid=36932&amp;url=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov%2Fentrez%2Fquery.fcgi%3Ftmpl%3DNoSidebarfile%26db%3DPubMed%26cmd%3DRetrieve%26list_uids%3D22289309%26dopt%3DAbstract</link>
            <description>Authors: Bowles S, Boyd R, Mathew S, Richerson PJ
    Abstract
    Experiments are not models of cooperation; instead, they demonstrate the presence of the ethical and other-regarding predispositions that often motivate cooperation and the punishment of free-riders. Experimental behavior predicts subjects' cooperation in the field. Ethnographic studies in small-scale societies without formal coercive institutions demonstrate that disciplining defectors is both essential to cooperation and often costly to the punisher.
    PMID: 22289309 [PubMed - in process] (Source: The Behavioral and Brain Sciences)</description>
            <author>The Behavioral and Brain Sciences</author>
            <type>journals</type>
        <comments>http://www.medworm.com/rss/comments.php?id=5659011</comments>
            <pubDate>Wed, 01 Feb 2012 05:00:00 +0100</pubDate>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">5659011</guid>        </item>
        <item>
            <title>Weak reciprocity alone cannot explain peer punishment.</title>
            <link>http://www.medworm.com/index.php?rid=5659010&amp;cid=s_36932_168_f&amp;fid=36932&amp;url=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov%2Fentrez%2Fquery.fcgi%3Ftmpl%3DNoSidebarfile%26db%3DPubMed%26cmd%3DRetrieve%26list_uids%3D22289310%26dopt%3DAbstract</link>
            <description>Authors: Casari M
    Abstract
    The claims about (1) the lack of empirical support for a model of strong reciprocation and (2) the irrelevant empirical role of costly punishment to support cooperation in the field need qualifications. The interpretation of field evidence is not straightforward, and other-regarding preferences are also likely to play a role in the field.
    PMID: 22289310 [PubMed - in process] (Source: The Behavioral and Brain Sciences)</description>
            <author>The Behavioral and Brain Sciences</author>
            <type>journals</type>
        <comments>http://www.medworm.com/rss/comments.php?id=5659010</comments>
            <pubDate>Wed, 01 Feb 2012 05:00:00 +0100</pubDate>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">5659010</guid>        </item>
        <item>
            <title>In medio stat virtus: Theoretical and methodological extremes regarding reciprocity will not explain complex social behaviors.</title>
            <link>http://www.medworm.com/index.php?rid=5659009&amp;cid=s_36932_168_f&amp;fid=36932&amp;url=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov%2Fentrez%2Fquery.fcgi%3Ftmpl%3DNoSidebarfile%26db%3DPubMed%26cmd%3DRetrieve%26list_uids%3D22289311%26dopt%3DAbstract</link>
            <description>Authors: Civai C, Langus A
    Abstract
    Guala contests the validity of strong reciprocity as a key element in shaping social behavior by contrasting evidence from experimental games to that of natural and historic data. He suggests that in order to understand the evolution of social behavior researchers should focus on natural data and weak reciprocity. We disagree with Guala's proposal to shift the focus of the study from one extreme of the spectrum (strong reciprocity) to the other extreme (weak reciprocity). We argue that the study of the evolution of social behavior must be comparative in nature, and we point out experimental evidence that shows that social behavior is not cooperation determined by a set of fixed factors. We argue for a model that sees social behavior as a dynamic ...</description>
            <author>The Behavioral and Brain Sciences</author>
            <type>journals</type>
        <comments>http://www.medworm.com/rss/comments.php?id=5659009</comments>
            <pubDate>Wed, 01 Feb 2012 05:00:00 +0100</pubDate>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">5659009</guid>        </item>
        <item>
            <title>Examining punishment at different explanatory levels.</title>
            <link>http://www.medworm.com/index.php?rid=5659008&amp;cid=s_36932_168_f&amp;fid=36932&amp;url=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov%2Fentrez%2Fquery.fcgi%3Ftmpl%3DNoSidebarfile%26db%3DPubMed%26cmd%3DRetrieve%26list_uids%3D22289312%26dopt%3DAbstract</link>
            <description>Authors: Dos Santos M, Wedekind C
    Abstract
    Experimental studies on punishment have sometimes been over-interpreted not only for the reasons Guala lists, but also because of a frequent conflation of proximate and ultimate explanatory levels that Guala's review perpetuates. Moreover, for future analyses we may need a clearer classification of different kinds of punishment.
    PMID: 22289312 [PubMed - in process] (Source: The Behavioral and Brain Sciences)</description>
            <author>The Behavioral and Brain Sciences</author>
            <type>journals</type>
        <comments>http://www.medworm.com/rss/comments.php?id=5659008</comments>
            <pubDate>Wed, 01 Feb 2012 05:00:00 +0100</pubDate>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">5659008</guid>        </item>
        <item>
            <title>Retaliation and antisocial punishment are overlooked in many theoretical models as well as behavioral experiments.</title>
            <link>http://www.medworm.com/index.php?rid=5659007&amp;cid=s_36932_168_f&amp;fid=36932&amp;url=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov%2Fentrez%2Fquery.fcgi%3Ftmpl%3DNoSidebarfile%26db%3DPubMed%26cmd%3DRetrieve%26list_uids%3D22289313%26dopt%3DAbstract</link>
            <description>Authors: Dreber A, Rand DG
    Abstract
    Guala argues that there is a mismatch between most laboratory experiments on costly punishment and behavior in the field. In the lab, experimental designs typically suppress retaliation. The same is true for most theoretical models of the co-evolution of costly punishment and cooperation, which a priori exclude the possibility of defectors punishing cooperators.
    PMID: 22289313 [PubMed - in process] (Source: The Behavioral and Brain Sciences)</description>
            <author>The Behavioral and Brain Sciences</author>
            <type>journals</type>
        <comments>http://www.medworm.com/rss/comments.php?id=5659007</comments>
            <pubDate>Wed, 01 Feb 2012 05:00:00 +0100</pubDate>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">5659007</guid>        </item>
        <item>
            <title>Gossip as an effective and low-cost form of punishment.</title>
            <link>http://www.medworm.com/index.php?rid=5659006&amp;cid=s_36932_168_f&amp;fid=36932&amp;url=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov%2Fentrez%2Fquery.fcgi%3Ftmpl%3DNoSidebarfile%26db%3DPubMed%26cmd%3DRetrieve%26list_uids%3D22289314%26dopt%3DAbstract</link>
            <description>Authors: Feinberg M, Cheng JT, Willer R
    Abstract
    The spreading of reputational information about group members through gossip represents a widespread, efficient, and low-cost form of punishment. Research shows that negative arousal states motivate individuals to gossip about the transgressions of group members. By sharing information in this way groups are better able to promote cooperation and maintain social control and order.
    PMID: 22289314 [PubMed - in process] (Source: The Behavioral and Brain Sciences)</description>
            <author>The Behavioral and Brain Sciences</author>
            <type>journals</type>
        <comments>http://www.medworm.com/rss/comments.php?id=5659006</comments>
            <pubDate>Wed, 01 Feb 2012 05:00:00 +0100</pubDate>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">5659006</guid>        </item>
        <item>
            <title>Blood, sex, personality, power, and altruism: Factors influencing the validity of strong reciprocity.</title>
            <link>http://www.medworm.com/index.php?rid=5659005&amp;cid=s_36932_168_f&amp;fid=36932&amp;url=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov%2Fentrez%2Fquery.fcgi%3Ftmpl%3DNoSidebarfile%26db%3DPubMed%26cmd%3DRetrieve%26list_uids%3D22289315%26dopt%3DAbstract</link>
            <description>Authors: Ferguson E, Corr P
    Abstract
    It is argued that the generality of strong reciprocity theory (SRT) is limited by the existence of anonymous spontaneous cooperation, maintained in the absence of punishment, despite free-riding. We highlight how individual differences, status, sex, and the legitimacy of non-cooperation need to be examined to increase the internal and ecological validity of SRT experiments and, ultimately, SRT's external validity.
    PMID: 22289315 [PubMed - in process] (Source: The Behavioral and Brain Sciences)</description>
            <author>The Behavioral and Brain Sciences</author>
            <type>journals</type>
        <comments>http://www.medworm.com/rss/comments.php?id=5659005</comments>
            <pubDate>Wed, 01 Feb 2012 05:00:00 +0100</pubDate>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">5659005</guid>        </item>
        <item>
            <title>In the lab and the field: Punishment is rare in equilibrium.</title>
            <link>http://www.medworm.com/index.php?rid=5659004&amp;cid=s_36932_168_f&amp;fid=36932&amp;url=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov%2Fentrez%2Fquery.fcgi%3Ftmpl%3DNoSidebarfile%26db%3DPubMed%26cmd%3DRetrieve%26list_uids%3D22289316%26dopt%3DAbstract</link>
            <description>Authors: Gächter S
    Abstract
    I argue that field (experimental) studies on (costly) peer punishment in social dilemmas face the problem that in equilibrium punishment will be rare and therefore may be hard to observe in the field. I also argue that the behavioral logic uncovered by lab experiments is not fundamentally different from the behavioral logic of cooperation in the field.
    PMID: 22289316 [PubMed - in process] (Source: The Behavioral and Brain Sciences)</description>
            <author>The Behavioral and Brain Sciences</author>
            <type>journals</type>
        <comments>http://www.medworm.com/rss/comments.php?id=5659004</comments>
            <pubDate>Wed, 01 Feb 2012 05:00:00 +0100</pubDate>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">5659004</guid>        </item>
        <item>
            <title>The social structure of cooperation and punishment.</title>
            <link>http://www.medworm.com/index.php?rid=5659003&amp;cid=s_36932_168_f&amp;fid=36932&amp;url=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov%2Fentrez%2Fquery.fcgi%3Ftmpl%3DNoSidebarfile%26db%3DPubMed%26cmd%3DRetrieve%26list_uids%3D22289317%26dopt%3DAbstract</link>
            <description>Authors: Gintis H, Fehr E
    Abstract
    The standard theories of cooperation in humans, which depend on repeated interaction and reputation effects among self-regarding agents, are inadequate. Strong reciprocity, a predisposition to participate in costly cooperation and the punishment, fosters cooperation where self-regarding behaviors fail. The effectiveness of socially coordinated punishment depends on individual motivations to participate, which are based on strong reciprocity motives. The relative infrequency of high-cost punishment is a result of the ubiquity of strong reciprocity, not its absence.
    PMID: 22289317 [PubMed - in process] (Source: The Behavioral and Brain Sciences)</description>
            <author>The Behavioral and Brain Sciences</author>
            <type>journals</type>
        <comments>http://www.medworm.com/rss/comments.php?id=5659003</comments>
            <pubDate>Wed, 01 Feb 2012 05:00:00 +0100</pubDate>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">5659003</guid>        </item>
        <item>
            <title>Is strong reciprocity really strong in the lab, let alone in the real world?</title>
            <link>http://www.medworm.com/index.php?rid=5659002&amp;cid=s_36932_168_f&amp;fid=36932&amp;url=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov%2Fentrez%2Fquery.fcgi%3Ftmpl%3DNoSidebarfile%26db%3DPubMed%26cmd%3DRetrieve%26list_uids%3D22289318%26dopt%3DAbstract</link>
            <description>Authors: Güney S, Newell BR
    Abstract
    We argue that standard experiments supporting the existence of &quot;strong reciprocity&quot; do not represent many cooperative situations outside the laboratory. More representative experiments that incorporate &quot;earned&quot; rather than &quot;windfall&quot; wealth also do not provide evidence for the impact of strong reciprocity on cooperation in contemporary real-life situations or in evolutionary history, supporting the main conclusions of the target article.
    PMID: 22289318 [PubMed - in process] (Source: The Behavioral and Brain Sciences)</description>
            <author>The Behavioral and Brain Sciences</author>
            <type>journals</type>
        <comments>http://www.medworm.com/rss/comments.php?id=5659002</comments>
            <pubDate>Wed, 01 Feb 2012 05:00:00 +0100</pubDate>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">5659002</guid>        </item>
        <item>
            <title>Understanding the research program.</title>
            <link>http://www.medworm.com/index.php?rid=5659001&amp;cid=s_36932_168_f&amp;fid=36932&amp;url=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov%2Fentrez%2Fquery.fcgi%3Ftmpl%3DNoSidebarfile%26db%3DPubMed%26cmd%3DRetrieve%26list_uids%3D22289319%26dopt%3DAbstract</link>
            <description>Authors: Henrich J, Chudek M
    Abstract
    The target article misunderstands the research program it criticizes. The work of Boyd, Richerson, Fehr, Gintis, Bowles and their collaborators has long included the theoretical and empirical study of models both with and without diffuse costly punishment. In triaging the situation, we aim to (1) clarify the theoretical landscape, (2) highlight key points of agreement, and (3) suggest a more productive line of debate.
    PMID: 22289319 [PubMed - in process] (Source: The Behavioral and Brain Sciences)</description>
            <author>The Behavioral and Brain Sciences</author>
            <type>journals</type>
        <comments>http://www.medworm.com/rss/comments.php?id=5659001</comments>
            <pubDate>Wed, 01 Feb 2012 05:00:00 +0100</pubDate>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">5659001</guid>        </item>
        <item>
            <title>Social preference experiments in animals: Strengthening the case for human preferences.</title>
            <link>http://www.medworm.com/index.php?rid=5659000&amp;cid=s_36932_168_f&amp;fid=36932&amp;url=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov%2Fentrez%2Fquery.fcgi%3Ftmpl%3DNoSidebarfile%26db%3DPubMed%26cmd%3DRetrieve%26list_uids%3D22289320%26dopt%3DAbstract</link>
            <description>Authors: Jensen K
    Abstract
    Guala appears to take social preferences for granted in his discussion of reciprocity experiments. While he does not overtly claim that social preferences are only by-products that arise in testing environments, he does assert that whatever they are - and how they evolved - they have little value in the real world. Experiments on animals suggest that social preferences may be unique to humans, supporting the idea that they might play a prominent role in our world.
    PMID: 22289320 [PubMed - in process] (Source: The Behavioral and Brain Sciences)</description>
            <author>The Behavioral and Brain Sciences</author>
            <type>journals</type>
        <comments>http://www.medworm.com/rss/comments.php?id=5659000</comments>
            <pubDate>Wed, 01 Feb 2012 05:00:00 +0100</pubDate>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">5659000</guid>        </item>
        <item>
            <title>The strategic logic of costly punishment necessitates natural field experiments, and at least one such experiment exists.</title>
            <link>http://www.medworm.com/index.php?rid=5658999&amp;cid=s_36932_168_f&amp;fid=36932&amp;url=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov%2Fentrez%2Fquery.fcgi%3Ftmpl%3DNoSidebarfile%26db%3DPubMed%26cmd%3DRetrieve%26list_uids%3D22289321%26dopt%3DAbstract</link>
            <description>Authors: Johnson T
    Abstract
    Costly punishment's scarcity &quot;in the wild&quot; does not belie strong reciprocity theory as Guala claims. In the presence of strong reciprocators, strategic defectors will cooperate and sanctioning will not occur. Accordingly, natural field experiments are necessary to assess a &quot;wide&quot; reading of costly punishment experiments. One such field experiment exists, and it supports the hypothesis that costly punishment promotes cooperation.
    PMID: 22289321 [PubMed - in process] (Source: The Behavioral and Brain Sciences)</description>
            <author>The Behavioral and Brain Sciences</author>
            <type>journals</type>
        <comments>http://www.medworm.com/rss/comments.php?id=5658999</comments>
            <pubDate>Wed, 01 Feb 2012 05:00:00 +0100</pubDate>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">5658999</guid>        </item>
        <item>
            <title>Altruistic punishment: What field data can (and cannot) demonstrate.</title>
            <link>http://www.medworm.com/index.php?rid=5658998&amp;cid=s_36932_168_f&amp;fid=36932&amp;url=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov%2Fentrez%2Fquery.fcgi%3Ftmpl%3DNoSidebarfile%26db%3DPubMed%26cmd%3DRetrieve%26list_uids%3D22289322%26dopt%3DAbstract</link>
            <description>Authors: Nikiforakis N
    Abstract
    The rarity of altruistic punishment in small-scale societies should not be interpreted as evidence that altruistic punishment is not an important determinant of cooperation in general. While it is essential to collect field data on altruistic punishment, this kind of data has limitations. Laboratory experiments can help shed light on the role of altruistic punishment &quot;in the wild.&quot;
    PMID: 22289322 [PubMed - in process] (Source: The Behavioral and Brain Sciences)</description>
            <author>The Behavioral and Brain Sciences</author>
            <type>journals</type>
        <comments>http://www.medworm.com/rss/comments.php?id=5658998</comments>
            <pubDate>Wed, 01 Feb 2012 05:00:00 +0100</pubDate>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">5658998</guid>        </item>
        <item>
            <title>Experiments combining communication with punishment options demonstrate how individuals can overcome social dilemmas.</title>
            <link>http://www.medworm.com/index.php?rid=5658997&amp;cid=s_36932_168_f&amp;fid=36932&amp;url=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov%2Fentrez%2Fquery.fcgi%3Ftmpl%3DNoSidebarfile%26db%3DPubMed%26cmd%3DRetrieve%26list_uids%3D22289323%26dopt%3DAbstract</link>
            <description>Authors: Ostrom E
    Abstract
    Guala raises important questions about the misinterpretation of experimental studies that have found that subjects engage in costly punishment. Instead of positing that punishment is the solution for social dilemmas, earlier research posited that when individuals facing a social dilemma agreed on their own rules and used graduated sanctions, they were more likely to have robust solutions over time.
    PMID: 22289323 [PubMed - in process] (Source: The Behavioral and Brain Sciences)</description>
            <author>The Behavioral and Brain Sciences</author>
            <type>journals</type>
        <comments>http://www.medworm.com/rss/comments.php?id=5658997</comments>
            <pubDate>Wed, 01 Feb 2012 05:00:00 +0100</pubDate>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">5658997</guid>        </item>
        <item>
            <title>Importing social preferences across contexts and the pitfall of over-generalization across theories.</title>
            <link>http://www.medworm.com/index.php?rid=5658996&amp;cid=s_36932_168_f&amp;fid=36932&amp;url=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov%2Fentrez%2Fquery.fcgi%3Ftmpl%3DNoSidebarfile%26db%3DPubMed%26cmd%3DRetrieve%26list_uids%3D22289324%26dopt%3DAbstract</link>
            <description>Authors: Pisor AC, Fessler DM
    Abstract
    Claims regarding negative strong reciprocity do indeed rest on experiments lacking established external validity, often without even a small &quot;menu of options.&quot; Guala's review should prompt strong reciprocity proponents to extend the real-world validity of their work, exploring the preferences participants bring to experiments. That said, Guala's approach fails to differentiate among group selection approaches and glosses over cross-cultural variability.
    PMID: 22289324 [PubMed - in process] (Source: The Behavioral and Brain Sciences)</description>
            <author>The Behavioral and Brain Sciences</author>
            <type>journals</type>
        <comments>http://www.medworm.com/rss/comments.php?id=5658996</comments>
            <pubDate>Wed, 01 Feb 2012 05:00:00 +0100</pubDate>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">5658996</guid>        </item>
        <item>
            <title>Culture: The missing piece in theories of weak and strong reciprocity.</title>
            <link>http://www.medworm.com/index.php?rid=5658995&amp;cid=s_36932_168_f&amp;fid=36932&amp;url=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov%2Fentrez%2Fquery.fcgi%3Ftmpl%3DNoSidebarfile%26db%3DPubMed%26cmd%3DRetrieve%26list_uids%3D22289325%26dopt%3DAbstract</link>
            <description>Authors: Read D
    Abstract
    Guala does not go far enough in his critique of the assumption that human decisions about sharing made in the context of experimental game conditions accurately reflect decision-making under real conditions. Sharing of hunted animals is constrained by cultural rules and is not &quot;spontaneous cooperation&quot; as assumed in models of weak and strong reciprocity. Missing in these models is the cultural basis of sharing that makes it a group property rather than an individual one.
    PMID: 22289325 [PubMed - in process] (Source: The Behavioral and Brain Sciences)</description>
            <author>The Behavioral and Brain Sciences</author>
            <type>journals</type>
        <comments>http://www.medworm.com/rss/comments.php?id=5658995</comments>
            <pubDate>Wed, 01 Feb 2012 05:00:00 +0100</pubDate>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">5658995</guid>        </item>
        <item>
            <title>Towards a unified theory of reciprocity.</title>
            <link>http://www.medworm.com/index.php?rid=5658994&amp;cid=s_36932_168_f&amp;fid=36932&amp;url=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov%2Fentrez%2Fquery.fcgi%3Ftmpl%3DNoSidebarfile%26db%3DPubMed%26cmd%3DRetrieve%26list_uids%3D22289326%26dopt%3DAbstract</link>
            <description>Authors: Rosas A
    Abstract
    In a unified theory of human reciprocity, the strong and weak forms are similar because neither is biologically altruistic and both require normative motivation to support cooperation. However, strong reciprocity is necessary to support cooperation in public goods games. It involves inflicting costs on defectors; and though the costs for punishers are recouped, recouping costs requires complex institutions that would not have emerged if weak reciprocity had been enough.
    PMID: 22289326 [PubMed - in process] (Source: The Behavioral and Brain Sciences)</description>
            <author>The Behavioral and Brain Sciences</author>
            <type>journals</type>
        <comments>http://www.medworm.com/rss/comments.php?id=5658994</comments>
            <pubDate>Wed, 01 Feb 2012 05:00:00 +0100</pubDate>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">5658994</guid>        </item>
        <item>
            <title>Special human vulnerability to low-cost collective punishment.</title>
            <link>http://www.medworm.com/index.php?rid=5658993&amp;cid=s_36932_168_f&amp;fid=36932&amp;url=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov%2Fentrez%2Fquery.fcgi%3Ftmpl%3DNoSidebarfile%26db%3DPubMed%26cmd%3DRetrieve%26list_uids%3D22289327%26dopt%3DAbstract</link>
            <description>Authors: Ross D
    Abstract
    Guala notes that low-cost punishment is the main mechanism that deters free-riding in small human communities. This mechanism is complemented by unusual human vulnerability to gossip. Defenders of an evolutionary discontinuity supporting human sociality might seize on this as an alternative to enjoyment of moralistic aggression as a special adaptation. However, the more basic adaptation of language likely suffices.
    PMID: 22289327 [PubMed - in process] (Source: The Behavioral and Brain Sciences)</description>
            <author>The Behavioral and Brain Sciences</author>
            <type>journals</type>
        <comments>http://www.medworm.com/rss/comments.php?id=5658993</comments>
            <pubDate>Wed, 01 Feb 2012 05:00:00 +0100</pubDate>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">5658993</guid>        </item>
        <item>
            <title>Strong reciprocity is not uncommon in the &quot;wild&quot;.</title>
            <link>http://www.medworm.com/index.php?rid=5658992&amp;cid=s_36932_168_f&amp;fid=36932&amp;url=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov%2Fentrez%2Fquery.fcgi%3Ftmpl%3DNoSidebarfile%26db%3DPubMed%26cmd%3DRetrieve%26list_uids%3D22289328%26dopt%3DAbstract</link>
            <description>Strong reciprocity is not uncommon in the &quot;wild&quot;.
    Behav Brain Sci. 2012 Feb;35(1):38-9
    Authors: Runciman WG
    Abstract
    Guala is right to draw attention to the difficulty of extrapolating from the experimental evidence for weak or strong reciprocity to what is observed in the &quot;wild.&quot; However, there may be more strong reciprocity in real-world communities than he allows for, as strikingly illustrated in the example of the Mafia.
    PMID: 22289328 [PubMed - in process] (Source: The Behavioral and Brain Sciences)</description>
            <author>The Behavioral and Brain Sciences</author>
            <type>journals</type>
        <comments>http://www.medworm.com/rss/comments.php?id=5658992</comments>
            <pubDate>Wed, 01 Feb 2012 05:00:00 +0100</pubDate>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">5658992</guid>        </item>
        <item>
            <title>Lab support for strong reciprocity is weak: Punishing for reputation rather than cooperation.</title>
            <link>http://www.medworm.com/index.php?rid=5658991&amp;cid=s_36932_168_f&amp;fid=36932&amp;url=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov%2Fentrez%2Fquery.fcgi%3Ftmpl%3DNoSidebarfile%26db%3DPubMed%26cmd%3DRetrieve%26list_uids%3D22289329%26dopt%3DAbstract</link>
            <description>Authors: Shaw A, Santos L
    Abstract
    Strong reciprocity is not the only account that can explain costly punishment in the lab; it can also be explained by reputation-based accounts. We discuss these two accounts and suggest what kinds of evidence would support the two different alternatives. We conclude that the current evidence favors a reputation-based account of costly punishment.
    PMID: 22289329 [PubMed - in process] (Source: The Behavioral and Brain Sciences)</description>
            <author>The Behavioral and Brain Sciences</author>
            <type>journals</type>
        <comments>http://www.medworm.com/rss/comments.php?id=5658991</comments>
            <pubDate>Wed, 01 Feb 2012 05:00:00 +0100</pubDate>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">5658991</guid>        </item>
        <item>
            <title>Altruistic punishment as an explanation of hunter-gatherer cooperation: How much has experimental economics achieved?</title>
            <link>http://www.medworm.com/index.php?rid=5658990&amp;cid=s_36932_168_f&amp;fid=36932&amp;url=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov%2Fentrez%2Fquery.fcgi%3Ftmpl%3DNoSidebarfile%26db%3DPubMed%26cmd%3DRetrieve%26list_uids%3D22289330%26dopt%3DAbstract</link>
            <description>Authors: Sugden R
    Abstract
    The discovery of the altruistic punishment mechanism as a replicable experimental result is a genuine achievement of behavioural economics. The hypothesis that cooperation in hunter-gatherer societies is sustained by altruistic punishment is a scientifically legitimate conjecture, but it must be tested against real-world observations. Guala's doubts about the evidential support for this hypothesis are well founded.
    PMID: 22289330 [PubMed - in process] (Source: The Behavioral and Brain Sciences)</description>
            <author>The Behavioral and Brain Sciences</author>
            <type>journals</type>
        <comments>http://www.medworm.com/rss/comments.php?id=5658990</comments>
            <pubDate>Wed, 01 Feb 2012 05:00:00 +0100</pubDate>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">5658990</guid>        </item>
        <item>
            <title>Punishing for your own good: The case of reputation-based cooperation.</title>
            <link>http://www.medworm.com/index.php?rid=5658989&amp;cid=s_36932_168_f&amp;fid=36932&amp;url=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov%2Fentrez%2Fquery.fcgi%3Ftmpl%3DNoSidebarfile%26db%3DPubMed%26cmd%3DRetrieve%26list_uids%3D22289331%26dopt%3DAbstract</link>
            <description>Authors: Tennie C
    Abstract
    Contrary to Guala, I claim that several mechanisms can explain punishment in humans. Here I focus on reputation-based cooperation - and I explore how it can lead to punishment under situations that may or may not be perceived as being anonymous. Additionally, no particular mechanism stands out in predicting an excess of punishment under constrained lab conditions.
    PMID: 22289331 [PubMed - in process] (Source: The Behavioral and Brain Sciences)</description>
            <author>The Behavioral and Brain Sciences</author>
            <type>journals</type>
        <comments>http://www.medworm.com/rss/comments.php?id=5658989</comments>
            <pubDate>Wed, 01 Feb 2012 05:00:00 +0100</pubDate>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">5658989</guid>        </item>
        <item>
            <title>What we need is theory of human cooperation (and meta-analysis) to bridge the gap between the lab and the wild.</title>
            <link>http://www.medworm.com/index.php?rid=5658988&amp;cid=s_36932_168_f&amp;fid=36932&amp;url=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov%2Fentrez%2Fquery.fcgi%3Ftmpl%3DNoSidebarfile%26db%3DPubMed%26cmd%3DRetrieve%26list_uids%3D22289332%26dopt%3DAbstract</link>
            <description>Authors: Van Lange PA, Balliet DP, Ijzerman H
    Abstract
    This commentary seeks to clarify the potential discrepancy between lab-based and field data in the use and effectiveness of punishment to promote cooperation by recommending theory that outlines key differences between the lab and field, such as the shadow of the future and degree of information availability. We also discuss a recent meta-analysis (Balliet et al. 2011) that does not support all conclusions outlined in Guala's target article.
    PMID: 22289332 [PubMed - in process] (Source: The Behavioral and Brain Sciences)</description>
            <author>The Behavioral and Brain Sciences</author>
            <type>journals</type>
        <comments>http://www.medworm.com/rss/comments.php?id=5658988</comments>
            <pubDate>Wed, 01 Feb 2012 05:00:00 +0100</pubDate>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">5658988</guid>        </item>
        <item>
            <title>The social costs of punishment.</title>
            <link>http://www.medworm.com/index.php?rid=5658987&amp;cid=s_36932_168_f&amp;fid=36932&amp;url=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov%2Fentrez%2Fquery.fcgi%3Ftmpl%3DNoSidebarfile%26db%3DPubMed%26cmd%3DRetrieve%26list_uids%3D22289333%26dopt%3DAbstract</link>
            <description>Authors: van den Berg P, Molleman L, Weissing FJ
    Abstract
    Lab experiments on punishment are of limited relevance for understanding cooperative behavior in the real world. In real interactions, punishment is not cheap, but the costs of punishment are of a different nature than in experiments. They do not correspond to direct payments or payoff deductions, but they arise from the repercussions punishment has on social networks and future interactions.
    PMID: 22289333 [PubMed - in process] (Source: The Behavioral and Brain Sciences)</description>
            <author>The Behavioral and Brain Sciences</author>
            <type>journals</type>
        <comments>http://www.medworm.com/rss/comments.php?id=5658987</comments>
            <pubDate>Wed, 01 Feb 2012 05:00:00 +0100</pubDate>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">5658987</guid>        </item>
        <item>
            <title>When the strong punish: Why net costs of punishment are often negligible.</title>
            <link>http://www.medworm.com/index.php?rid=5658986&amp;cid=s_36932_168_f&amp;fid=36932&amp;url=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov%2Fentrez%2Fquery.fcgi%3Ftmpl%3DNoSidebarfile%26db%3DPubMed%26cmd%3DRetrieve%26list_uids%3D22289334%26dopt%3DAbstract</link>
            <description>Authors: von Rueden CR, Gurven M
    Abstract
    In small-scale societies, punishment of adults is infrequent and employed when the anticipated cost-to-benefit ratio is low, such as when punishment is collectively justified and administered. In addition, benefits may exceed costs when punishers have relatively greater physical and social capital and gain more from cooperation. We provide examples from the Tsimane horticulturalists of Bolivia to support our claims.
    PMID: 22289334 [PubMed - in process] (Source: The Behavioral and Brain Sciences)</description>
            <author>The Behavioral and Brain Sciences</author>
            <type>journals</type>
        <comments>http://www.medworm.com/rss/comments.php?id=5658986</comments>
            <pubDate>Wed, 01 Feb 2012 05:00:00 +0100</pubDate>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">5658986</guid>        </item>
        <item>
            <title>Perspectives from ethnography on weak and strong reciprocity.</title>
            <link>http://www.medworm.com/index.php?rid=5658985&amp;cid=s_36932_168_f&amp;fid=36932&amp;url=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov%2Fentrez%2Fquery.fcgi%3Ftmpl%3DNoSidebarfile%26db%3DPubMed%26cmd%3DRetrieve%26list_uids%3D22289335%26dopt%3DAbstract</link>
            <description>Authors: Wiessner P
    Abstract
    To add ethnographic perspective to Guala's arguments, I suggest reasons why experimental and ethnographic evidence do not concur and highlight some difficulties in measuring whether positive and negative reciprocity are indeed costly. I suggest that institutions to reduce the costs of maintaining cooperation are not limited to complex societies.
    PMID: 22289335 [PubMed - in process] (Source: The Behavioral and Brain Sciences)</description>
            <author>The Behavioral and Brain Sciences</author>
            <type>journals</type>
        <comments>http://www.medworm.com/rss/comments.php?id=5658985</comments>
            <pubDate>Wed, 01 Feb 2012 05:00:00 +0100</pubDate>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">5658985</guid>        </item>
        <item>
            <title>Parasite-stress, cultures of honor, and the emergence of gender bias in purity norms.</title>
            <link>http://www.medworm.com/index.php?rid=5659031&amp;cid=s_36932_168_f&amp;fid=36932&amp;url=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov%2Fentrez%2Fquery.fcgi%3Ftmpl%3DNoSidebarfile%26db%3DPubMed%26cmd%3DRetrieve%26list_uids%3D22289148%26dopt%3DAbstract</link>
            <description>Authors: Vandello JA, Hettinger VE
    Abstract
    Of the many far-reaching implications of Fincher &amp; Thornhill's (F&amp;T's) theory, we focus on the consequences of parasite stress for mating strategies, marriage, and the differing roles and restrictions for men and women. In particular, we explain how examination of cultures of honor can provide a theoretical bridge between effects of parasite stress and disproportionate emphasis on female purity.
    PMID: 22289148 [PubMed - as supplied by publisher] (Source: The Behavioral and Brain Sciences)</description>
            <author>The Behavioral and Brain Sciences</author>
            <type>journals</type>
        <comments>http://www.medworm.com/rss/comments.php?id=5659031</comments>
            <pubDate>Tue, 31 Jan 2012 05:00:00 +0100</pubDate>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">5659031</guid>        </item>
        <item>
            <title>Climato-economic livability predicts societal collectivism and political autocracy better than parasitic stress does.</title>
            <link>http://www.medworm.com/index.php?rid=5659030&amp;cid=s_36932_168_f&amp;fid=36932&amp;url=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov%2Fentrez%2Fquery.fcgi%3Ftmpl%3DNoSidebarfile%26db%3DPubMed%26cmd%3DRetrieve%26list_uids%3D22289160%26dopt%3DAbstract</link>
            <description>Authors: Van de Vliert E, Postmes T
    Abstract
    A 121-nation study of societal collectivism and a 174-nation study of political autocracy show that parasitic stress does not account for any variation in these components of culture once the interactive impacts of climatic demands and income resources have been accounted for. Climato-economic livability is a viable rival explanation for the reported effects of parasitic stress on culture.
    PMID: 22289160 [PubMed - as supplied by publisher] (Source: The Behavioral and Brain Sciences)</description>
            <author>The Behavioral and Brain Sciences</author>
            <type>journals</type>
        <comments>http://www.medworm.com/rss/comments.php?id=5659030</comments>
            <pubDate>Tue, 31 Jan 2012 05:00:00 +0100</pubDate>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">5659030</guid>        </item>
        <item>
            <title>Intra-regional assortative sociality may be better explained by social network dynamics rather than pathogen risk avoidance.</title>
            <link>http://www.medworm.com/index.php?rid=5659029&amp;cid=s_36932_168_f&amp;fid=36932&amp;url=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov%2Fentrez%2Fquery.fcgi%3Ftmpl%3DNoSidebarfile%26db%3DPubMed%26cmd%3DRetrieve%26list_uids%3D22289188%26dopt%3DAbstract</link>
            <description>Authors: Vigil JM, Coulombe P
    Abstract
    Fincher &amp; Thornhill's (F&amp;T's) model is not entirely supported by common patterns of affect behaviors among people who live under varying climatic conditions and among people who endorse varying levels of (Western) religiosity and conservative political ideals. The authors' model is also unable to account for intra-regional heterogeneity in assortative sociality, which, we argue, can be better explained by a framework that emphasizes the differential expression of fundamental social cues for maintaining distinct social network structures.
    PMID: 22289188 [PubMed - as supplied by publisher] (Source: The Behavioral and Brain Sciences)</description>
            <author>The Behavioral and Brain Sciences</author>
            <type>journals</type>
        <comments>http://www.medworm.com/rss/comments.php?id=5659029</comments>
            <pubDate>Tue, 31 Jan 2012 05:00:00 +0100</pubDate>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">5659029</guid>        </item>
        <item>
            <title>Immigration, parasitic infection, and United States religiosity.</title>
            <link>http://www.medworm.com/index.php?rid=5659028&amp;cid=s_36932_168_f&amp;fid=36932&amp;url=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov%2Fentrez%2Fquery.fcgi%3Ftmpl%3DNoSidebarfile%26db%3DPubMed%26cmd%3DRetrieve%26list_uids%3D22289210%26dopt%3DAbstract</link>
            <description>Authors: Wall JN, Shackelford TK
    Abstract
    Fincher &amp; Thornhill (F&amp;T) present a powerful case for the relationship between parasite-stress and religiosity. We argue, however, that the United States may be more religious than can be accounted for by parasite-stress. This greater religiosity might be attributable to greater sensitivity to immigration, which may hyperactivate evolved mechanisms that motivate avoidance of potential carriers of novel parasites.
    PMID: 22289210 [PubMed - as supplied by publisher] (Source: The Behavioral and Brain Sciences)</description>
            <author>The Behavioral and Brain Sciences</author>
            <type>journals</type>
        <comments>http://www.medworm.com/rss/comments.php?id=5659028</comments>
            <pubDate>Tue, 31 Jan 2012 05:00:00 +0100</pubDate>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">5659028</guid>        </item>
        <item>
            <title>Parasite-stress promotes in-group assortative sociality: The cases of strong family ties and heightened religiosity.</title>
            <link>http://www.medworm.com/index.php?rid=5659027&amp;cid=s_36932_168_f&amp;fid=36932&amp;url=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov%2Fentrez%2Fquery.fcgi%3Ftmpl%3DNoSidebarfile%26db%3DPubMed%26cmd%3DRetrieve%26list_uids%3D22289223%26dopt%3DAbstract</link>
            <description>We examined this hypothesis by testing the predictions that there would be a positive association between parasite-stress and strength of family ties or religiosity. We conducted this study by comparing among nations and among states in the United States of America. We found for both the international and the interstate analyses that in-group assortative sociality was positively associated with parasite-stress. This was true when controlling for potentially confounding factors such as human freedom and economic development. The findings support the parasite-stress theory of sociality, that is, the proposal that parasite-stress is central to the evolution of social life in humans and other animals.
    PMID: 22289223 [PubMed - as supplied by publisher] (Source: The Behavioral and Brain Scie...</description>
            <author>The Behavioral and Brain Sciences</author>
            <type>journals</type>
        <comments>http://www.medworm.com/rss/comments.php?id=5659027</comments>
            <pubDate>Tue, 31 Jan 2012 05:00:00 +0100</pubDate>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">5659027</guid>        </item>
        <item>
            <title>Time allocation, religious observance, and illness in Mayan horticulturalists.</title>
            <link>http://www.medworm.com/index.php?rid=5659026&amp;cid=s_36932_168_f&amp;fid=36932&amp;url=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov%2Fentrez%2Fquery.fcgi%3Ftmpl%3DNoSidebarfile%26db%3DPubMed%26cmd%3DRetrieve%26list_uids%3D22289224%26dopt%3DAbstract</link>
            <description>Authors: Waynforth D
    Abstract
    Analysis of individual differences in religious observance in a Belizean community showed that the most religious (pastors and church workers) reported more illnesses, and that there was no tendency for the religiously observant to restrict their interactions to family or extended family. Instead, the most religiously observant tended to have community roles that widened their social contact: religion did not aid isolation - thus violating a key assumption of the parasite-stress theory of sociality.
    PMID: 22289224 [PubMed - as supplied by publisher] (Source: The Behavioral and Brain Sciences)</description>
            <author>The Behavioral and Brain Sciences</author>
            <type>journals</type>
        <comments>http://www.medworm.com/rss/comments.php?id=5659026</comments>
            <pubDate>Tue, 31 Jan 2012 05:00:00 +0100</pubDate>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">5659026</guid>        </item>
        <item>
            <title>Connecting biological concepts and religious behavior.</title>
            <link>http://www.medworm.com/index.php?rid=5659025&amp;cid=s_36932_168_f&amp;fid=36932&amp;url=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov%2Fentrez%2Fquery.fcgi%3Ftmpl%3DNoSidebarfile%26db%3DPubMed%26cmd%3DRetrieve%26list_uids%3D22289267%26dopt%3DAbstract</link>
            <description>Authors: Beit-Hallahmi B
    Abstract
    This commentary proposes experiments to examine connections between the presence of out-group members, neurovisceral reactions, religiosity, and ethnocentrism, to clarify the meaning of the correlational findings presented in the target article. It also suggests different ways of describing religious socialization and of viewing assertions about religion and health or about the human ability to detect pathogens.
    PMID: 22289267 [PubMed - as supplied by publisher] (Source: The Behavioral and Brain Sciences)</description>
            <author>The Behavioral and Brain Sciences</author>
            <type>journals</type>
        <comments>http://www.medworm.com/rss/comments.php?id=5659025</comments>
            <pubDate>Tue, 31 Jan 2012 05:00:00 +0100</pubDate>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">5659025</guid>        </item>
        <item>
            <title>Coping with germs and people: Investigating the link between pathogen threat and human social cognition.</title>
            <link>http://www.medworm.com/index.php?rid=5659024&amp;cid=s_36932_168_f&amp;fid=36932&amp;url=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov%2Fentrez%2Fquery.fcgi%3Ftmpl%3DNoSidebarfile%26db%3DPubMed%26cmd%3DRetrieve%26list_uids%3D22289268%26dopt%3DAbstract</link>
            <description>Authors: Navarrete CD
    Abstract
    Group assortative biases are stronger in regions where pathogen stress has been historically prevalent. Pushing the logic of this approach, extensions should include investigations of how cultural norms related to prosociality and relational striving may also covary with regional pathogen stress. Likewise, the pan-specific observation that diseased animals show decreased motor activity to facilitate recovery suggests that norms relevant to sickness behaviors may also vary as a function of regional parasite stress.
    PMID: 22289268 [PubMed - as supplied by publisher] (Source: The Behavioral and Brain Sciences)</description>
            <author>The Behavioral and Brain Sciences</author>
            <type>journals</type>
        <comments>http://www.medworm.com/rss/comments.php?id=5659024</comments>
            <pubDate>Tue, 31 Jan 2012 05:00:00 +0100</pubDate>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">5659024</guid>        </item>
        <item>
            <title>Condition-dependent adaptive phenotypic plasticity and interspecific gene-culture coevolution.</title>
            <link>http://www.medworm.com/index.php?rid=5659023&amp;cid=s_36932_168_f&amp;fid=36932&amp;url=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov%2Fentrez%2Fquery.fcgi%3Ftmpl%3DNoSidebarfile%26db%3DPubMed%26cmd%3DRetrieve%26list_uids%3D22289275%26dopt%3DAbstract</link>
            <description>Authors: Blute M
    Abstract
    Evolutionary socioecological theory and research proposing linking parasites with human social organization is uncommon and therefore welcome. However, more generally, condition-dependent adaptive phenotypic plasticity requires environmental uncertainty on a small scale, accompanied by reliable cues. In addition, genes in parasites may select among biologically adaptive cultural alternatives directly without necessarily going through human genetic predispositions, resulting in inter-specific gene-culture coevolution.
    PMID: 22289275 [PubMed - as supplied by publisher] (Source: The Behavioral and Brain Sciences)</description>
            <author>The Behavioral and Brain Sciences</author>
            <type>journals</type>
        <comments>http://www.medworm.com/rss/comments.php?id=5659023</comments>
            <pubDate>Tue, 31 Jan 2012 05:00:00 +0100</pubDate>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">5659023</guid>        </item>
        <item>
            <title>Parasite stress is not so critical to the history of religions or major modern group formations.</title>
            <link>http://www.medworm.com/index.php?rid=5659022&amp;cid=s_36932_168_f&amp;fid=36932&amp;url=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov%2Fentrez%2Fquery.fcgi%3Ftmpl%3DNoSidebarfile%26db%3DPubMed%26cmd%3DRetrieve%26list_uids%3D22289276%26dopt%3DAbstract</link>
            <description>Authors: Atran S
    Abstract
    Fincher &amp; Thornhill's (F&amp;T's) central hypothesis is that strong in-group norms were formed in part to foster parochial social alliances so as to enable cultural groups to adaptively respond to parasite stress. Applied to ancestral hominid environments, the story fits with evolutionary theory and the fragmentary data available on early hominid social formations and their geographical distributions. Applied to modern social formations, however, the arguments and inferences from data are problematic.
    PMID: 22289276 [PubMed - as supplied by publisher] (Source: The Behavioral and Brain Sciences)</description>
            <author>The Behavioral and Brain Sciences</author>
            <type>journals</type>
        <comments>http://www.medworm.com/rss/comments.php?id=5659022</comments>
            <pubDate>Tue, 31 Jan 2012 05:00:00 +0100</pubDate>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">5659022</guid>        </item>
        <item>
            <title>Pathogens promote matrilocal family ties and the copying of foreign religions.</title>
            <link>http://www.medworm.com/index.php?rid=5659021&amp;cid=s_36932_168_f&amp;fid=36932&amp;url=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov%2Fentrez%2Fquery.fcgi%3Ftmpl%3DNoSidebarfile%26db%3DPubMed%26cmd%3DRetrieve%26list_uids%3D22289282%26dopt%3DAbstract</link>
            <description>Authors: Chang L, Lu HJ, Wu BP
    Abstract
    Within the same pathogen-stress framework as proposed by Fincher &amp; Thornhill (F&amp;T), we argue further that pathogen stress promotes matrilocal rather than patrilocal family ties which, in turn, slow down the process of modernity; and that pathogen stress promotes social learning or copying, including the adoption of foreign religions.
    PMID: 22289282 [PubMed - as supplied by publisher] (Source: The Behavioral and Brain Sciences)</description>
            <author>The Behavioral and Brain Sciences</author>
            <type>journals</type>
        <comments>http://www.medworm.com/rss/comments.php?id=5659021</comments>
            <pubDate>Tue, 31 Jan 2012 05:00:00 +0100</pubDate>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">5659021</guid>        </item>
        <item>
            <title>In-group loyalty or out-group avoidance? Isolating the links between pathogens and in-group assortative sociality.</title>
            <link>http://www.medworm.com/index.php?rid=5659020&amp;cid=s_36932_168_f&amp;fid=36932&amp;url=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov%2Fentrez%2Fquery.fcgi%3Ftmpl%3DNoSidebarfile%26db%3DPubMed%26cmd%3DRetrieve%26list_uids%3D22289289%26dopt%3DAbstract</link>
            <description>Authors: Cashdan E
    Abstract
    The target article gives two explanations for the correlation between pathogens, family ties, and religiosity: one highlights the benefits of xenophobic attitudes for reducing pathogen exposure, the other highlights the benefits of ethnic loyalty for mitigating the costs when a person falls ill. Preliminary data from traditional societies provide some support for the former explanation but not the latter.
    PMID: 22289289 [PubMed - as supplied by publisher] (Source: The Behavioral and Brain Sciences)</description>
            <author>The Behavioral and Brain Sciences</author>
            <type>journals</type>
        <comments>http://www.medworm.com/rss/comments.php?id=5659020</comments>
            <pubDate>Tue, 31 Jan 2012 05:00:00 +0100</pubDate>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">5659020</guid>        </item>
        <item>
            <title>Analyses do not support the parasite-stress theory of human sociality.</title>
            <link>http://www.medworm.com/index.php?rid=5659019&amp;cid=s_36932_168_f&amp;fid=36932&amp;url=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov%2Fentrez%2Fquery.fcgi%3Ftmpl%3DNoSidebarfile%26db%3DPubMed%26cmd%3DRetrieve%26list_uids%3D22289294%26dopt%3DAbstract</link>
            <description>Authors: Currie TE, Mace R
    Abstract
    Re-analysis of the data provided in the target article reveals a lack of evidence for a strong, universal relationship between parasite stress and the variables relating to sociality. Furthermore, even if associations between these variables do exist, the analyses presented here do not provide evidence for Fincher &amp; Thornhill's (F&amp;T's) proposed causal mechanism.
    PMID: 22289294 [PubMed - as supplied by publisher] (Source: The Behavioral and Brain Sciences)</description>
            <author>The Behavioral and Brain Sciences</author>
            <type>journals</type>
        <comments>http://www.medworm.com/rss/comments.php?id=5659019</comments>
            <pubDate>Tue, 31 Jan 2012 05:00:00 +0100</pubDate>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">5659019</guid>        </item>
        <item>
            <title>Are the pathogens of out-groups really more dangerous?</title>
            <link>http://www.medworm.com/index.php?rid=5659018&amp;cid=s_36932_168_f&amp;fid=36932&amp;url=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov%2Fentrez%2Fquery.fcgi%3Ftmpl%3DNoSidebarfile%26db%3DPubMed%26cmd%3DRetrieve%26list_uids%3D22289301%26dopt%3DAbstract</link>
            <description>Authors: de Barra M, Curtis V
    Abstract
    We question the plausibility of Fincher &amp; Thornhill's (F&amp;T's) argument that localised pathogen-host coevolution leads to out-groups having pathogens more damaging than those infecting one's own family or religious group.
    PMID: 22289301 [PubMed - as supplied by publisher] (Source: The Behavioral and Brain Sciences)</description>
            <author>The Behavioral and Brain Sciences</author>
            <type>journals</type>
        <comments>http://www.medworm.com/rss/comments.php?id=5659018</comments>
            <pubDate>Tue, 31 Jan 2012 05:00:00 +0100</pubDate>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">5659018</guid>        </item>
        <item>
            <title>Extending parasite-stress theory to variation in human mate preferences.</title>
            <link>http://www.medworm.com/index.php?rid=5658984&amp;cid=s_36932_168_f&amp;fid=36932&amp;url=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov%2Fentrez%2Fquery.fcgi%3Ftmpl%3DNoSidebarfile%26db%3DPubMed%26cmd%3DRetrieve%26list_uids%3D22289354%26dopt%3DAbstract</link>
            <description>Authors: Debruine LM, Little AC, Jones BC
    Abstract
    In this commentary we suggest that Fincher &amp; Thornhill's (F&amp;T's) parasite-stress theory of social behaviors and attitudes can be extended to mating behaviors and preferences. We discuss evidence from prior correlational and experimental studies that support this claim. We also reanalyze data from two of those studies using F&amp;T's new parasite stress measures.
    PMID: 22289354 [PubMed - as supplied by publisher] (Source: The Behavioral and Brain Sciences)</description>
            <author>The Behavioral and Brain Sciences</author>
            <type>journals</type>
        <comments>http://www.medworm.com/rss/comments.php?id=5658984</comments>
            <pubDate>Tue, 31 Jan 2012 05:00:00 +0100</pubDate>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">5658984</guid>        </item>
        <item>
            <title>Parasite stress, ethnocentrism, and life history strategy.</title>
            <link>http://www.medworm.com/index.php?rid=5658983&amp;cid=s_36932_168_f&amp;fid=36932&amp;url=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov%2Fentrez%2Fquery.fcgi%3Ftmpl%3DNoSidebarfile%26db%3DPubMed%26cmd%3DRetrieve%26list_uids%3D22289411%26dopt%3DAbstract</link>
            <description>Authors: Figueredo AJ, Gladden PR, Black CJ
    Abstract
    Fincher &amp; Thornhill (F&amp;T) present a compelling argument that parasite stress underlies certain cultural practices promoting assortative sociality. However, we suggest that the theoretical framework proposed is limited in several ways, and that life history theory provides a more explanatory and inclusive framework, making more specific predictions about the trade-offs faced by organisms in the allocation of bioenergetic and material resources.
    PMID: 22289411 [PubMed - as supplied by publisher] (Source: The Behavioral and Brain Sciences)</description>
            <author>The Behavioral and Brain Sciences</author>
            <type>journals</type>
        <comments>http://www.medworm.com/rss/comments.php?id=5658983</comments>
            <pubDate>Tue, 31 Jan 2012 05:00:00 +0100</pubDate>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">5658983</guid>        </item>
        <item>
            <title>The evolution and development of human social systems requires more than parasite-stress avoidance explanation.</title>
            <link>http://www.medworm.com/index.php?rid=5658982&amp;cid=s_36932_168_f&amp;fid=36932&amp;url=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov%2Fentrez%2Fquery.fcgi%3Ftmpl%3DNoSidebarfile%26db%3DPubMed%26cmd%3DRetrieve%26list_uids%3D22289427%26dopt%3DAbstract</link>
            <description>Authors: Grotuss J
    Abstract
    Fincher &amp; Thornhill (F&amp;T) present a model of in-group assortative sociality resulting from differing levels of parasite-stress in differing geographical locations in the United States and the world. Their model, while compelling, overlooks some important issues, such as mutualistic associations with parasites that are beneficial to humans and how some religious practices increase parasite risk.
    PMID: 22289427 [PubMed - as supplied by publisher] (Source: The Behavioral and Brain Sciences)</description>
            <author>The Behavioral and Brain Sciences</author>
            <type>journals</type>
        <comments>http://www.medworm.com/rss/comments.php?id=5658982</comments>
            <pubDate>Tue, 31 Jan 2012 05:00:00 +0100</pubDate>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">5658982</guid>        </item>
        <item>
            <title>High illness loads (physical and social) do not always force high levels of mass religiosity.</title>
            <link>http://www.medworm.com/index.php?rid=5658981&amp;cid=s_36932_168_f&amp;fid=36932&amp;url=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov%2Fentrez%2Fquery.fcgi%3Ftmpl%3DNoSidebarfile%26db%3DPubMed%26cmd%3DRetrieve%26list_uids%3D22289444%26dopt%3DAbstract</link>
            <description>Authors: Paul GS
    Abstract
    The hypothesis that high levels of religiosity are partly caused by high disease loads is in accord with studies showing that societal dysfunction promotes mass supernaturalism. However, some cultures suffering from high rates of disease and other socioeconomic dysfunction exhibit low levels of popular religiosity. At this point, it appears that religion is hard pressed to thrive in healthy societies, but poor conditions do not always make religion popular, either.
    PMID: 22289444 [PubMed - as supplied by publisher] (Source: The Behavioral and Brain Sciences)</description>
            <author>The Behavioral and Brain Sciences</author>
            <type>journals</type>
        <comments>http://www.medworm.com/rss/comments.php?id=5658981</comments>
            <pubDate>Tue, 31 Jan 2012 05:00:00 +0100</pubDate>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">5658981</guid>        </item>
        <item>
            <title>An ethical and prudential argument for prioritizing the reduction of parasite-stress in the allocation of health care resources.</title>
            <link>http://www.medworm.com/index.php?rid=5658980&amp;cid=s_36932_168_f&amp;fid=36932&amp;url=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov%2Fentrez%2Fquery.fcgi%3Ftmpl%3DNoSidebarfile%26db%3DPubMed%26cmd%3DRetrieve%26list_uids%3D22289629%26dopt%3DAbstract</link>
            <description>Authors: Powell R, Clarke S, Savulescu J
    Abstract
    The link between parasite-stress and complex psychological dispositions implies that the social, political, and economic benefits likely to flow from public health interventions that reduce rates of non-zoonotic infectious disease are far greater than have traditionally been thought. We sketch a prudential and ethical argument for increasing public health resources globally and redistributing these to focus on the alleviation of parasite-stress in human populations.
    PMID: 22289629 [PubMed - as supplied by publisher] (Source: The Behavioral and Brain Sciences)</description>
            <author>The Behavioral and Brain Sciences</author>
            <type>journals</type>
        <comments>http://www.medworm.com/rss/comments.php?id=5658980</comments>
            <pubDate>Tue, 31 Jan 2012 05:00:00 +0100</pubDate>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">5658980</guid>        </item>
        <item>
            <title>Mechanisms by which parasites influence cultures, and why they matter.</title>
            <link>http://www.medworm.com/index.php?rid=5658979&amp;cid=s_36932_168_f&amp;fid=36932&amp;url=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov%2Fentrez%2Fquery.fcgi%3Ftmpl%3DNoSidebarfile%26db%3DPubMed%26cmd%3DRetrieve%26list_uids%3D22289640%26dopt%3DAbstract</link>
            <description>Authors: Schaller M, Murray DR
    Abstract
    At least four conceptually distinct mechanisms may mediate relations between parasite-stress and cultural outcomes: genetic evolution, developmental plasticity, neurocognitive flexibility, and cultural transmission. These mechanisms may operate independently or in conjunction with one another. Rigorous research on specific mediating mechanisms is required to more completely articulate implications of parasite stress on human psychology and human culture.
    PMID: 22289640 [PubMed - as supplied by publisher] (Source: The Behavioral and Brain Sciences)</description>
            <author>The Behavioral and Brain Sciences</author>
            <type>journals</type>
        <comments>http://www.medworm.com/rss/comments.php?id=5658979</comments>
            <pubDate>Tue, 31 Jan 2012 05:00:00 +0100</pubDate>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">5658979</guid>        </item>
        <item>
            <title>Form and function in religious signaling under pathogen stress.</title>
            <link>http://www.medworm.com/index.php?rid=5658978&amp;cid=s_36932_168_f&amp;fid=36932&amp;url=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov%2Fentrez%2Fquery.fcgi%3Ftmpl%3DNoSidebarfile%26db%3DPubMed%26cmd%3DRetrieve%26list_uids%3D22289648%26dopt%3DAbstract</link>
            <description>Authors: Swartwout P, Purzycki BG, Sosis R
    Abstract
    The evolution of religious traditions may be partially explained by out-group avoidance due to pathogen stress. However, many religious rituals may increase rather than decrease performers' susceptibility to infection. Moreover, religions often spread through proselytizing, which requires out-group interaction; and in other cases, the benefits of economic exchange increase religious pluralism and social interactions with out-groups.
    PMID: 22289648 [PubMed - as supplied by publisher] (Source: The Behavioral and Brain Sciences)</description>
            <author>The Behavioral and Brain Sciences</author>
            <type>journals</type>
        <comments>http://www.medworm.com/rss/comments.php?id=5658978</comments>
            <pubDate>Tue, 31 Jan 2012 05:00:00 +0100</pubDate>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">5658978</guid>        </item>
        <item>
            <title>Rethinking innovative designs to further test parasite-stress theory.</title>
            <link>http://www.medworm.com/index.php?rid=5658977&amp;cid=s_36932_168_f&amp;fid=36932&amp;url=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov%2Fentrez%2Fquery.fcgi%3Ftmpl%3DNoSidebarfile%26db%3DPubMed%26cmd%3DRetrieve%26list_uids%3D22289668%26dopt%3DAbstract</link>
            <description>Authors: Uskul AK
    Abstract
    Fincher &amp; Thornhill's (F&amp;T's) parasite-stress theory of sociality is supported largely by correlational evidence; its persuasiveness would increase significantly via lab and natural experiments and demonstrations of its mediating role. How the theory is linked to other approaches to group differences in psychological differences and to production and dissemination of cultural ideas and practices, need further clarification. So does the theory's view on the possible reduction of negative group interactions.
    PMID: 22289668 [PubMed - as supplied by publisher] (Source: The Behavioral and Brain Sciences)</description>
            <author>The Behavioral and Brain Sciences</author>
            <type>journals</type>
        <comments>http://www.medworm.com/rss/comments.php?id=5658977</comments>
            <pubDate>Tue, 31 Jan 2012 05:00:00 +0100</pubDate>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">5658977</guid>        </item>
        <item>
            <title>Drugs as instruments: A new framework for non-addictive psychoactive drug use.</title>
            <link>http://www.medworm.com/index.php?rid=5420141&amp;cid=s_36932_168_f&amp;fid=36932&amp;url=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov%2Fentrez%2Fquery.fcgi%3Ftmpl%3DNoSidebarfile%26db%3DPubMed%26cmd%3DRetrieve%26list_uids%3D22074962%26dopt%3DAbstract</link>
            <description>Authors: Müller CP, Schumann G
    Abstract
    Most people who are regular consumers of psychoactive drugs are not drug addicts, nor will they ever become addicts. In neurobiological theories, non-addictive drug consumption is acknowledged only as a &quot;necessary&quot; prerequisite for addiction, but not as a stable and widespread behavior in its own right. This target article proposes a new neurobiological framework theory for non-addictive psychoactive drug consumption, introducing the concept of &quot;drug instrumentalization.&quot; Psychoactive drugs are consumed for their effects on mental states. Humans are able to learn that mental states can be changed on purpose by drugs, in order to facilitate other, non-drug-related behaviors. We discuss specific &quot;instrumentalization goals&quot; and outline neurobio...</description>
            <author>The Behavioral and Brain Sciences</author>
            <type>journals</type>
        <comments>http://www.medworm.com/rss/comments.php?id=5420141</comments>
            <pubDate>Fri, 18 Nov 2011 18:15:16 +0100</pubDate>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">5420141</guid>        </item>
        <item>
            <title>Toward an evolutionary basis for resilience to drug addiction.</title>
            <link>http://www.medworm.com/index.php?rid=5420140&amp;cid=s_36932_168_f&amp;fid=36932&amp;url=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov%2Fentrez%2Fquery.fcgi%3Ftmpl%3DNoSidebarfile%26db%3DPubMed%26cmd%3DRetrieve%26list_uids%3D22074963%26dopt%3DAbstract</link>
            <description>Authors: Ahmed SH
    Abstract
    According to Müller &amp; Schumann (M&amp;S), people would have evolved adaptations for learning to use psychoactive plants and drugs as instruments that reveal particularly advantageous in modern urban environments. Here I &quot;instrumentalize&quot; this framework to propose an evolutionary basis for the existence of a biological resilience to drug addiction in people.
    PMID: 22074963 [PubMed - in process] (Source: The Behavioral and Brain Sciences)</description>
            <author>The Behavioral and Brain Sciences</author>
            <type>journals</type>
        <comments>http://www.medworm.com/rss/comments.php?id=5420140</comments>
            <pubDate>Fri, 18 Nov 2011 18:15:05 +0100</pubDate>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">5420140</guid>        </item>
        <item>
            <title>Drugs' rapid payoffs distort evaluation of their instrumental uses.</title>
            <link>http://www.medworm.com/index.php?rid=5420139&amp;cid=s_36932_168_f&amp;fid=36932&amp;url=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov%2Fentrez%2Fquery.fcgi%3Ftmpl%3DNoSidebarfile%26db%3DPubMed%26cmd%3DRetrieve%26list_uids%3D22074964%26dopt%3DAbstract</link>
            <description>Authors: Ainslie G
    Abstract
    Science has needed a dispassionate valuation of psychoactive drugs, but a motivational analysis should be conducted with respect to long-term reward rather than reproductive fitness. Because of hyperbolic overvaluation of short-term rewards, an individual's valuation depends on the time she forms it and the times she will revisit it, sometimes making her best long-term interest lie in total abstinence.
    PMID: 22074964 [PubMed - in process] (Source: The Behavioral and Brain Sciences)</description>
            <author>The Behavioral and Brain Sciences</author>
            <type>journals</type>
        <comments>http://www.medworm.com/rss/comments.php?id=5420139</comments>
            <pubDate>Fri, 18 Nov 2011 18:14:54 +0100</pubDate>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">5420139</guid>        </item>
        <item>
            <title>Drugs as instruments from a developmental child and adolescent psychiatric perspective.</title>
            <link>http://www.medworm.com/index.php?rid=5420138&amp;cid=s_36932_168_f&amp;fid=36932&amp;url=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov%2Fentrez%2Fquery.fcgi%3Ftmpl%3DNoSidebarfile%26db%3DPubMed%26cmd%3DRetrieve%26list_uids%3D22074965%26dopt%3DAbstract</link>
            <description>Authors: Banaschewski T, Blomeyer D, Buchmann AF, Poustka L, Rothenberger A, Laucht M
    Abstract
    Developmental, epidemiological, and neurobiological studies indicate that the adaptive and maladaptive functions, as well as immediate and long-term consequences of drug use, may vary by age. Early initiation seems to be associated with a reduced ability to use drugs purposely in a temporally stable, non-addictive manner. Prevention strategies should consider social environmental factors and aim to delay age at initiation.
    PMID: 22074965 [PubMed - in process] (Source: The Behavioral and Brain Sciences)</description>
            <author>The Behavioral and Brain Sciences</author>
            <type>journals</type>
        <comments>http://www.medworm.com/rss/comments.php?id=5420138</comments>
            <pubDate>Fri, 18 Nov 2011 18:14:43 +0100</pubDate>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">5420138</guid>        </item>
        <item>
            <title>Drug use as consumer behavior.</title>
            <link>http://www.medworm.com/index.php?rid=5420137&amp;cid=s_36932_168_f&amp;fid=36932&amp;url=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov%2Fentrez%2Fquery.fcgi%3Ftmpl%3DNoSidebarfile%26db%3DPubMed%26cmd%3DRetrieve%26list_uids%3D22074966%26dopt%3DAbstract</link>
            <description>Authors: Foxall GR, Sigurdsson V
    Abstract
    Seeking integration of drug consumption research by a theory of memory function and emphasizing drug consumption rather than addiction, Müller &amp; Schumann (M&amp;S) treat drug self-administration as part of a general pattern of consumption. This insight is located within a more comprehensive framework for understanding drug use as consumer behavior that explicates the reinforcement contingencies associated with modes of drug consumption.
    PMID: 22074966 [PubMed - in process] (Source: The Behavioral and Brain Sciences)</description>
            <author>The Behavioral and Brain Sciences</author>
            <type>journals</type>
        <comments>http://www.medworm.com/rss/comments.php?id=5420137</comments>
            <pubDate>Fri, 18 Nov 2011 18:14:32 +0100</pubDate>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">5420137</guid>        </item>
        <item>
            <title>Nonaddictive instrumental drug use: Theoretical strengths and weaknesses.</title>
            <link>http://www.medworm.com/index.php?rid=5420136&amp;cid=s_36932_168_f&amp;fid=36932&amp;url=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov%2Fentrez%2Fquery.fcgi%3Ftmpl%3DNoSidebarfile%26db%3DPubMed%26cmd%3DRetrieve%26list_uids%3D22074967%26dopt%3DAbstract</link>
            <description>Authors: Goudie AJ, Gullo MJ, Rose AK, Christiansen P, Cole JC, Field M, Sumnall H
    Abstract
    The potential to instrumentalize drug use based upon the detection of very many different drug states undoubtedly exists, and such states may play a role in psychiatric and many other drug uses. Nevertheless, nonaddictive drug use is potentially more parsimoniously explained in terms of sensation seeking/impulsivity and drug expectations. Cultural factors also play a major role in nonaddictive drug use.
    PMID: 22074967 [PubMed - in process] (Source: The Behavioral and Brain Sciences)</description>
            <author>The Behavioral and Brain Sciences</author>
            <type>journals</type>
        <comments>http://www.medworm.com/rss/comments.php?id=5420136</comments>
            <pubDate>Fri, 18 Nov 2011 18:14:22 +0100</pubDate>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">5420136</guid>        </item>
        <item>
            <title>Non-addictive psychoactive drug use: Implications for behavioral addiction.</title>
            <link>http://www.medworm.com/index.php?rid=5420135&amp;cid=s_36932_168_f&amp;fid=36932&amp;url=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov%2Fentrez%2Fquery.fcgi%3Ftmpl%3DNoSidebarfile%26db%3DPubMed%26cmd%3DRetrieve%26list_uids%3D22074968%26dopt%3DAbstract</link>
            <description>Authors: Griffiths MD
    Abstract
    The newly proposed framework for non-addictive psychoactive substances postulated by Müller &amp; Schumann (M&amp;S) provides an interesting and plausible explanation for non-addictive drug use. However, with specific reference to the relevant behavioral addiction literature, this commentary argues that the model may unexpectedly hold utility not only for non-addictive use of drugs, but also for non-addictive use of other potentially addictive behaviors.
    PMID: 22074968 [PubMed - in process] (Source: The Behavioral and Brain Sciences)</description>
            <author>The Behavioral and Brain Sciences</author>
            <type>journals</type>
        <comments>http://www.medworm.com/rss/comments.php?id=5420135</comments>
            <pubDate>Fri, 18 Nov 2011 18:14:12 +0100</pubDate>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">5420135</guid>        </item>
        <item>
            <title>Does drug mis-instrumentalization lead to drug abuse?</title>
            <link>http://www.medworm.com/index.php?rid=5420134&amp;cid=s_36932_168_f&amp;fid=36932&amp;url=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov%2Fentrez%2Fquery.fcgi%3Ftmpl%3DNoSidebarfile%26db%3DPubMed%26cmd%3DRetrieve%26list_uids%3D22074969%26dopt%3DAbstract</link>
            <description>Authors: Kippin TE
    Abstract
    Understanding the perceived benefits of using drugs to achieve specific mental states will provide novel insights into the reasons individuals seek to use drugs. However, the precision of attempts to instrumentalize drugs is unclear both across drugs and individuals. Moreover, mis-instrumentalization, defined as discrepancies between such endpoints, may have relevance to understanding the relation among use, abuse, and addiction.
    PMID: 22074969 [PubMed - in process] (Source: The Behavioral and Brain Sciences)</description>
            <author>The Behavioral and Brain Sciences</author>
            <type>journals</type>
        <comments>http://www.medworm.com/rss/comments.php?id=5420134</comments>
            <pubDate>Fri, 18 Nov 2011 18:14:02 +0100</pubDate>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">5420134</guid>        </item>
        <item>
            <title>Drug instrumentalization and evolution: Going even further.</title>
            <link>http://www.medworm.com/index.php?rid=5420133&amp;cid=s_36932_168_f&amp;fid=36932&amp;url=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov%2Fentrez%2Fquery.fcgi%3Ftmpl%3DNoSidebarfile%26db%3DPubMed%26cmd%3DRetrieve%26list_uids%3D22074970%26dopt%3DAbstract</link>
            <description>Authors: Lende DH
    Abstract
    Müller &amp; Schumann (M&amp;S) deserve applause for their interdisciplinary examination of drug use, evolution, and learning. Further steps can deepen their evolutionary analysis: a focus on adaptive benefits, a distinction between approach and consummatory behaviors, an examination of how drugs can create adaptive lag through changing human niche construction, the importance of other neurobehavioral mechanisms in drug use besides instrumentalization, and the importance of sociocultural dynamics and neural plasticity in both human evolution and drug use.
    PMID: 22074970 [PubMed - in process] (Source: The Behavioral and Brain Sciences)</description>
            <author>The Behavioral and Brain Sciences</author>
            <type>journals</type>
        <comments>http://www.medworm.com/rss/comments.php?id=5420133</comments>
            <pubDate>Fri, 18 Nov 2011 18:13:53 +0100</pubDate>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">5420133</guid>        </item>
        <item>
            <title>Optimal drug use and rational drug policy.</title>
            <link>http://www.medworm.com/index.php?rid=5420132&amp;cid=s_36932_168_f&amp;fid=36932&amp;url=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov%2Fentrez%2Fquery.fcgi%3Ftmpl%3DNoSidebarfile%26db%3DPubMed%26cmd%3DRetrieve%26list_uids%3D22074971%26dopt%3DAbstract</link>
            <description>Authors: Miller GF
    Abstract
    The Müller &amp; Schumann (M&amp;S) view of drug use is courageous and compelling, with radical implications for drug policy and research. It implies that most nations prohibit most drugs that could promote happiness, social capital, and economic growth; that most individuals underuse rather than overuse drugs; and that behavioral scientists could use drugs more effectively in generating hypotheses and collaborating empathically.
    PMID: 22074971 [PubMed - in process] (Source: The Behavioral and Brain Sciences)</description>
            <author>The Behavioral and Brain Sciences</author>
            <type>journals</type>
        <comments>http://www.medworm.com/rss/comments.php?id=5420132</comments>
            <pubDate>Fri, 18 Nov 2011 18:13:44 +0100</pubDate>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">5420132</guid>        </item>
        <item>
            <title>Sacramental and spiritual use of hallucinogenic drugs.</title>
            <link>http://www.medworm.com/index.php?rid=5420131&amp;cid=s_36932_168_f&amp;fid=36932&amp;url=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov%2Fentrez%2Fquery.fcgi%3Ftmpl%3DNoSidebarfile%26db%3DPubMed%26cmd%3DRetrieve%26list_uids%3D22074972%26dopt%3DAbstract</link>
            <description>Authors: Móró L, Noreika V
    Abstract
    Arguably, the religious use of hallucinogenic drugs stems from a human search of metaphysical insight rather than from a direct need for cognitive, emotional, social, physical, or sexual improvement. Therefore, the sacramental and spiritual intake of hallucinogenic drugs goes so far beyond other biopsychosocial functions that it deserves its own category in the drug instrumentalization list.
    PMID: 22074972 [PubMed - in process] (Source: The Behavioral and Brain Sciences)</description>
            <author>The Behavioral and Brain Sciences</author>
            <type>journals</type>
        <comments>http://www.medworm.com/rss/comments.php?id=5420131</comments>
            <pubDate>Fri, 18 Nov 2011 18:13:34 +0100</pubDate>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">5420131</guid>        </item>
        <item>
            <title>The instrumental rationality of addiction.</title>
            <link>http://www.medworm.com/index.php?rid=5420130&amp;cid=s_36932_168_f&amp;fid=36932&amp;url=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov%2Fentrez%2Fquery.fcgi%3Ftmpl%3DNoSidebarfile%26db%3DPubMed%26cmd%3DRetrieve%26list_uids%3D22074973%26dopt%3DAbstract</link>
            <description>Authors: Pickard H
    Abstract
    The claim that non-addictive drug use is instrumental must be distinguished from the claim that its desired ends are evolutionarily adaptive or easy to comprehend. Use can be instrumental without being adaptive or comprehensible. This clarification, together with additional data, suggests that Müller &amp; Schumann's (M&amp;S's) instrumental framework may explain addictive, as well as non-addictive consumption.
    PMID: 22074973 [PubMed - in process] (Source: The Behavioral and Brain Sciences)</description>
            <author>The Behavioral and Brain Sciences</author>
            <type>journals</type>
        <comments>http://www.medworm.com/rss/comments.php?id=5420130</comments>
            <pubDate>Fri, 18 Nov 2011 18:13:25 +0100</pubDate>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">5420130</guid>        </item>
        <item>
            <title>Drug addiction finds its own niche.</title>
            <link>http://www.medworm.com/index.php?rid=5420129&amp;cid=s_36932_168_f&amp;fid=36932&amp;url=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov%2Fentrez%2Fquery.fcgi%3Ftmpl%3DNoSidebarfile%26db%3DPubMed%26cmd%3DRetrieve%26list_uids%3D22074974%26dopt%3DAbstract</link>
            <description>Authors: Reid A
    Abstract
    The evolutionary framework suggested by Müller &amp; Schumann (M&amp;S) can be extended further by considering drug-taking in terms of Niche Construction Theory (NCT). It is suggested here that genetic and environmental components of addiction are modified by cultural acceptance of the advantages of non-addicted drug taking and the legitimate supply of performance-enhancing drugs. This may then reduce the prevalence of addiction.
    PMID: 22074974 [PubMed - in process] (Source: The Behavioral and Brain Sciences)</description>
            <author>The Behavioral and Brain Sciences</author>
            <type>journals</type>
        <comments>http://www.medworm.com/rss/comments.php?id=5420129</comments>
            <pubDate>Fri, 18 Nov 2011 18:13:15 +0100</pubDate>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">5420129</guid>        </item>
        <item>
            <title>But is it evolution…?</title>
            <link>http://www.medworm.com/index.php?rid=5420128&amp;cid=s_36932_168_f&amp;fid=36932&amp;url=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov%2Fentrez%2Fquery.fcgi%3Ftmpl%3DNoSidebarfile%26db%3DPubMed%26cmd%3DRetrieve%26list_uids%3D22074975%26dopt%3DAbstract</link>
            <description>Authors: Sullivan RJ, Hagen EH
    Abstract
    We applaud Müller &amp; Schumann (M&amp;S) for bringing needed attention to the problem of motivation for common non-addictive drug use, as opposed to the usual focus on exotic drugs and addiction. Unfortunately, their target article has many underdeveloped and sometimes contradictory ideas. Here, we will focus on three key issues.
    PMID: 22074975 [PubMed - in process] (Source: The Behavioral and Brain Sciences)</description>
            <author>The Behavioral and Brain Sciences</author>
            <type>journals</type>
        <comments>http://www.medworm.com/rss/comments.php?id=5420128</comments>
            <pubDate>Fri, 18 Nov 2011 18:13:06 +0100</pubDate>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">5420128</guid>        </item>
        <item>
            <title>Why do we take drugs? From the drug-reinforcement theory to a novel concept of drug instrumentalization.</title>
            <link>http://www.medworm.com/index.php?rid=5420127&amp;cid=s_36932_168_f&amp;fid=36932&amp;url=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov%2Fentrez%2Fquery.fcgi%3Ftmpl%3DNoSidebarfile%26db%3DPubMed%26cmd%3DRetrieve%26list_uids%3D22074976%26dopt%3DAbstract</link>
            <description>Authors: Spanagel R
    Abstract
    The drug-reinforcement theory explains why humans get engaged in drug taking behavior. This theory posits that drugs of abuse serve as biological rewards by activating the reinforcement system. Although from a psychological and neurobiological perspective this theory is extremely helpful, it does not tell us about the drug-taking motives and motivation of an individual. The definition of drug instrumentalization goals will improve our understanding of individual drug-taking profiles.
    PMID: 22074976 [PubMed - in process] (Source: The Behavioral and Brain Sciences)</description>
            <author>The Behavioral and Brain Sciences</author>
            <type>journals</type>
        <comments>http://www.medworm.com/rss/comments.php?id=5420127</comments>
            <pubDate>Fri, 18 Nov 2011 18:12:56 +0100</pubDate>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">5420127</guid>        </item>
        <item>
            <title>Flaws of drug instrumentalization.</title>
            <link>http://www.medworm.com/index.php?rid=5420126&amp;cid=s_36932_168_f&amp;fid=36932&amp;url=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov%2Fentrez%2Fquery.fcgi%3Ftmpl%3DNoSidebarfile%26db%3DPubMed%26cmd%3DRetrieve%26list_uids%3D22074977%26dopt%3DAbstract</link>
            <description>Authors: Swendsen J, Le Moal M
    Abstract
    The adaptive use of drugs, or &quot;drug instrumentalization,&quot; is presented as a reality that the scientific literature has largely ignored. In this commentary, we demonstrate why this concept has limited value from the standpoint of nosology, why it should not be viewed as &quot;adaptive,&quot; and why it has dangerous implications for policy and public health efforts.
    PMID: 22074977 [PubMed - in process] (Source: The Behavioral and Brain Sciences)</description>
            <author>The Behavioral and Brain Sciences</author>
            <type>journals</type>
        <comments>http://www.medworm.com/rss/comments.php?id=5420126</comments>
            <pubDate>Fri, 18 Nov 2011 18:12:48 +0100</pubDate>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">5420126</guid>        </item>
        <item>
            <title>Psychoactive drug use: Expand the scope of outcome assessment.</title>
            <link>http://www.medworm.com/index.php?rid=5420125&amp;cid=s_36932_168_f&amp;fid=36932&amp;url=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov%2Fentrez%2Fquery.fcgi%3Ftmpl%3DNoSidebarfile%26db%3DPubMed%26cmd%3DRetrieve%26list_uids%3D22074978%26dopt%3DAbstract</link>
            <description>Authors: Troisi A
    Abstract
    The &quot;hijacking&quot; and &quot;drug instrumentalization&quot; models of psychoactive drug use predict opposite outcomes in terms of adaptive behavior and fitness benefits. Which is the range of applicability of each model? To answer this question, we need more data than those reported by studies focusing on medical, psychiatric, and legal problems in addicted users. An evolutionary analysis requires a much wider focus.
    PMID: 22074978 [PubMed - in process] (Source: The Behavioral and Brain Sciences)</description>
            <author>The Behavioral and Brain Sciences</author>
            <type>journals</type>
        <comments>http://www.medworm.com/rss/comments.php?id=5420125</comments>
            <pubDate>Fri, 18 Nov 2011 18:12:38 +0100</pubDate>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">5420125</guid>        </item>
        <item>
            <title>Drugs, mental instruments, and self-control.</title>
            <link>http://www.medworm.com/index.php?rid=5420124&amp;cid=s_36932_168_f&amp;fid=36932&amp;url=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov%2Fentrez%2Fquery.fcgi%3Ftmpl%3DNoSidebarfile%26db%3DPubMed%26cmd%3DRetrieve%26list_uids%3D22074979%26dopt%3DAbstract</link>
            <description>Authors: Van Gulick R
    Abstract
    The instrumental model offered by Müller &amp; Schumann (M&amp;S) is broadened to apply not only to drugs, but also to other methods of self-control, including the use of mental constructs to produce adaptive changes in behavior with the possibility of synergistic interactions between various instruments.
    PMID: 22074979 [PubMed - in process] (Source: The Behavioral and Brain Sciences)</description>
            <author>The Behavioral and Brain Sciences</author>
            <type>journals</type>
        <comments>http://www.medworm.com/rss/comments.php?id=5420124</comments>
            <pubDate>Fri, 18 Nov 2011 18:12:29 +0100</pubDate>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">5420124</guid>        </item>
        <item>
            <title>Aspects of nicotine utilization.</title>
            <link>http://www.medworm.com/index.php?rid=5420123&amp;cid=s_36932_168_f&amp;fid=36932&amp;url=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov%2Fentrez%2Fquery.fcgi%3Ftmpl%3DNoSidebarfile%26db%3DPubMed%26cmd%3DRetrieve%26list_uids%3D22074980%26dopt%3DAbstract</link>
            <description>Authors: Warburton DM
    Abstract
    This commentary reviews the effects of nicotine on mood and cognition in support of the drug utilization concept of Müller &amp; Schumann (M&amp;S). Specifically, it amplifies the concept with the nicotine utilization hypothesis (NUH), which opposes the nicotine withdrawal hypothesis (NWH). Evidence against NWH comes from changes in mood after abstinence and the performance effects of nicotine supporting drug utilization.
    PMID: 22074980 [PubMed - in process] (Source: The Behavioral and Brain Sciences)</description>
            <author>The Behavioral and Brain Sciences</author>
            <type>journals</type>
        <comments>http://www.medworm.com/rss/comments.php?id=5420123</comments>
            <pubDate>Fri, 18 Nov 2011 18:12:20 +0100</pubDate>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">5420123</guid>        </item>
        <item>
            <title>Governing drug use through neurobiological subject construction: The sad loss of the sociocultural.</title>
            <link>http://www.medworm.com/index.php?rid=5420122&amp;cid=s_36932_168_f&amp;fid=36932&amp;url=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov%2Fentrez%2Fquery.fcgi%3Ftmpl%3DNoSidebarfile%26db%3DPubMed%26cmd%3DRetrieve%26list_uids%3D22074981%26dopt%3DAbstract</link>
            <description>Authors: Wu KC
    Abstract
    Based on their &quot;drugs as instruments&quot; framework, Müller &amp; Schumann (M&amp;S) propose a staged drug policy that matches well the neoliberal governance scheme. To mend the sad loss of the sociocultural dimension in their model, I propose three such considerations: first, sociocultural interactions with the brain; second, sociocultural context and justice of drug use; and third, sociocultural preparedness for implementing their drug policy.
    PMID: 22074981 [PubMed - in process] (Source: The Behavioral and Brain Sciences)</description>
            <author>The Behavioral and Brain Sciences</author>
            <type>journals</type>
        <comments>http://www.medworm.com/rss/comments.php?id=5420122</comments>
            <pubDate>Fri, 18 Nov 2011 18:12:11 +0100</pubDate>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">5420122</guid>        </item>
        <item>
            <title>Subtracting &quot;ought&quot; from &quot;is&quot;: Descriptivism versus normativism in the study of human thinking.</title>
            <link>http://www.medworm.com/index.php?rid=5327899&amp;cid=s_36932_168_f&amp;fid=36932&amp;url=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov%2Fentrez%2Fquery.fcgi%3Ftmpl%3DNoSidebarfile%26db%3DPubMed%26cmd%3DRetrieve%26list_uids%3D22000212%26dopt%3DAbstract</link>
            <description>Subtracting &quot;ought&quot; from &quot;is&quot;: Descriptivism versus normativism in the study of human thinking.
    Behav Brain Sci. 2011 Oct;34(5):233-48
    Authors: Elqayam S, Evans JS
    Abstract
    We propose a critique of normativism, defined as the idea that human thinking reflects a normative system against which it should be measured and judged. We analyze the methodological problems associated with normativism, proposing that it invites the controversial &quot;is-ought&quot; inference, much contested in the philosophical literature. This problem is triggered when there are competing normative accounts (the arbitration problem), as empirical evidence can help arbitrate between descriptive theories, but not between normative systems. Drawing on linguistics as a model, we propose that a clear distinction b...</description>
            <author>The Behavioral and Brain Sciences</author>
            <type>journals</type>
        <comments>http://www.medworm.com/rss/comments.php?id=5327899</comments>
            <pubDate>Sat, 01 Oct 2011 04:00:00 +0100</pubDate>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">5327899</guid>        </item>
        <item>
            <title>Norms for reasoning about decisions.</title>
            <link>http://www.medworm.com/index.php?rid=5327898&amp;cid=s_36932_168_f&amp;fid=36932&amp;url=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov%2Fentrez%2Fquery.fcgi%3Ftmpl%3DNoSidebarfile%26db%3DPubMed%26cmd%3DRetrieve%26list_uids%3D22000213%26dopt%3DAbstract</link>
            <description>Authors: Bonnefon JF
    Abstract
    Reasoning research has traditionally focused on the derivation of beliefs from beliefs, but it is increasingly turning to reasoning about decisions. In the absence of a single, entrenched normative model, the drive toward normativism is weaker in this new field than in its parent fields. The current balance between normativism and descriptivism is illustrated by three approaches to reasoning about decisions.
    PMID: 22000213 [PubMed - in process] (Source: The Behavioral and Brain Sciences)</description>
            <author>The Behavioral and Brain Sciences</author>
            <type>journals</type>
        <comments>http://www.medworm.com/rss/comments.php?id=5327898</comments>
            <pubDate>Sat, 01 Oct 2011 04:00:00 +0100</pubDate>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">5327898</guid>        </item>
        <item>
            <title>Throwing the normative baby out with the prescriptivist bathwater.</title>
            <link>http://www.medworm.com/index.php?rid=5327897&amp;cid=s_36932_168_f&amp;fid=36932&amp;url=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov%2Fentrez%2Fquery.fcgi%3Ftmpl%3DNoSidebarfile%26db%3DPubMed%26cmd%3DRetrieve%26list_uids%3D22000214%26dopt%3DAbstract</link>
            <description>Authors: Achourioti T, Fugard A, Stenning K
    Abstract
    It is neither desirable nor possible to eliminate normative concerns from the psychology of reasoning. Norms define the most fundamental psychological questions: What are people trying to do, and how? Even if no one system of reasoning can be the norm, pure descriptivism is as undesirable and unobtainable in the psychology of reasoning as elsewhere in science.
    PMID: 22000214 [PubMed - in process] (Source: The Behavioral and Brain Sciences)</description>
            <author>The Behavioral and Brain Sciences</author>
            <type>journals</type>
        <comments>http://www.medworm.com/rss/comments.php?id=5327897</comments>
            <pubDate>Sat, 01 Oct 2011 04:00:00 +0100</pubDate>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">5327897</guid>        </item>
        <item>
            <title>The unbearable lightness of &quot;Thinking&quot;: Moving beyond simple concepts of thinking, rationality, and hypothesis testing.</title>
            <link>http://www.medworm.com/index.php?rid=5327896&amp;cid=s_36932_168_f&amp;fid=36932&amp;url=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov%2Fentrez%2Fquery.fcgi%3Ftmpl%3DNoSidebarfile%26db%3DPubMed%26cmd%3DRetrieve%26list_uids%3D22000215%26dopt%3DAbstract</link>
            <description>The unbearable lightness of &quot;Thinking&quot;: Moving beyond simple concepts of thinking, rationality, and hypothesis testing.
    Behav Brain Sci. 2011 Oct;34(5):250-1
    Authors: Brase GL, Shanteau J
    Abstract
    Three correctives can get researchers out of the trap of constructing unitary theories of &quot;thinking&quot;: (1) Strong inference methods largely avoid problems associated with universal prescriptive normativism; (2) theories must recognize that significant modularity of cognitive processes is antithetical to general accounts of thinking; and (3) consideration of the domain-specificity of rationality render many of the present article's issues moot.
    PMID: 22000215 [PubMed - in process] (Source: The Behavioral and Brain Sciences)</description>
            <author>The Behavioral and Brain Sciences</author>
            <type>journals</type>
        <comments>http://www.medworm.com/rss/comments.php?id=5327896</comments>
            <pubDate>Sat, 01 Oct 2011 04:00:00 +0100</pubDate>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">5327896</guid>        </item>
        <item>
            <title>Competence, reflective equilibrium, and dual-system theories.</title>
            <link>http://www.medworm.com/index.php?rid=5327895&amp;cid=s_36932_168_f&amp;fid=36932&amp;url=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov%2Fentrez%2Fquery.fcgi%3Ftmpl%3DNoSidebarfile%26db%3DPubMed%26cmd%3DRetrieve%26list_uids%3D22000216%26dopt%3DAbstract</link>
            <description>Authors: Buckwalter W, Stich S
    Abstract
    A critique of inferences from &quot;is&quot; to &quot;ought&quot; plays a central role in Elqayam &amp; Evans' (E&amp;E's) defense of descriptivism. However, the reflective equilibrium strategy described by Goodman and embraced by Rawls, Cohen, and many others poses an important challenge to that critique. Dual-system theories may help respond to that challenge.
    PMID: 22000216 [PubMed - in process] (Source: The Behavioral and Brain Sciences)</description>
            <author>The Behavioral and Brain Sciences</author>
            <type>journals</type>
        <comments>http://www.medworm.com/rss/comments.php?id=5327895</comments>
            <pubDate>Sat, 01 Oct 2011 04:00:00 +0100</pubDate>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">5327895</guid>        </item>
        <item>
            <title>A role for normativism.</title>
            <link>http://www.medworm.com/index.php?rid=5327894&amp;cid=s_36932_168_f&amp;fid=36932&amp;url=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov%2Fentrez%2Fquery.fcgi%3Ftmpl%3DNoSidebarfile%26db%3DPubMed%26cmd%3DRetrieve%26list_uids%3D22000217%26dopt%3DAbstract</link>
            <description>Authors: Douven I
    Abstract
    Elqayam &amp; Evans (E&amp;E) argue against prescriptive normativism and in favor of descriptivism. I challenge the assumption, implicit in their article, that there is a choice to be made between the two approaches. While descriptivism may be the right approach for some questions, others call for a normativist approach. To illustrate the point, I briefly discuss two questions of the latter sort.
    PMID: 22000217 [PubMed - in process] (Source: The Behavioral and Brain Sciences)</description>
            <author>The Behavioral and Brain Sciences</author>
            <type>journals</type>
        <comments>http://www.medworm.com/rss/comments.php?id=5327894</comments>
            <pubDate>Sat, 01 Oct 2011 04:00:00 +0100</pubDate>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">5327894</guid>        </item>
        <item>
            <title>The historical and philosophical origins of normativism.</title>
            <link>http://www.medworm.com/index.php?rid=5327893&amp;cid=s_36932_168_f&amp;fid=36932&amp;url=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov%2Fentrez%2Fquery.fcgi%3Ftmpl%3DNoSidebarfile%26db%3DPubMed%26cmd%3DRetrieve%26list_uids%3D22000218%26dopt%3DAbstract</link>
            <description>Authors: Novaes CD
    Abstract
    Elqayam &amp; Evans' (E&amp;E's) critique of normativism is related to an inherently philosophical question: Is thinking a normative affair? Should thinking be held accountable towards certain norms? I present the historical and philosophical origins of the view that thinking belongs to the realm of normativity and has a tight connection with logic, stressing the pivotal role of Kant in these developments.
    PMID: 22000218 [PubMed - in process] (Source: The Behavioral and Brain Sciences)</description>
            <author>The Behavioral and Brain Sciences</author>
            <type>journals</type>
        <comments>http://www.medworm.com/rss/comments.php?id=5327893</comments>
            <pubDate>Sat, 01 Oct 2011 04:00:00 +0100</pubDate>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">5327893</guid>        </item>
        <item>
            <title>Just the facts, and only the facts, about human rationality?</title>
            <link>http://www.medworm.com/index.php?rid=5327892&amp;cid=s_36932_168_f&amp;fid=36932&amp;url=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov%2Fentrez%2Fquery.fcgi%3Ftmpl%3DNoSidebarfile%26db%3DPubMed%26cmd%3DRetrieve%26list_uids%3D22000219%26dopt%3DAbstract</link>
            <description>Authors: Foss J
    Abstract
    Elqayam &amp; Evans' (E&amp;E's) laudable program to keep the scientific investigation of human reasoning norm-free and focused on the facts alone is an essential part of a long tradition in the philosophy of science - but it faces deeper difficulties than the authors seem to realize, since reasoning is a competence, and the very concept of competence is normative.
    PMID: 22000219 [PubMed - in process] (Source: The Behavioral and Brain Sciences)</description>
            <author>The Behavioral and Brain Sciences</author>
            <type>journals</type>
        <comments>http://www.medworm.com/rss/comments.php?id=5327892</comments>
            <pubDate>Sat, 01 Oct 2011 04:00:00 +0100</pubDate>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">5327892</guid>        </item>
        <item>
            <title>Overselling the case against normativism.</title>
            <link>http://www.medworm.com/index.php?rid=5327891&amp;cid=s_36932_168_f&amp;fid=36932&amp;url=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov%2Fentrez%2Fquery.fcgi%3Ftmpl%3DNoSidebarfile%26db%3DPubMed%26cmd%3DRetrieve%26list_uids%3D22000220%26dopt%3DAbstract</link>
            <description>Authors: Fuller T, Samuels R
    Abstract
    Though we are in broad agreement with much of Elqayam &amp; Evans' (E&amp;E's) position, we criticize two aspects of their argument. First, rejecting normativism is unlikely to yield the benefits that E&amp;E seek. Second, their conception of rational norms is overly restrictive and, as a consequence, their arguments at most challenge a relatively restrictive version of normativism.
    PMID: 22000220 [PubMed - in process] (Source: The Behavioral and Brain Sciences)</description>
            <author>The Behavioral and Brain Sciences</author>
            <type>journals</type>
        <comments>http://www.medworm.com/rss/comments.php?id=5327891</comments>
            <pubDate>Sat, 01 Oct 2011 04:00:00 +0100</pubDate>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">5327891</guid>        </item>
        <item>
            <title>Undisputed norms and normal errors in human thinking.</title>
            <link>http://www.medworm.com/index.php?rid=5327890&amp;cid=s_36932_168_f&amp;fid=36932&amp;url=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov%2Fentrez%2Fquery.fcgi%3Ftmpl%3DNoSidebarfile%26db%3DPubMed%26cmd%3DRetrieve%26list_uids%3D22000221%26dopt%3DAbstract</link>
            <description>Authors: Girotto V
    Abstract
    This commentary questions Elqayam &amp; Evans' (E&amp;E's) claims that thinking tasks are doomed to have multiple normative readings and that only applied research allows normative evaluations. In fact, some tasks have just one undisputed normative reading, and not only pathological gamblers but also normal individuals sometimes need normative guidance. To conclude, normative evaluations are inevitable in the investigation of human thinking.
    PMID: 22000221 [PubMed - in process] (Source: The Behavioral and Brain Sciences)</description>
            <author>The Behavioral and Brain Sciences</author>
            <type>journals</type>
        <comments>http://www.medworm.com/rss/comments.php?id=5327890</comments>
            <pubDate>Sat, 01 Oct 2011 04:00:00 +0100</pubDate>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">5327890</guid>        </item>
        <item>
            <title>Normative theory in decision making and moral reasoning.</title>
            <link>http://www.medworm.com/index.php?rid=5327889&amp;cid=s_36932_168_f&amp;fid=36932&amp;url=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov%2Fentrez%2Fquery.fcgi%3Ftmpl%3DNoSidebarfile%26db%3DPubMed%26cmd%3DRetrieve%26list_uids%3D22000222%26dopt%3DAbstract</link>
            <description>Authors: Gold N, Colman AM, Pulford BD
    Abstract
    Normative theories can be useful in developing descriptive theories, as when normative subjective expected utility theory is used to develop descriptive rational choice theory and behavioral game theory. &quot;Ought&quot; questions are also the essence of theories of moral reasoning, a domain of higher mental processing that could not survive without normative considerations.
    PMID: 22000222 [PubMed - in process] (Source: The Behavioral and Brain Sciences)</description>
            <author>The Behavioral and Brain Sciences</author>
            <type>journals</type>
        <comments>http://www.medworm.com/rss/comments.php?id=5327889</comments>
            <pubDate>Sat, 01 Oct 2011 04:00:00 +0100</pubDate>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">5327889</guid>        </item>
        <item>
            <title>Why rational norms are indispensable.</title>
            <link>http://www.medworm.com/index.php?rid=5327888&amp;cid=s_36932_168_f&amp;fid=36932&amp;url=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov%2Fentrez%2Fquery.fcgi%3Ftmpl%3DNoSidebarfile%26db%3DPubMed%26cmd%3DRetrieve%26list_uids%3D22000223%26dopt%3DAbstract</link>
            <description>Authors: Hahn U
    Abstract
    Normative theories provide essential tools for understanding behaviour, not just for reasoning, judgement, and decision-making, but many other areas of cognition as well; and their utility extends to the development of process theories. Furthermore, the way these tools are used has nothing to do with the is-ought fallacy. There therefore seems no basis for the claim that research would be better off without them.
    PMID: 22000223 [PubMed - in process] (Source: The Behavioral and Brain Sciences)</description>
            <author>The Behavioral and Brain Sciences</author>
            <type>journals</type>
        <comments>http://www.medworm.com/rss/comments.php?id=5327888</comments>
            <pubDate>Sat, 01 Oct 2011 04:00:00 +0100</pubDate>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">5327888</guid>        </item>
        <item>
            <title>Defending normativism.</title>
            <link>http://www.medworm.com/index.php?rid=5327887&amp;cid=s_36932_168_f&amp;fid=36932&amp;url=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov%2Fentrez%2Fquery.fcgi%3Ftmpl%3DNoSidebarfile%26db%3DPubMed%26cmd%3DRetrieve%26list_uids%3D22000224%26dopt%3DAbstract</link>
            <description>Authors: Hrotic S
    Abstract
    Elqayam &amp; Evans (E&amp;E) argue that evaluative normativism leads to unacceptable research biases, and should be avoided. Though it is stipulated that the particular biases they discuss are cause for concern, this argument should not be generalized. The boundary between evaluative and goal-directed &quot;directive&quot; norms is difficult to define, and normative assumptions are an integral part of academic progress; moreover, the biases that result may have beneficial potential.
    PMID: 22000224 [PubMed - in process] (Source: The Behavioral and Brain Sciences)</description>
            <author>The Behavioral and Brain Sciences</author>
            <type>journals</type>
        <comments>http://www.medworm.com/rss/comments.php?id=5327887</comments>
            <pubDate>Sat, 01 Oct 2011 04:00:00 +0100</pubDate>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">5327887</guid>        </item>
        <item>
            <title>Cultural and individual differences in the generalization of theories regarding human thinking.</title>
            <link>http://www.medworm.com/index.php?rid=5327886&amp;cid=s_36932_168_f&amp;fid=36932&amp;url=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov%2Fentrez%2Fquery.fcgi%3Ftmpl%3DNoSidebarfile%26db%3DPubMed%26cmd%3DRetrieve%26list_uids%3D22000225%26dopt%3DAbstract</link>
            <description>Authors: Kim K, Park Y
    Abstract
    Tests of a universal theory often find significant variability and individual differences between cultures. We propose that descriptivism research should focus more on cultural and individual differences, especially those based on motivational factors. Explaining human thinking by focusing on individual difference factors across cultures could provide a parsimonious paradigm, by uncovering the true causal mechanisms of psychological processes.
    PMID: 22000225 [PubMed - in process] (Source: The Behavioral and Brain Sciences)</description>
            <author>The Behavioral and Brain Sciences</author>
            <type>journals</type>
        <comments>http://www.medworm.com/rss/comments.php?id=5327886</comments>
            <pubDate>Sat, 01 Oct 2011 04:00:00 +0100</pubDate>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">5327886</guid>        </item>
        <item>
            <title>Norms and high-level cognition: Consequences, trends, and antidotes.</title>
            <link>http://www.medworm.com/index.php?rid=5327885&amp;cid=s_36932_168_f&amp;fid=36932&amp;url=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov%2Fentrez%2Fquery.fcgi%3Ftmpl%3DNoSidebarfile%26db%3DPubMed%26cmd%3DRetrieve%26list_uids%3D22000226%26dopt%3DAbstract</link>
            <description>Authors: McNair S, Feeney A
    Abstract
    We are neither as pessimistic nor as optimistic as Elqayam &amp; Evans (E&amp;E). The consequences of normativism have not been uniformly disastrous, even among the examples they consider. However, normativism won't be going away any time soon and in the literature on causal Bayes nets new debates about normativism are emerging. Finally, we suggest that to concentrate on expert reasoners as an antidote to normativism may limit the contribution of research on thinking to basic psychological science.
    PMID: 22000226 [PubMed - in process] (Source: The Behavioral and Brain Sciences)</description>
            <author>The Behavioral and Brain Sciences</author>
            <type>journals</type>
        <comments>http://www.medworm.com/rss/comments.php?id=5327885</comments>
            <pubDate>Sat, 01 Oct 2011 04:00:00 +0100</pubDate>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">5327885</guid>        </item>
        <item>
            <title>Norms, goals, and the study of thinking.</title>
            <link>http://www.medworm.com/index.php?rid=5327884&amp;cid=s_36932_168_f&amp;fid=36932&amp;url=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov%2Fentrez%2Fquery.fcgi%3Ftmpl%3DNoSidebarfile%26db%3DPubMed%26cmd%3DRetrieve%26list_uids%3D22000227%26dopt%3DAbstract</link>
            <description>Authors: Nickerson RS
    Abstract
    Elqayam &amp; Evans (E&amp;E) argue that the major objective of research on human thinking should be the development of descriptive theories, and they challenge normativism - &quot;the belief that people ought to conform to a normative standard&quot; (target article, sect. 1, para. 10). I contend that although their argument for the importance of developing descriptive theories is compelling, normative theories are also important, not only for improving thinking but for investigating and understanding it as well.
    PMID: 22000227 [PubMed - in process] (Source: The Behavioral and Brain Sciences)</description>
            <author>The Behavioral and Brain Sciences</author>
            <type>journals</type>
        <comments>http://www.medworm.com/rss/comments.php?id=5327884</comments>
            <pubDate>Sat, 01 Oct 2011 04:00:00 +0100</pubDate>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">5327884</guid>        </item>
        <item>
            <title>The &quot;is-ought fallacy&quot; fallacy.</title>
            <link>http://www.medworm.com/index.php?rid=5327883&amp;cid=s_36932_168_f&amp;fid=36932&amp;url=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov%2Fentrez%2Fquery.fcgi%3Ftmpl%3DNoSidebarfile%26db%3DPubMed%26cmd%3DRetrieve%26list_uids%3D22000228%26dopt%3DAbstract</link>
            <description>The &quot;is-ought fallacy&quot; fallacy.
    Behav Brain Sci. 2011 Oct;34(5):262-3
    Authors: Oaksford M, Chater N
    Abstract
    Mere facts about how the world is cannot determine how we ought to think or behave. Elqayam &amp; Evans (E&amp;E) argue that this &quot;is-ought fallacy&quot; undercuts the use of rational analysis in explaining how people reason, by ourselves and with others. But this presumed application of the &quot;is-ought&quot; fallacy is itself fallacious. Rational analysis seeks to explain how people do reason, for example in laboratory experiments, not how they ought to reason. Thus, no ought is derived from an is; and rational analysis is unchallenged by E&amp;E's arguments.
    PMID: 22000228 [PubMed - in process] (Source: The Behavioral and Brain Sciences)</description>
            <author>The Behavioral and Brain Sciences</author>
            <type>journals</type>
        <comments>http://www.medworm.com/rss/comments.php?id=5327883</comments>
            <pubDate>Sat, 01 Oct 2011 04:00:00 +0100</pubDate>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">5327883</guid>        </item>
        <item>
            <title>Systematic rationality norms provide research roadmaps and clarity.</title>
            <link>http://www.medworm.com/index.php?rid=5327882&amp;cid=s_36932_168_f&amp;fid=36932&amp;url=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov%2Fentrez%2Fquery.fcgi%3Ftmpl%3DNoSidebarfile%26db%3DPubMed%26cmd%3DRetrieve%26list_uids%3D22000229%26dopt%3DAbstract</link>
            <description>Authors: Pfeifer N
    Abstract
    Normative theories like probability logic provide roadmaps for psychological investigations. They make theorizing precise. Therefore, normative considerations should not be subtracted from psychological research. I explain why conditional elimination inferences involve at least two norm paradigms; why reporting agreement with rationality norms is informative; why alleged asymmetric relations between formal and psychological theories are symmetric; and I discuss the arbitration problem.
    PMID: 22000229 [PubMed - in process] (Source: The Behavioral and Brain Sciences)</description>
            <author>The Behavioral and Brain Sciences</author>
            <type>journals</type>
        <comments>http://www.medworm.com/rss/comments.php?id=5327882</comments>
            <pubDate>Sat, 01 Oct 2011 04:00:00 +0100</pubDate>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">5327882</guid>        </item>
        <item>
            <title>A case for limited prescriptive normativism.</title>
            <link>http://www.medworm.com/index.php?rid=5327881&amp;cid=s_36932_168_f&amp;fid=36932&amp;url=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov%2Fentrez%2Fquery.fcgi%3Ftmpl%3DNoSidebarfile%26db%3DPubMed%26cmd%3DRetrieve%26list_uids%3D22000230%26dopt%3DAbstract</link>
            <description>Authors: Pothos EM, Busemeyer JR
    Abstract
    Understanding cognitive processes with a formal framework necessitates some limited, internal prescriptive normativism. This is because it is not possible to endorse the psychological relevance of some axioms in a formal framework, but reject that of others. The empirical challenge then becomes identifying the remit of different formal frameworks, an objective consistent with the descriptivism Elqayam &amp; Evans (E&amp;E) advocate.
    PMID: 22000230 [PubMed - in process] (Source: The Behavioral and Brain Sciences)</description>
            <author>The Behavioral and Brain Sciences</author>
            <type>journals</type>
        <comments>http://www.medworm.com/rss/comments.php?id=5327881</comments>
            <pubDate>Sat, 01 Oct 2011 04:00:00 +0100</pubDate>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">5327881</guid>        </item>
        <item>
            <title>Epistemic normativity from the reasoner's viewpoint.</title>
            <link>http://www.medworm.com/index.php?rid=5327880&amp;cid=s_36932_168_f&amp;fid=36932&amp;url=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov%2Fentrez%2Fquery.fcgi%3Ftmpl%3DNoSidebarfile%26db%3DPubMed%26cmd%3DRetrieve%26list_uids%3D22000231%26dopt%3DAbstract</link>
            <description>Authors: Proust J
    Abstract
    Elqayam &amp; Evans (E&amp;E) are focused on the normative judgments used by theorists to characterize subjects' performances (e.g. in terms of logic or probability theory). They ignore the fact, however, that subjects themselves have an independent ability to evaluate their own reasoning performance, and that this ability plays a major role in controlling their first-order reasoning tasks.
    PMID: 22000231 [PubMed - in process] (Source: The Behavioral and Brain Sciences)</description>
            <author>The Behavioral and Brain Sciences</author>
            <type>journals</type>
        <comments>http://www.medworm.com/rss/comments.php?id=5327880</comments>
            <pubDate>Sat, 01 Oct 2011 04:00:00 +0100</pubDate>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">5327880</guid>        </item>
        <item>
            <title>Naturalizing the normative and the bridges between &quot;is&quot; and &quot;ought&quot;.</title>
            <link>http://www.medworm.com/index.php?rid=5327879&amp;cid=s_36932_168_f&amp;fid=36932&amp;url=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov%2Fentrez%2Fquery.fcgi%3Ftmpl%3DNoSidebarfile%26db%3DPubMed%26cmd%3DRetrieve%26list_uids%3D22000232%26dopt%3DAbstract</link>
            <description>Naturalizing the normative and the bridges between &quot;is&quot; and &quot;ought&quot;.
    Behav Brain Sci. 2011 Oct;34(5):266
    Authors: Quintelier KJ, Fessler DM
    Abstract
    Elqayam &amp; Evans (E&amp;E) suggest descriptivism as a way to avoid fallacies and research biases. We argue, first, that descriptive and prescriptive theories might be better off with a closer interaction between &quot;is&quot; and &quot;ought.&quot; Moreover, while we acknowledge the problematic nature of the discussed fallacies and biases, important aspects of research would be lost through a broad application of descriptivism.
    PMID: 22000232 [PubMed - in process] (Source: The Behavioral and Brain Sciences)</description>
            <author>The Behavioral and Brain Sciences</author>
            <type>journals</type>
        <comments>http://www.medworm.com/rss/comments.php?id=5327879</comments>
            <pubDate>Sat, 01 Oct 2011 04:00:00 +0100</pubDate>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">5327879</guid>        </item>
        <item>
            <title>Truth-conduciveness as the primary epistemic justification of normative systems of reasoning.</title>
            <link>http://www.medworm.com/index.php?rid=5327878&amp;cid=s_36932_168_f&amp;fid=36932&amp;url=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov%2Fentrez%2Fquery.fcgi%3Ftmpl%3DNoSidebarfile%26db%3DPubMed%26cmd%3DRetrieve%26list_uids%3D22000233%26dopt%3DAbstract</link>
            <description>Authors: Schurz G
    Abstract
    Although I agree with Elqayam &amp; Evans' (E&amp;E's) criticisms of is-ought and ought-is fallacies, I criticize their rejection of normativism on two grounds: (1) Contrary to E&amp;E's assumption, not every normative system of reasoning consists of formal rules. (2) E&amp;E assume that norms of reasoning are grounded on intuition or authority, whereas in contemporary epistemology they have to be justified, primarily by their truth-conduciveness.
    PMID: 22000233 [PubMed - in process] (Source: The Behavioral and Brain Sciences)</description>
            <author>The Behavioral and Brain Sciences</author>
            <type>journals</type>
        <comments>http://www.medworm.com/rss/comments.php?id=5327878</comments>
            <pubDate>Sat, 01 Oct 2011 04:00:00 +0100</pubDate>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">5327878</guid>        </item>
        <item>
            <title>Reason is normative, and should be studied accordingly.</title>
            <link>http://www.medworm.com/index.php?rid=5327877&amp;cid=s_36932_168_f&amp;fid=36932&amp;url=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov%2Fentrez%2Fquery.fcgi%3Ftmpl%3DNoSidebarfile%26db%3DPubMed%26cmd%3DRetrieve%26list_uids%3D22000234%26dopt%3DAbstract</link>
            <description>Authors: Spurrett D
    Abstract
    Reason aims at truth, so normative considerations are a proper part of the study of reasoning. Excluding them means neglecting some of what we know or can discover about reasoning. Also, the normativist position we are asked to reject by Elqayam &amp; Evans (E&amp;E) is defined in attenuated and self-contradictory ways.
    PMID: 22000234 [PubMed - in process] (Source: The Behavioral and Brain Sciences)</description>
            <author>The Behavioral and Brain Sciences</author>
            <type>journals</type>
        <comments>http://www.medworm.com/rss/comments.php?id=5327877</comments>
            <pubDate>Sat, 01 Oct 2011 04:00:00 +0100</pubDate>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">5327877</guid>        </item>
        <item>
            <title>Normative models in psychology are here to stay.</title>
            <link>http://www.medworm.com/index.php?rid=5327876&amp;cid=s_36932_168_f&amp;fid=36932&amp;url=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov%2Fentrez%2Fquery.fcgi%3Ftmpl%3DNoSidebarfile%26db%3DPubMed%26cmd%3DRetrieve%26list_uids%3D22000235%26dopt%3DAbstract</link>
            <description>Authors: Stanovich KE
    Abstract
    Elqayam &amp; Evans (E&amp;E) drive a wedge between Bayesianism and instrumental rationality that most decision scientists will not recognize. Their analogy from linguistics to judgment and decision making is inapt. Normative models remain extremely useful in the progressive research programs of the judgment and decision making field.
    PMID: 22000235 [PubMed - in process] (Source: The Behavioral and Brain Sciences)</description>
            <author>The Behavioral and Brain Sciences</author>
            <type>journals</type>
        <comments>http://www.medworm.com/rss/comments.php?id=5327876</comments>
            <pubDate>Sat, 01 Oct 2011 04:00:00 +0100</pubDate>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">5327876</guid>        </item>
        <item>
            <title>Understanding reasoning: Let's describe what we really think about.</title>
            <link>http://www.medworm.com/index.php?rid=5327875&amp;cid=s_36932_168_f&amp;fid=36932&amp;url=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov%2Fentrez%2Fquery.fcgi%3Ftmpl%3DNoSidebarfile%26db%3DPubMed%26cmd%3DRetrieve%26list_uids%3D22000236%26dopt%3DAbstract</link>
            <description>Authors: Sternberg RJ
    Abstract
    I suggest psychologists would more profitably study a totally different area of human reasoning than is discussed in the target article - the inductive reasoning people use in their everyday life that matters in consequential real-life decision making, rather than the deductive reasoning that psychologists have studied meticulously but that has relatively less ecological relevance to people's lives.
    PMID: 22000236 [PubMed - in process] (Source: The Behavioral and Brain Sciences)</description>
            <author>The Behavioral and Brain Sciences</author>
            <type>journals</type>
        <comments>http://www.medworm.com/rss/comments.php?id=5327875</comments>
            <pubDate>Sat, 01 Oct 2011 04:00:00 +0100</pubDate>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">5327875</guid>        </item>
        <item>
            <title>Normative benchmarks are useful for studying individual differences in reasoning.</title>
            <link>http://www.medworm.com/index.php?rid=5327874&amp;cid=s_36932_168_f&amp;fid=36932&amp;url=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov%2Fentrez%2Fquery.fcgi%3Ftmpl%3DNoSidebarfile%26db%3DPubMed%26cmd%3DRetrieve%26list_uids%3D22000237%26dopt%3DAbstract</link>
            <description>Authors: Stupple EJ, Ball LJ
    Abstract
    We applaud many aspects of Elqayam &amp; Evans' (E&amp;E's) call for a descriptivist research programme in studying reasoning. Nevertheless, we contend that normative benchmarks are vital for understanding individual differences in performance. We argue that the presence of normative responses to particular problems by certain individuals should inspire researchers to look for converging evidence for analytic processing that may have a normative basis.
    PMID: 22000237 [PubMed - in process] (Source: The Behavioral and Brain Sciences)</description>
            <author>The Behavioral and Brain Sciences</author>
            <type>journals</type>
        <comments>http://www.medworm.com/rss/comments.php?id=5327874</comments>
            <pubDate>Sat, 01 Oct 2011 04:00:00 +0100</pubDate>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">5327874</guid>        </item>
        <item>
            <title>Probability theory and perception of randomness: Bridging &quot;ought&quot; and &quot;is&quot;.</title>
            <link>http://www.medworm.com/index.php?rid=5327873&amp;cid=s_36932_168_f&amp;fid=36932&amp;url=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov%2Fentrez%2Fquery.fcgi%3Ftmpl%3DNoSidebarfile%26db%3DPubMed%26cmd%3DRetrieve%26list_uids%3D22000238%26dopt%3DAbstract</link>
            <description>Probability theory and perception of randomness: Bridging &quot;ought&quot; and &quot;is&quot;.
    Behav Brain Sci. 2011 Oct;34(5):271-2
    Authors: Sun Y, Wang H
    Abstract
    We argue that approaches adhering to normative systems can be as fruitful as those by descriptive systems. In measuring people's perception of randomness, discrepancies between human behavior and normative models could have resulted from unknown properties of the models, and it does not necessarily lead to the conclusion that people are irrational or that the normative system has to be abandoned.
    PMID: 22000238 [PubMed - in process] (Source: The Behavioral and Brain Sciences)</description>
            <author>The Behavioral and Brain Sciences</author>
            <type>journals</type>
        <comments>http://www.medworm.com/rss/comments.php?id=5327873</comments>
            <pubDate>Sat, 01 Oct 2011 04:00:00 +0100</pubDate>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">5327873</guid>        </item>
        <item>
            <title>Normativism versus mechanism.</title>
            <link>http://www.medworm.com/index.php?rid=5327872&amp;cid=s_36932_168_f&amp;fid=36932&amp;url=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov%2Fentrez%2Fquery.fcgi%3Ftmpl%3DNoSidebarfile%26db%3DPubMed%26cmd%3DRetrieve%26list_uids%3D22000239%26dopt%3DAbstract</link>
            <description>Authors: Thompson VA
    Abstract
    Using normative correctness as a diagnostic tool reduces the outcome of complex cognitive functions to a binary classification (normative or non-normative). It also focuses attention on outcomes, rather than processes, impeding the development of good cognitive theories. Given that both normative and non-normative responses may be produced by the same process, normativity is a poor indicator of underlying processes.
    PMID: 22000239 [PubMed - in process] (Source: The Behavioral and Brain Sciences)</description>
            <author>The Behavioral and Brain Sciences</author>
            <type>journals</type>
        <comments>http://www.medworm.com/rss/comments.php?id=5327872</comments>
            <pubDate>Sat, 01 Oct 2011 04:00:00 +0100</pubDate>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">5327872</guid>        </item>
        <item>
            <title>Neurath's ship: The constitutive relation between normative and descriptive theories of rationality.</title>
            <link>http://www.medworm.com/index.php?rid=5327870&amp;cid=s_36932_168_f&amp;fid=36932&amp;url=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov%2Fentrez%2Fquery.fcgi%3Ftmpl%3DNoSidebarfile%26db%3DPubMed%26cmd%3DRetrieve%26list_uids%3D22000240%26dopt%3DAbstract</link>
            <description>Authors: Waldmann MR
    Abstract
    I defend the claim that in psychological theories concerned with theoretical or practical rationality there is a constitutive relation between normative and descriptive theories: Normative theories provide idealized descriptive accounts of rational agents. However, we need to resist the temptation to collapse descriptive theories with any specific normative theory. I show how a partial separation is possible.
    PMID: 22000240 [PubMed - in process] (Source: The Behavioral and Brain Sciences)</description>
            <author>The Behavioral and Brain Sciences</author>
            <type>journals</type>
        <comments>http://www.medworm.com/rss/comments.php?id=5327870</comments>
            <pubDate>Sat, 01 Oct 2011 04:00:00 +0100</pubDate>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">5327870</guid>        </item>
        <item>
            <title>What is evaluative normativity, that we (maybe) should avoid it?</title>
            <link>http://www.medworm.com/index.php?rid=5327868&amp;cid=s_36932_168_f&amp;fid=36932&amp;url=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov%2Fentrez%2Fquery.fcgi%3Ftmpl%3DNoSidebarfile%26db%3DPubMed%26cmd%3DRetrieve%26list_uids%3D22000241%26dopt%3DAbstract</link>
            <description>Authors: Weinberg JM
    Abstract
    Elqayam &amp; Evans (E&amp;E) argue that we should avoid evaluative normativity in our psychological theorizing. But there are two crucial issues lacking clarity in their presentation of evaluative normativity. One of them can be resolved through disambiguation, but the other points to a deeper problem: Evaluative normativity is too tightly-woven in our theorizing to be easily disentangled and discarded.
    PMID: 22000241 [PubMed - in process] (Source: The Behavioral and Brain Sciences)</description>
            <author>The Behavioral and Brain Sciences</author>
            <type>journals</type>
        <comments>http://www.medworm.com/rss/comments.php?id=5327868</comments>
            <pubDate>Sat, 01 Oct 2011 04:00:00 +0100</pubDate>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">5327868</guid>        </item>
        <item>
            <title>Is everyone Bayes? On the testable implications of Bayesian Fundamentalism - Erratum.</title>
            <link>http://www.medworm.com/index.php?rid=5327865&amp;cid=s_36932_168_f&amp;fid=36932&amp;url=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov%2Fentrez%2Fquery.fcgi%3Ftmpl%3DNoSidebarfile%26db%3DPubMed%26cmd%3DRetrieve%26list_uids%3D22000242%26dopt%3DAbstract</link>
            <description>Authors: Speekenbrink M, Shanks DR
    PMID: 22000242 [PubMed - in process] (Source: The Behavioral and Brain Sciences)</description>
            <author>The Behavioral and Brain Sciences</author>
            <type>journals</type>
        <comments>http://www.medworm.com/rss/comments.php?id=5327865</comments>
            <pubDate>Sat, 01 Oct 2011 04:00:00 +0100</pubDate>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">5327865</guid>        </item>
        <item>
            <title>Bayesian Fundamentalism or Enlightenment? On the explanatory status and theoretical contributions of Bayesian models of cognition.</title>
            <link>http://www.medworm.com/index.php?rid=5175915&amp;cid=s_36932_168_f&amp;fid=36932&amp;url=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov%2Fentrez%2Fquery.fcgi%3Ftmpl%3DNoSidebarfile%26db%3DPubMed%26cmd%3DRetrieve%26list_uids%3D21864419%26dopt%3DAbstract</link>
            <description>Authors: Jones M, Love BC
    Abstract
    The prominence of Bayesian modeling of cognition has increased recently largely because of mathematical advances in specifying and deriving predictions from complex probabilistic models. Much of this research aims to demonstrate that cognitive behavior can be explained from rational principles alone, without recourse to psychological or neurological processes and representations. We note commonalities between this rational approach and other movements in psychology - namely, Behaviorism and evolutionary psychology - that set aside mechanistic explanations or make use of optimality assumptions. Through these comparisons, we identify a number of challenges that limit the rational program's potential contribution to psychological theory. Specifically...</description>
            <author>The Behavioral and Brain Sciences</author>
            <type>journals</type>
        <comments>http://www.medworm.com/rss/comments.php?id=5175915</comments>
            <pubDate>Sun, 31 Jul 2011 23:00:00 +0100</pubDate>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">5175915</guid>        </item>
        <item>
            <title>Evolutionary psychology and Bayesian modeling.</title>
            <link>http://www.medworm.com/index.php?rid=5175914&amp;cid=s_36932_168_f&amp;fid=36932&amp;url=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov%2Fentrez%2Fquery.fcgi%3Ftmpl%3DNoSidebarfile%26db%3DPubMed%26cmd%3DRetrieve%26list_uids%3D21864420%26dopt%3DAbstract</link>
            <description>Authors: Al-Shawaf L, Buss D
    Abstract
    The target article provides important theoretical contributions to psychology and Bayesian modeling. Despite the article's excellent points, we suggest that it succumbs to a few misconceptions about evolutionary psychology (EP). These include a mischaracterization of evolutionary psychology's approach to optimality; failure to appreciate the centrality of mechanism in EP; and an incorrect depiction of hypothesis testing. An accurate characterization of EP offers more promise for successful integration with Bayesian modeling.
    PMID: 21864420 [PubMed - in process] (Source: The Behavioral and Brain Sciences)</description>
            <author>The Behavioral and Brain Sciences</author>
            <type>journals</type>
        <comments>http://www.medworm.com/rss/comments.php?id=5175914</comments>
            <pubDate>Sun, 31 Jul 2011 23:00:00 +0100</pubDate>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">5175914</guid>        </item>
        <item>
            <title>The myth of computational level theory and the vacuity of rational analysis.</title>
            <link>http://www.medworm.com/index.php?rid=5175913&amp;cid=s_36932_168_f&amp;fid=36932&amp;url=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov%2Fentrez%2Fquery.fcgi%3Ftmpl%3DNoSidebarfile%26db%3DPubMed%26cmd%3DRetrieve%26list_uids%3D21864421%26dopt%3DAbstract</link>
            <description>Authors: Anderson BL
    Abstract
    I extend Jones &amp; Love's (J&amp;L's) critique of Bayesian models and evaluate the conceptual foundations on which they are built. I argue that: (1) the &quot;Bayesian&quot; part of Bayesian models is scientifically trivial; (2) &quot;computational level&quot; theory is a fiction that arises from an inappropriate programming metaphor; and (3) the real scientific problems lie outside Bayesian theorizing.
    PMID: 21864421 [PubMed - in process] (Source: The Behavioral and Brain Sciences)</description>
            <author>The Behavioral and Brain Sciences</author>
            <type>journals</type>
        <comments>http://www.medworm.com/rss/comments.php?id=5175913</comments>
            <pubDate>Sun, 31 Jul 2011 23:00:00 +0100</pubDate>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">5175913</guid>        </item>
        <item>
            <title>Maybe this old dinosaur isn't extinct: What does Bayesian modeling add to associationism?</title>
            <link>http://www.medworm.com/index.php?rid=5175912&amp;cid=s_36932_168_f&amp;fid=36932&amp;url=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov%2Fentrez%2Fquery.fcgi%3Ftmpl%3DNoSidebarfile%26db%3DPubMed%26cmd%3DRetrieve%26list_uids%3D21864422%26dopt%3DAbstract</link>
            <description>Authors: Baetu I, Barberia I, Murphy RA, Baker AG
    Abstract
    We agree with Jones &amp; Love (J&amp;L) that much of Bayesian modeling has taken a fundamentalist approach to cognition; but we do not believe in the potential of Bayesianism to provide insights into psychological processes. We discuss the advantages of associative explanations over Bayesian approaches to causal induction, and argue that Bayesian models have added little to our understanding of human causal reasoning.
    PMID: 21864422 [PubMed - in process] (Source: The Behavioral and Brain Sciences)</description>
            <author>The Behavioral and Brain Sciences</author>
            <type>journals</type>
        <comments>http://www.medworm.com/rss/comments.php?id=5175912</comments>
            <pubDate>Sun, 31 Jul 2011 23:00:00 +0100</pubDate>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">5175912</guid>        </item>
        <item>
            <title>Integrating Bayesian analysis and mechanistic theories in grounded cognition.</title>
            <link>http://www.medworm.com/index.php?rid=5175911&amp;cid=s_36932_168_f&amp;fid=36932&amp;url=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov%2Fentrez%2Fquery.fcgi%3Ftmpl%3DNoSidebarfile%26db%3DPubMed%26cmd%3DRetrieve%26list_uids%3D21864423%26dopt%3DAbstract</link>
            <description>Authors: Barsalou LW
    Abstract
    Grounded cognition offers a natural approach for integrating Bayesian accounts of optimality with mechanistic accounts of cognition, the brain, the body, the physical environment, and the social environment. The constructs of simulator and situated conceptualization illustrate how Bayesian priors and likelihoods arise naturally in grounded mechanisms to predict and control situated action.
    PMID: 21864423 [PubMed - in process] (Source: The Behavioral and Brain Sciences)</description>
            <author>The Behavioral and Brain Sciences</author>
            <type>journals</type>
        <comments>http://www.medworm.com/rss/comments.php?id=5175911</comments>
            <pubDate>Sun, 31 Jul 2011 23:00:00 +0100</pubDate>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">5175911</guid>        </item>
        <item>
            <title>Mechanistic curiosity will not kill the Bayesian cat.</title>
            <link>http://www.medworm.com/index.php?rid=5175910&amp;cid=s_36932_168_f&amp;fid=36932&amp;url=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov%2Fentrez%2Fquery.fcgi%3Ftmpl%3DNoSidebarfile%26db%3DPubMed%26cmd%3DRetrieve%26list_uids%3D21864424%26dopt%3DAbstract</link>
            <description>Authors: Borsboom D, Wagenmakers EJ, Romeijn JW
    Abstract
    Jones &amp; Love (J&amp;L) suggest that Bayesian approaches to the explanation of human behavior should be constrained by mechanistic theories. We argue that their proposal misconstrues the relation between process models, such as the Bayesian model, and mechanisms. While mechanistic theories can answer specific issues that arise from the study of processes, one cannot expect them to provide constraints in general.
    PMID: 21864424 [PubMed - in process] (Source: The Behavioral and Brain Sciences)</description>
            <author>The Behavioral and Brain Sciences</author>
            <type>journals</type>
        <comments>http://www.medworm.com/rss/comments.php?id=5175910</comments>
            <pubDate>Sun, 31 Jul 2011 23:00:00 +0100</pubDate>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">5175910</guid>        </item>
        <item>
            <title>More varieties of Bayesian theories, but no enlightenment.</title>
            <link>http://www.medworm.com/index.php?rid=5175909&amp;cid=s_36932_168_f&amp;fid=36932&amp;url=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov%2Fentrez%2Fquery.fcgi%3Ftmpl%3DNoSidebarfile%26db%3DPubMed%26cmd%3DRetrieve%26list_uids%3D21864425%26dopt%3DAbstract</link>
            <description>Authors: Bowers JS, Davis CJ
    Abstract
    We argue that Bayesian models are best categorized as methodological or theoretical. That is, models are used as tools to constrain theories, with no commitment to the processes that mediate cognition, or models are intended to approximate the underlying algorithmic solutions. We argue that both approaches are flawed, and that the Enlightened Bayesian approach is unlikely to help.
    PMID: 21864425 [PubMed - in process] (Source: The Behavioral and Brain Sciences)</description>
            <author>The Behavioral and Brain Sciences</author>
            <type>journals</type>
        <comments>http://www.medworm.com/rss/comments.php?id=5175909</comments>
            <pubDate>Sun, 31 Jul 2011 23:00:00 +0100</pubDate>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">5175909</guid>        </item>
        <item>
            <title>The imaginary fundamentalists: The unshocking truth about Bayesian cognitive science.</title>
            <link>http://www.medworm.com/index.php?rid=5175908&amp;cid=s_36932_168_f&amp;fid=36932&amp;url=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov%2Fentrez%2Fquery.fcgi%3Ftmpl%3DNoSidebarfile%26db%3DPubMed%26cmd%3DRetrieve%26list_uids%3D21864426%26dopt%3DAbstract</link>
            <description>Authors: Chater N, Goodman N, Griffiths TL, Kemp C, Oaksford M, Tenenbaum JB
    Abstract
    If Bayesian Fundamentalism existed, Jones &amp; Love's (J&amp;L's) arguments would provide a necessary corrective. But it does not. Bayesian cognitive science is deeply concerned with characterizing algorithms and representations, and, ultimately, implementations in neural circuits; it pays close attention to environmental structure and the constraints of behavioral data, when available; and it rigorously compares multiple models, both within and across papers. J&amp;L's recommendation of Bayesian Enlightenment corresponds to past, present, and, we hope, future practice in Bayesian cognitive science.
    PMID: 21864426 [PubMed - in process] (Source: The Behavioral and Brain Sciences)</description>
            <author>The Behavioral and Brain Sciences</author>
            <type>journals</type>
        <comments>http://www.medworm.com/rss/comments.php?id=5175908</comments>
            <pubDate>Sun, 31 Jul 2011 23:00:00 +0100</pubDate>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">5175908</guid>        </item>
        <item>
            <title>Survival in a world of probable objects: A fundamental reason for Bayesian enlightenment.</title>
            <link>http://www.medworm.com/index.php?rid=5175907&amp;cid=s_36932_168_f&amp;fid=36932&amp;url=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov%2Fentrez%2Fquery.fcgi%3Ftmpl%3DNoSidebarfile%26db%3DPubMed%26cmd%3DRetrieve%26list_uids%3D21864427%26dopt%3DAbstract</link>
            <description>Authors: Edelman S, Shahbazi R
    Abstract
    The only viable formulation of perception, thinking, and action under uncertainty is statistical inference, and the normative way of statistical inference is Bayesian. No wonder, then, that even seemingly non-Bayesian computational frameworks in cognitive science ultimately draw their justification from Bayesian considerations, as enlightened theorists know fully well.
    PMID: 21864427 [PubMed - in process] (Source: The Behavioral and Brain Sciences)</description>
            <author>The Behavioral and Brain Sciences</author>
            <type>journals</type>
        <comments>http://www.medworm.com/rss/comments.php?id=5175907</comments>
            <pubDate>Sun, 31 Jul 2011 23:00:00 +0100</pubDate>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">5175907</guid>        </item>
        <item>
            <title>Keeping Bayesian models rational: The need for an account of algorithmic rationality.</title>
            <link>http://www.medworm.com/index.php?rid=5175906&amp;cid=s_36932_168_f&amp;fid=36932&amp;url=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov%2Fentrez%2Fquery.fcgi%3Ftmpl%3DNoSidebarfile%26db%3DPubMed%26cmd%3DRetrieve%26list_uids%3D21864428%26dopt%3DAbstract</link>
            <description>Authors: Danks D, Eberhardt F
    Abstract
    We argue that the authors' call to integrate Bayesian models more strongly with algorithmic- and implementational-level models must go hand in hand with a call for a fully developed account of algorithmic rationality. Without such an account, the integration of levels would come at the expense of the explanatory benefit that rational models provide.
    PMID: 21864428 [PubMed - in process] (Source: The Behavioral and Brain Sciences)</description>
            <author>The Behavioral and Brain Sciences</author>
            <type>journals</type>
        <comments>http://www.medworm.com/rss/comments.php?id=5175906</comments>
            <pubDate>Sun, 31 Jul 2011 23:00:00 +0100</pubDate>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">5175906</guid>        </item>
        <item>
            <title>Don't throw out the Bayes with the bathwater.</title>
            <link>http://www.medworm.com/index.php?rid=5175905&amp;cid=s_36932_168_f&amp;fid=36932&amp;url=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov%2Fentrez%2Fquery.fcgi%3Ftmpl%3DNoSidebarfile%26db%3DPubMed%26cmd%3DRetrieve%26list_uids%3D21864429%26dopt%3DAbstract</link>
            <description>Authors: Fernbach PM, Sloman SA
    Abstract
    We highlight one way in which Jones &amp; Love (J&amp;L) misconstrue the Bayesian program: Bayesian models do not represent a rejection of mechanism. This mischaracterization obscures the valid criticisms in their article. We conclude that computational-level Bayesian modeling should not be rejected or discouraged a priori, but should be held to the same empirical standards as other models.
    PMID: 21864429 [PubMed - in process] (Source: The Behavioral and Brain Sciences)</description>
            <author>The Behavioral and Brain Sciences</author>
            <type>journals</type>
        <comments>http://www.medworm.com/rss/comments.php?id=5175905</comments>
            <pubDate>Sun, 31 Jul 2011 23:00:00 +0100</pubDate>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">5175905</guid>        </item>
        <item>
            <title>Osiander's psychology.</title>
            <link>http://www.medworm.com/index.php?rid=5175904&amp;cid=s_36932_168_f&amp;fid=36932&amp;url=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov%2Fentrez%2Fquery.fcgi%3Ftmpl%3DNoSidebarfile%26db%3DPubMed%26cmd%3DRetrieve%26list_uids%3D21864430%26dopt%3DAbstract</link>
            <description>Authors: Glymour C
    Abstract
    Bayesian psychology follows an old instrumentalist tradition most infamously illustrated by Osiander's preface to Copernicus's masterpiece. Jones &amp; Love's (J&amp;L's) criticisms are, if anything, understated, and their proposals overoptimistic.
    PMID: 21864430 [PubMed - in process] (Source: The Behavioral and Brain Sciences)</description>
            <author>The Behavioral and Brain Sciences</author>
            <type>journals</type>
        <comments>http://www.medworm.com/rss/comments.php?id=5175904</comments>
            <pubDate>Sun, 31 Jul 2011 23:00:00 +0100</pubDate>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">5175904</guid>        </item>
        <item>
            <title>Probabilistic models as theories of children's minds.</title>
            <link>http://www.medworm.com/index.php?rid=5175903&amp;cid=s_36932_168_f&amp;fid=36932&amp;url=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov%2Fentrez%2Fquery.fcgi%3Ftmpl%3DNoSidebarfile%26db%3DPubMed%26cmd%3DRetrieve%26list_uids%3D21864431%26dopt%3DAbstract</link>
            <description>Authors: Gopnik A
    Abstract
    My research program proposes that children have representations and learning mechanisms that can be characterized as causal models of the world - coherent, structured hypotheses with consistent relationships to probabilistic patterns of evidence. We also propose that Bayesian inference is one mechanism by which children learn these models from data. These proposals are straightforward psychological hypotheses and far from &quot;Bayesian Fundamentalism.&quot;
    PMID: 21864431 [PubMed - in process] (Source: The Behavioral and Brain Sciences)</description>
            <author>The Behavioral and Brain Sciences</author>
            <type>journals</type>
        <comments>http://www.medworm.com/rss/comments.php?id=5175903</comments>
            <pubDate>Sun, 31 Jul 2011 23:00:00 +0100</pubDate>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">5175903</guid>        </item>
        <item>
            <title>The uncertain status of Bayesian accounts of reasoning.</title>
            <link>http://www.medworm.com/index.php?rid=5175902&amp;cid=s_36932_168_f&amp;fid=36932&amp;url=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov%2Fentrez%2Fquery.fcgi%3Ftmpl%3DNoSidebarfile%26db%3DPubMed%26cmd%3DRetrieve%26list_uids%3D21864432%26dopt%3DAbstract</link>
            <description>Authors: Hayes BK, Newell BR
    Abstract
    Bayesian accounts are currently popular in the field of inductive reasoning. This commentary briefly reviews the limitations of one such account, the Rational Model (Anderson 1991b), in explaining how inferences are made about objects whose category membership is uncertain. These shortcomings are symptomatic of what Jones &amp; Love (J&amp;L) refer to as &quot;fundamentalist&quot; Bayesian approaches.
    PMID: 21864432 [PubMed - in process] (Source: The Behavioral and Brain Sciences)</description>
            <author>The Behavioral and Brain Sciences</author>
            <type>journals</type>
        <comments>http://www.medworm.com/rss/comments.php?id=5175902</comments>
            <pubDate>Sun, 31 Jul 2011 23:00:00 +0100</pubDate>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">5175902</guid>        </item>
        <item>
            <title>Relating Bayes to cognitive mechanisms.</title>
            <link>http://www.medworm.com/index.php?rid=5175901&amp;cid=s_36932_168_f&amp;fid=36932&amp;url=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov%2Fentrez%2Fquery.fcgi%3Ftmpl%3DNoSidebarfile%26db%3DPubMed%26cmd%3DRetrieve%26list_uids%3D21864433%26dopt%3DAbstract</link>
            <description>Authors: Herschbach M, Bechtel W
    Abstract
    We support Enlightenment Bayesianism's commitment to grounding Bayesian analysis in empirical details of psychological and neural mechanisms. Recent philosophical accounts of mechanistic science illuminate some of the challenges this approach faces. In particular, mechanistic decomposition of mechanisms into their component parts and operations gives rise to a notion of levels distinct from and more challenging to accommodate than Marr's.
    PMID: 21864433 [PubMed - in process] (Source: The Behavioral and Brain Sciences)</description>
            <author>The Behavioral and Brain Sciences</author>
            <type>journals</type>
        <comments>http://www.medworm.com/rss/comments.php?id=5175901</comments>
            <pubDate>Sun, 31 Jul 2011 23:00:00 +0100</pubDate>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">5175901</guid>        </item>
        <item>
            <title>In praise of secular Bayesianism.</title>
            <link>http://www.medworm.com/index.php?rid=5175900&amp;cid=s_36932_168_f&amp;fid=36932&amp;url=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov%2Fentrez%2Fquery.fcgi%3Ftmpl%3DNoSidebarfile%26db%3DPubMed%26cmd%3DRetrieve%26list_uids%3D21864434%26dopt%3DAbstract</link>
            <description>Authors: Heit E, Erickson S
    Abstract
    It is timely to assess Bayesian models, but Bayesianism is not a religion. Bayesian modeling is typically used as a tool to explain human data. Bayesian models are sometimes equivalent to other models, but have the advantage of explicitly integrating prior hypotheses with new observations. Any lack of representational or neural assumptions may be an advantage rather than a disadvantage.
    PMID: 21864434 [PubMed - in process] (Source: The Behavioral and Brain Sciences)</description>
            <author>The Behavioral and Brain Sciences</author>
            <type>journals</type>
        <comments>http://www.medworm.com/rss/comments.php?id=5175900</comments>
            <pubDate>Sun, 31 Jul 2011 23:00:00 +0100</pubDate>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">5175900</guid>        </item>
        <item>
            <title>What the Bayesian framework has contributed to understanding cognition: Causal learning as a case study.</title>
            <link>http://www.medworm.com/index.php?rid=5175899&amp;cid=s_36932_168_f&amp;fid=36932&amp;url=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov%2Fentrez%2Fquery.fcgi%3Ftmpl%3DNoSidebarfile%26db%3DPubMed%26cmd%3DRetrieve%26list_uids%3D21864435%26dopt%3DAbstract</link>
            <description>Authors: Holyoak KJ, Lu H
    Abstract
    The field of causal learning and reasoning (largely overlooked in the target article) provides an illuminating case study of how the modern Bayesian framework has deepened theoretical understanding, resolved long-standing controversies, and guided development of new and more principled algorithmic models. This progress was guided in large part by the systematic formulation and empirical comparison of multiple alternative Bayesian models.
    PMID: 21864435 [PubMed - in process] (Source: The Behavioral and Brain Sciences)</description>
            <author>The Behavioral and Brain Sciences</author>
            <type>journals</type>
        <comments>http://www.medworm.com/rss/comments.php?id=5175899</comments>
            <pubDate>Sun, 31 Jul 2011 23:00:00 +0100</pubDate>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">5175899</guid>        </item>
        <item>
            <title>Come down from the clouds: Grounding Bayesian insights in developmental and behavioral processes.</title>
            <link>http://www.medworm.com/index.php?rid=5175897&amp;cid=s_36932_168_f&amp;fid=36932&amp;url=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov%2Fentrez%2Fquery.fcgi%3Ftmpl%3DNoSidebarfile%26db%3DPubMed%26cmd%3DRetrieve%26list_uids%3D21864436%26dopt%3DAbstract</link>
            <description>Authors: Jenkins GW, Samuelson LK, Spencer JP
    Abstract
    According to Jones &amp; Love (J&amp;L), Bayesian theories are too often isolated from other theories and behavioral processes. Here, we highlight examples of two types of isolation from the field of word learning. Specifically, Bayesian theories ignore emergence, critical to development theory, and have not probed the behavioral details of several key phenomena, such as the &quot;suspicious coincidence&quot; effect.
    PMID: 21864436 [PubMed - in process] (Source: The Behavioral and Brain Sciences)</description>
            <author>The Behavioral and Brain Sciences</author>
            <type>journals</type>
        <comments>http://www.medworm.com/rss/comments.php?id=5175897</comments>
            <pubDate>Sun, 31 Jul 2011 23:00:00 +0100</pubDate>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">5175897</guid>        </item>
        <item>
            <title>In praise of Ecumenical Bayes.</title>
            <link>http://www.medworm.com/index.php?rid=5175894&amp;cid=s_36932_168_f&amp;fid=36932&amp;url=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov%2Fentrez%2Fquery.fcgi%3Ftmpl%3DNoSidebarfile%26db%3DPubMed%26cmd%3DRetrieve%26list_uids%3D21864437%26dopt%3DAbstract</link>
            <description>Authors: Lee MD
    Abstract
    Jones &amp; Love (J&amp;L) should have given more attention to Agnostic uses of Bayesian methods for the statistical analysis of models and data. Reliance on the frequentist analysis of Bayesian models has retarded their development and prevented their full evaluation. The Ecumenical integration of Bayesian statistics to analyze Bayesian models offers a better way to test their inferential and predictive capabilities.
    PMID: 21864437 [PubMed - in process] (Source: The Behavioral and Brain Sciences)</description>
            <author>The Behavioral and Brain Sciences</author>
            <type>journals</type>
        <comments>http://www.medworm.com/rss/comments.php?id=5175894</comments>
            <pubDate>Sun, 31 Jul 2011 23:00:00 +0100</pubDate>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">5175894</guid>        </item>
        <item>
            <title>Enlightenment grows from fundamentals.</title>
            <link>http://www.medworm.com/index.php?rid=5175893&amp;cid=s_36932_168_f&amp;fid=36932&amp;url=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov%2Fentrez%2Fquery.fcgi%3Ftmpl%3DNoSidebarfile%26db%3DPubMed%26cmd%3DRetrieve%26list_uids%3D21864438%26dopt%3DAbstract</link>
            <description>Authors: Navarro DJ, Perfors AF
    Abstract
    Jones &amp; Love (J&amp;L) contend that the Bayesian approach should integrate process constraints with abstract computational analysis. We agree, but argue that the fundamentalist/enlightened dichotomy is a false one: Enlightened research is deeply intertwined with - and to a large extent is impossible without - the basic, fundamental work upon which it is based.
    PMID: 21864438 [PubMed - in process] (Source: The Behavioral and Brain Sciences)</description>
            <author>The Behavioral and Brain Sciences</author>
            <type>journals</type>
        <comments>http://www.medworm.com/rss/comments.php?id=5175893</comments>
            <pubDate>Sun, 31 Jul 2011 23:00:00 +0100</pubDate>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">5175893</guid>        </item>
        <item>
            <title>Cognitive systems optimize energy rather than information.</title>
            <link>http://www.medworm.com/index.php?rid=5175892&amp;cid=s_36932_168_f&amp;fid=36932&amp;url=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov%2Fentrez%2Fquery.fcgi%3Ftmpl%3DNoSidebarfile%26db%3DPubMed%26cmd%3DRetrieve%26list_uids%3D21864439%26dopt%3DAbstract</link>
            <description>Authors: Markman AB, Otto AR
    Abstract
    Cognitive models focus on information and the computational manipulation of information. Rational models optimize the function that relates the input of a process to the output. In contrast, efficient algorithms minimize the computational cost of processing in terms of time. Minimizing time is a better criterion for normative models, because it reflects the energy costs of a physical system.
    PMID: 21864439 [PubMed - in process] (Source: The Behavioral and Brain Sciences)</description>
            <author>The Behavioral and Brain Sciences</author>
            <type>journals</type>
        <comments>http://www.medworm.com/rss/comments.php?id=5175892</comments>
            <pubDate>Sun, 31 Jul 2011 23:00:00 +0100</pubDate>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">5175892</guid>        </item>
        <item>
            <title>The illusion of mechanism: Mechanistic fundamentalism or enlightenment?</title>
            <link>http://www.medworm.com/index.php?rid=5175891&amp;cid=s_36932_168_f&amp;fid=36932&amp;url=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov%2Fentrez%2Fquery.fcgi%3Ftmpl%3DNoSidebarfile%26db%3DPubMed%26cmd%3DRetrieve%26list_uids%3D21864440%26dopt%3DAbstract</link>
            <description>Authors: Norris D
    Abstract
    Rather than worrying about Bayesian Fundamentalists, I suggest that our real concern should be with Mechanistic Fundamentalists; that is, those who believe that concrete, but frequently untestable mechanisms, should be at the heart of all cognitive theories.
    PMID: 21864440 [PubMed - in process] (Source: The Behavioral and Brain Sciences)</description>
            <author>The Behavioral and Brain Sciences</author>
            <type>journals</type>
        <comments>http://www.medworm.com/rss/comments.php?id=5175891</comments>
            <pubDate>Sun, 31 Jul 2011 23:00:00 +0100</pubDate>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">5175891</guid>        </item>
        <item>
            <title>Reverse engineering the structure of cognitive mechanisms.</title>
            <link>http://www.medworm.com/index.php?rid=5175890&amp;cid=s_36932_168_f&amp;fid=36932&amp;url=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov%2Fentrez%2Fquery.fcgi%3Ftmpl%3DNoSidebarfile%26db%3DPubMed%26cmd%3DRetrieve%26list_uids%3D21864441%26dopt%3DAbstract</link>
            <description>Authors: Pietraszewski D, Wertz AE
    Abstract
    Describing a cognitive system at a mechanistic level requires an engineering task analysis. This involves identifying the task and developing models of possible solutions. Evolutionary psychology and Bayesian modeling make complimentary contributions: Evolutionary psychology suggests the types of tasks that human brains were designed to solve, while Bayesian modeling provides a rigorous description of possible computational solutions to such problems.
    PMID: 21864441 [PubMed - in process] (Source: The Behavioral and Brain Sciences)</description>
            <author>The Behavioral and Brain Sciences</author>
            <type>journals</type>
        <comments>http://www.medworm.com/rss/comments.php?id=5175890</comments>
            <pubDate>Sun, 31 Jul 2011 23:00:00 +0100</pubDate>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">5175890</guid>        </item>
        <item>
            <title>Taking the rationality out of probabilistic models.</title>
            <link>http://www.medworm.com/index.php?rid=5175889&amp;cid=s_36932_168_f&amp;fid=36932&amp;url=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov%2Fentrez%2Fquery.fcgi%3Ftmpl%3DNoSidebarfile%26db%3DPubMed%26cmd%3DRetrieve%26list_uids%3D21864442%26dopt%3DAbstract</link>
            <description>Authors: Rehder B
    Abstract
    Rational models vary in their goals and sources of justification. While the assumptions of some are grounded in the environment, those of others - which I label probabilistic models - are induced and so require more traditional sources of justification, such as generalizability to dissimilar tasks and making novel predictions. Their contribution to scientific understanding will remain uncertain until standards of evidence are clarified.
    PMID: 21864442 [PubMed - in process] (Source: The Behavioral and Brain Sciences)</description>
            <author>The Behavioral and Brain Sciences</author>
            <type>journals</type>
        <comments>http://www.medworm.com/rss/comments.php?id=5175889</comments>
            <pubDate>Sun, 31 Jul 2011 23:00:00 +0100</pubDate>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">5175889</guid>        </item>
        <item>
            <title>Distinguishing literal from metaphorical applications of Bayesian approaches.</title>
            <link>http://www.medworm.com/index.php?rid=5175888&amp;cid=s_36932_168_f&amp;fid=36932&amp;url=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov%2Fentrez%2Fquery.fcgi%3Ftmpl%3DNoSidebarfile%26db%3DPubMed%26cmd%3DRetrieve%26list_uids%3D21864443%26dopt%3DAbstract</link>
            <description>Authors: Rogers TT, Seidenberg MS
    Abstract
    We distinguish between literal and metaphorical applications of Bayesian models. When intended literally, an isomorphism exists between the elements of representation assumed by the rational analysis and the mechanism that implements the computation. Thus, observation of the implementation can externally validate assumptions underlying the rational analysis. In other applications, no such isomorphism exists, so it is not clear how the assumptions that allow a Bayesian model to fit data can be independently validated.
    PMID: 21864443 [PubMed - in process] (Source: The Behavioral and Brain Sciences)</description>
            <author>The Behavioral and Brain Sciences</author>
            <type>journals</type>
        <comments>http://www.medworm.com/rss/comments.php?id=5175888</comments>
            <pubDate>Sun, 31 Jul 2011 23:00:00 +0100</pubDate>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">5175888</guid>        </item>
        <item>
            <title>Bayesian computation and mechanism: Theoretical pluralism drives scientific emergence.</title>
            <link>http://www.medworm.com/index.php?rid=5175887&amp;cid=s_36932_168_f&amp;fid=36932&amp;url=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov%2Fentrez%2Fquery.fcgi%3Ftmpl%3DNoSidebarfile%26db%3DPubMed%26cmd%3DRetrieve%26list_uids%3D21864444%26dopt%3DAbstract</link>
            <description>Authors: Sewell DK, Little DR, Lewandowsky S
    Abstract
    The breadth-first search adopted by Bayesian researchers to map out the conceptual space and identify what the framework can do is beneficial for science and reflective of its collaborative and incremental nature. Theoretical pluralism among researchers facilitates refinement of models within various levels of analysis, which ultimately enables effective cross-talk between different levels of analysis.
    PMID: 21864444 [PubMed - in process] (Source: The Behavioral and Brain Sciences)</description>
            <author>The Behavioral and Brain Sciences</author>
            <type>journals</type>
        <comments>http://www.medworm.com/rss/comments.php?id=5175887</comments>
            <pubDate>Sun, 31 Jul 2011 23:00:00 +0100</pubDate>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">5175887</guid>        </item>
        <item>
            <title>Is everyone Bayes? On the testable implications of Bayesian Fundamentalism.</title>
            <link>http://www.medworm.com/index.php?rid=5175886&amp;cid=s_36932_168_f&amp;fid=36932&amp;url=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov%2Fentrez%2Fquery.fcgi%3Ftmpl%3DNoSidebarfile%26db%3DPubMed%26cmd%3DRetrieve%26list_uids%3D21864445%26dopt%3DAbstract</link>
            <description>Authors: Speekenbrink M, Shanks DR
    Abstract
    A central claim of Jones &amp; Love's (J&amp;L's) article is that Bayesian Fundamentalism is empirically unconstrained. Unless constraints are placed on prior beliefs, likelihood, and utility functions, all behaviour - it is proposed - is consistent with Bayesian rationality. Although such claims are commonplace, their basis is rarely justified. We fill this gap by sketching a proof, and we discuss possible solutions that would make Bayesian approaches empirically interesting.
    PMID: 21864445 [PubMed - in process] (Source: The Behavioral and Brain Sciences)</description>
            <author>The Behavioral and Brain Sciences</author>
            <type>journals</type>
        <comments>http://www.medworm.com/rss/comments.php?id=5175886</comments>
            <pubDate>Sun, 31 Jul 2011 23:00:00 +0100</pubDate>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">5175886</guid>        </item>
        <item>
            <title>Post hoc rationalism in science.</title>
            <link>http://www.medworm.com/index.php?rid=5175885&amp;cid=s_36932_168_f&amp;fid=36932&amp;url=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov%2Fentrez%2Fquery.fcgi%3Ftmpl%3DNoSidebarfile%26db%3DPubMed%26cmd%3DRetrieve%26list_uids%3D21864446%26dopt%3DAbstract</link>
            <description>Authors: Uhlmann EL
    Abstract
    In advocating Bayesian Enlightenment as a solution to Bayesian Fundamentalism, Jones &amp; Love (J&amp;L) rule out a broader critique of rationalist approaches to cognition. However, Bayesian Fundamentalism is merely one example of the more general phenomenon of Rationalist Fundamentalism: the tendency to characterize human judgments as rational and optimal in a post hoc manner, after the empirical data are already known.
    PMID: 21864446 [PubMed - in process] (Source: The Behavioral and Brain Sciences)</description>
            <author>The Behavioral and Brain Sciences</author>
            <type>journals</type>
        <comments>http://www.medworm.com/rss/comments.php?id=5175885</comments>
            <pubDate>Sun, 31 Jul 2011 23:00:00 +0100</pubDate>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">5175885</guid>        </item>
        <item>
            <title>Précis of the origin of concepts.</title>
            <link>http://www.medworm.com/index.php?rid=5008794&amp;cid=s_36932_168_f&amp;fid=36932&amp;url=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov%2Fentrez%2Fquery.fcgi%3Ftmpl%3DNoSidebarfile%26db%3DPubMed%26cmd%3DRetrieve%26list_uids%3D21676291%26dopt%3DAbstract</link>
            <description>Authors: Carey S
    A theory of conceptual development must specify the innate representational primitives, must characterize the ways in which the initial state differs from the adult state, and must characterize the processes through which one is transformed into the other. The Origin of Concepts (henceforth TOOC) defends three theses. With respect to the initial state, the innate stock of primitives is not limited to sensory, perceptual, or sensorimotor representations; rather, there are also innate conceptual representations. With respect to developmental change, conceptual development consists of episodes of qualitative change, resulting in systems of representation that are more powerful than, and sometimes incommensurable with, those from which they are built. With respect to a lea...</description>
            <author>The Behavioral and Brain Sciences</author>
            <type>journals</type>
        <comments>http://www.medworm.com/rss/comments.php?id=5008794</comments>
            <pubDate>Tue, 31 May 2011 23:00:00 +0100</pubDate>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">5008794</guid>        </item>
        <item>
            <title>You can't get there from here: Foundationalism and development.</title>
            <link>http://www.medworm.com/index.php?rid=5008793&amp;cid=s_36932_168_f&amp;fid=36932&amp;url=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov%2Fentrez%2Fquery.fcgi%3Ftmpl%3DNoSidebarfile%26db%3DPubMed%26cmd%3DRetrieve%26list_uids%3D21676292%26dopt%3DAbstract</link>
            <description>Authors: Allen JW, Bickhard MH
    The thesis of our commentary is that the framework used to address what are taken by Carey to be the open issues is highly problematic. The presumed necessity of an innate stock of representational primitives fails to account for the emergence of representation out of a nonrepresentational base. This failure manifests itself in problematic ways throughout Carey's book.
    PMID: 21676292 [PubMed - in process] (Source: The Behavioral and Brain Sciences)</description>
            <author>The Behavioral and Brain Sciences</author>
            <type>journals</type>
        <comments>http://www.medworm.com/rss/comments.php?id=5008793</comments>
            <pubDate>Tue, 31 May 2011 23:00:00 +0100</pubDate>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">5008793</guid>        </item>
        <item>
            <title>Border crossings: Perceptual and post-perceptual object representation.</title>
            <link>http://www.medworm.com/index.php?rid=5008792&amp;cid=s_36932_168_f&amp;fid=36932&amp;url=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov%2Fentrez%2Fquery.fcgi%3Ftmpl%3DNoSidebarfile%26db%3DPubMed%26cmd%3DRetrieve%26list_uids%3D21676293%26dopt%3DAbstract</link>
            <description>Authors: Burge T
    Carey's claim that no object representations are perceptual rests on a faulty view of perception. To delineate origins of post-perceptual (&quot;conceptual&quot; or &quot;core cognitive&quot;) representation, we need a more accurate view of perceptual representation.
    PMID: 21676293 [PubMed - in process] (Source: The Behavioral and Brain Sciences)</description>
            <author>The Behavioral and Brain Sciences</author>
            <type>journals</type>
        <comments>http://www.medworm.com/rss/comments.php?id=5008792</comments>
            <pubDate>Tue, 31 May 2011 23:00:00 +0100</pubDate>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">5008792</guid>        </item>
        <item>
            <title>Infants' representations of causation.</title>
            <link>http://www.medworm.com/index.php?rid=5008791&amp;cid=s_36932_168_f&amp;fid=36932&amp;url=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov%2Fentrez%2Fquery.fcgi%3Ftmpl%3DNoSidebarfile%26db%3DPubMed%26cmd%3DRetrieve%26list_uids%3D21676294%26dopt%3DAbstract</link>
            <description>Authors: Butterfill SA
    It is consistent with the evidence in The Origin of Concepts to conjecture that infants' causal representations, like their numerical representations, are not continuous with adults', so that bootstrapping is needed in both cases.
    PMID: 21676294 [PubMed - in process] (Source: The Behavioral and Brain Sciences)</description>
            <author>The Behavioral and Brain Sciences</author>
            <type>journals</type>
        <comments>http://www.medworm.com/rss/comments.php?id=5008791</comments>
            <pubDate>Tue, 31 May 2011 23:00:00 +0100</pubDate>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">5008791</guid>        </item>
        <item>
            <title>The case for continuity.</title>
            <link>http://www.medworm.com/index.php?rid=5008790&amp;cid=s_36932_168_f&amp;fid=36932&amp;url=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov%2Fentrez%2Fquery.fcgi%3Ftmpl%3DNoSidebarfile%26db%3DPubMed%26cmd%3DRetrieve%26list_uids%3D21676295%26dopt%3DAbstract</link>
            <description>This article defends a continuity position. Infants can abstract numerosity and young preschool children do respond appropriately to tasks that tap their ability to use a count and cardinal value and/or arithmetic principles. Active use of a nonverbal domain of arithmetic serves to enable the child to find relevant data to build knowledge about the language and use rules of numerosity and quantity.
    PMID: 21676295 [PubMed - in process] (Source: The Behavioral and Brain Sciences)</description>
            <author>The Behavioral and Brain Sciences</author>
            <type>journals</type>
        <comments>http://www.medworm.com/rss/comments.php?id=5008790</comments>
            <pubDate>Tue, 31 May 2011 23:00:00 +0100</pubDate>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">5008790</guid>        </item>
        <item>
            <title>Concepts are not icons.</title>
            <link>http://www.medworm.com/index.php?rid=5008789&amp;cid=s_36932_168_f&amp;fid=36932&amp;url=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov%2Fentrez%2Fquery.fcgi%3Ftmpl%3DNoSidebarfile%26db%3DPubMed%26cmd%3DRetrieve%26list_uids%3D21676296%26dopt%3DAbstract</link>
            <description>Authors: Gauker C
    Carey speculates that the representations of core cognition are entirely iconic. However, this idea is undercut by her contention that core cognition includes concepts such as object and agency, which are employed in thought as predicates. If Carey had taken on board her claim that core cognition is iconic, very different hypotheses might have come into view.
    PMID: 21676296 [PubMed - in process] (Source: The Behavioral and Brain Sciences)</description>
            <author>The Behavioral and Brain Sciences</author>
            <type>journals</type>
        <comments>http://www.medworm.com/rss/comments.php?id=5008789</comments>
            <pubDate>Tue, 31 May 2011 23:00:00 +0100</pubDate>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">5008789</guid>        </item>
        <item>
            <title>Language and analogy in conceptual change.</title>
            <link>http://www.medworm.com/index.php?rid=5008788&amp;cid=s_36932_168_f&amp;fid=36932&amp;url=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov%2Fentrez%2Fquery.fcgi%3Ftmpl%3DNoSidebarfile%26db%3DPubMed%26cmd%3DRetrieve%26list_uids%3D21676297%26dopt%3DAbstract</link>
            <description>Authors: Gentner D, Simms N
    Carey proposes that the acquisition of the natural numbers relies on the interaction between language and analogical processes: specifically, on an analogical mapping from ordinal linguistic structure to ordinal conceptual structure. We suggest that this analogy in fact requires several steps. Further, we propose that additional analogical processes enter into the acquisition of number.
    PMID: 21676297 [PubMed - in process] (Source: The Behavioral and Brain Sciences)</description>
            <author>The Behavioral and Brain Sciences</author>
            <type>journals</type>
        <comments>http://www.medworm.com/rss/comments.php?id=5008788</comments>
            <pubDate>Tue, 31 May 2011 23:00:00 +0100</pubDate>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">5008788</guid>        </item>
        <item>
            <title>A unified account of abstract structure and conceptual change: Probabilistic models and early learning mechanisms.</title>
            <link>http://www.medworm.com/index.php?rid=5008787&amp;cid=s_36932_168_f&amp;fid=36932&amp;url=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov%2Fentrez%2Fquery.fcgi%3Ftmpl%3DNoSidebarfile%26db%3DPubMed%26cmd%3DRetrieve%26list_uids%3D21676298%26dopt%3DAbstract</link>
            <description>Authors: Gopnik A
    We need not propose, as Carey does, a radical discontinuity between core cognition, which is responsible for abstract structure, and language and &quot;Quinian bootstrapping,&quot; which are responsible for learning and conceptual change. From a probabilistic models view, conceptual structure and learning reflect the same principles, and they are both in place from the beginning.
    PMID: 21676298 [PubMed - in process] (Source: The Behavioral and Brain Sciences)</description>
            <author>The Behavioral and Brain Sciences</author>
            <type>journals</type>
        <comments>http://www.medworm.com/rss/comments.php?id=5008787</comments>
            <pubDate>Tue, 31 May 2011 23:00:00 +0100</pubDate>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">5008787</guid>        </item>
        <item>
            <title>Can multiple bootstrapping provide means of very early conceptual development?</title>
            <link>http://www.medworm.com/index.php?rid=5008786&amp;cid=s_36932_168_f&amp;fid=36932&amp;url=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov%2Fentrez%2Fquery.fcgi%3Ftmpl%3DNoSidebarfile%26db%3DPubMed%26cmd%3DRetrieve%26list_uids%3D21676299%26dopt%3DAbstract</link>
            <description>Authors: Haman M, Hernik M
    Carey focuses her theory on initial knowledge and Quinian bootstrapping. We reflect on developmental mechanisms, which can operate in between. Whereas most of the research aims at delimitating early cognitive mechanisms, we point at the need for studying their integration and mutual bootstrapping. We illustrate this call by referring to a current debate on infants' use of featural representations.
    PMID: 21676299 [PubMed - in process] (Source: The Behavioral and Brain Sciences)</description>
            <author>The Behavioral and Brain Sciences</author>
            <type>journals</type>
        <comments>http://www.medworm.com/rss/comments.php?id=5008786</comments>
            <pubDate>Tue, 31 May 2011 23:00:00 +0100</pubDate>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">5008786</guid>        </item>
        <item>
            <title>Presuming placeholders are relevant enables conceptual change.</title>
            <link>http://www.medworm.com/index.php?rid=5008785&amp;cid=s_36932_168_f&amp;fid=36932&amp;url=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov%2Fentrez%2Fquery.fcgi%3Ftmpl%3DNoSidebarfile%26db%3DPubMed%26cmd%3DRetrieve%26list_uids%3D21676300%26dopt%3DAbstract</link>
            <description>Authors: Heintz C
    Placeholders enable conceptual change only if presumed to be relevant (e.g., lead to the formation of true beliefs) even though their meaning is not yet fully understood and their cognitive function not yet specified. Humans are predisposed to make such presumptions in a communicative context. Specifying the role of the presumption of relevance in conceptual change would provide a more comprehensive account of Quinian bootstrapping.
    PMID: 21676300 [PubMed - in process] (Source: The Behavioral and Brain Sciences)</description>
            <author>The Behavioral and Brain Sciences</author>
            <type>journals</type>
        <comments>http://www.medworm.com/rss/comments.php?id=5008785</comments>
            <pubDate>Tue, 31 May 2011 23:00:00 +0100</pubDate>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">5008785</guid>        </item>
        <item>
            <title>Can Carey answer Quine?</title>
            <link>http://www.medworm.com/index.php?rid=5008784&amp;cid=s_36932_168_f&amp;fid=36932&amp;url=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov%2Fentrez%2Fquery.fcgi%3Ftmpl%3DNoSidebarfile%26db%3DPubMed%26cmd%3DRetrieve%26list_uids%3D21676301%26dopt%3DAbstract</link>
            <description>Authors: Hill CS
    In order to defend her claim that the concept object is biologically determined, Carey must answer Quine's gavagai argument, which purports to show that mastery of any concept with determinate reference presupposes a substantial repertoire of logical concepts. I maintain that the gavagai argument withstands the experimental data that Carey provides, but that it yields to an a priori argument.
    PMID: 21676301 [PubMed - in process] (Source: The Behavioral and Brain Sciences)</description>
            <author>The Behavioral and Brain Sciences</author>
            <type>journals</type>
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            <pubDate>Tue, 31 May 2011 23:00:00 +0100</pubDate>
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            <title>Graceful degradation and conceptual development.</title>
            <link>http://www.medworm.com/index.php?rid=5008783&amp;cid=s_36932_168_f&amp;fid=36932&amp;url=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov%2Fentrez%2Fquery.fcgi%3Ftmpl%3DNoSidebarfile%26db%3DPubMed%26cmd%3DRetrieve%26list_uids%3D21676302%26dopt%3DAbstract</link>
            <description>Authors: Keil F
    In this book, Carey gives cognitive science a detailed account of the origins of concepts and an explanation of how origins stories are essential to understanding what concepts are and how we use them. At the same time, this book's details help highlight the challenge of explaining how conceptual change works with real-world concepts that often have heavily degraded internal content.
    PMID: 21676302 [PubMed - in process] (Source: The Behavioral and Brain Sciences)</description>
            <author>The Behavioral and Brain Sciences</author>
            <type>journals</type>
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            <pubDate>Tue, 31 May 2011 23:00:00 +0100</pubDate>
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            <title>The notion of incommensurability can be extended to the child's developing theories of mind as well.</title>
            <link>http://www.medworm.com/index.php?rid=5008782&amp;cid=s_36932_168_f&amp;fid=36932&amp;url=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov%2Fentrez%2Fquery.fcgi%3Ftmpl%3DNoSidebarfile%26db%3DPubMed%26cmd%3DRetrieve%26list_uids%3D21676303%26dopt%3DAbstract</link>
            <description>Authors: Kiss S
    In this commentary I argue that the notion of incommensurability can be extended to the child's developing theories of mind. I use Carey's concept of Quinian bootstrapping and show that this learning process can account for the acquisition of the semantics of mental terms. I suggest a distinction among three stages of acquisition and adopt the theory-theory of conceptual development.
    PMID: 21676303 [PubMed - in process] (Source: The Behavioral and Brain Sciences)</description>
            <author>The Behavioral and Brain Sciences</author>
            <type>journals</type>
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            <pubDate>Tue, 31 May 2011 23:00:00 +0100</pubDate>
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            <title>Concept revision is sensitive to changes in category structure, causal history.</title>
            <link>http://www.medworm.com/index.php?rid=5008781&amp;cid=s_36932_168_f&amp;fid=36932&amp;url=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov%2Fentrez%2Fquery.fcgi%3Ftmpl%3DNoSidebarfile%26db%3DPubMed%26cmd%3DRetrieve%26list_uids%3D21676304%26dopt%3DAbstract</link>
            <description>Authors: Korman J
    Carey argues that the aspects of categorization that are diagnostic of deep conceptual structure and, by extension, narrow conceptual content, must be distinguished from those aspects that are incidental to categorization tasks. For natural kind concepts, discriminating between these two types of processes is complicated by the role of explanatory stance and the causal history of features in determining category structure.
    PMID: 21676304 [PubMed - in process] (Source: The Behavioral and Brain Sciences)</description>
            <author>The Behavioral and Brain Sciences</author>
            <type>journals</type>
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            <pubDate>Tue, 31 May 2011 23:00:00 +0100</pubDate>
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            <title>Conceptual discontinuity involves recycling old processes in new domains.</title>
            <link>http://www.medworm.com/index.php?rid=5008780&amp;cid=s_36932_168_f&amp;fid=36932&amp;url=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov%2Fentrez%2Fquery.fcgi%3Ftmpl%3DNoSidebarfile%26db%3DPubMed%26cmd%3DRetrieve%26list_uids%3D21676305%26dopt%3DAbstract</link>
            <description>Authors: Landy D, Allen C, Anderson ML
    We dispute Carey's assumption that distinct core cognitive processes employ domain-specific input analyzers to construct proprietary representations. We give reasons to believe that conceptual systems co-opt core components for new domains. Domain boundaries, as well as boundaries between perceptual-motor and conceptual cognitive resources may be useful abstractions, but do not appear to reflect constraints respected by brains and cognitive systems.
    PMID: 21676305 [PubMed - in process] (Source: The Behavioral and Brain Sciences)</description>
            <author>The Behavioral and Brain Sciences</author>
            <type>journals</type>
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            <pubDate>Tue, 31 May 2011 23:00:00 +0100</pubDate>
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            <title>What is the significance of The Origin of Concepts for philosophers' and psychologists' theories of concepts?</title>
            <link>http://www.medworm.com/index.php?rid=5008779&amp;cid=s_36932_168_f&amp;fid=36932&amp;url=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov%2Fentrez%2Fquery.fcgi%3Ftmpl%3DNoSidebarfile%26db%3DPubMed%26cmd%3DRetrieve%26list_uids%3D21676306%26dopt%3DAbstract</link>
            <description>Authors: Machery E
    Carey holds that the study of conceptual development bears on the theories of concepts developed by philosophers and psychologists. In this commentary, I scrutinize her claims about the significance of the study of conceptual development.
    PMID: 21676306 [PubMed - in process] (Source: The Behavioral and Brain Sciences)</description>
            <author>The Behavioral and Brain Sciences</author>
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