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        <title>MedWorm Tags: bioterrorism</title>
        <description>MedWorm provides a medical RSS filtering service. Over 6000 RSS medical sources are combined and output via different filters. This feed contains the latest medical blog items that have been tagged with 'bioterrorism'.</description>
        <link><![CDATA[http://www.medworm.com/rss/search.php?qu=%22bioterrorism%22&t=%22bioterrorism%22&r=Exact&o=d&f=tag]]></link>
        <lastBuildDate>Sat, 03 Sep 2011 02:09:16 +0100</lastBuildDate>
        <item>
            <title>Should smallpox virus be destroyed?</title>
            <link>http://www.medworm.com/index.php?rid=4605546&amp;cid=t_107096_139_f&amp;fid=38879&amp;url=http%3A%2F%2Ffeedproxy.google.com%2F%7Er%2FVirologyBlog%2F%7E3%2F9sah7Le-OWA%2F</link>
            <description>After the eradication of smallpox in 1980, the World Health Organization called for destruction of known remaining stocks of the virus. The United States and Russia, which hold the known stocks of smallpox virus, have not destroyed their stocks. The WHO met in January 2011 to debate the future of smallpox, and a committee will issue a final recommendation sometime this year. For further information on this topic, there is an editorial in Vaccine entitled &amp;#8220;Why not destroy remaining smallpox virus stocks&amp;#8220;, and a WHO review on smallpox research.
During TWiV #124, I was surprised to learn that the remaining stocks of smallpox are not just a few tubes of virus, but a substantial strain collection. Here is a transcript of the relevant portion of the podcast, beginning at 1:13:00, whe...</description>
            <author>virology blog</author>
            <type>blogs</type>
        <comments>http://www.medworm.com/rss/comments.php?id=4605546</comments>
            <pubDate>Thu, 17 Mar 2011 10:47:57 +0100</pubDate>
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        <item>
            <title>TWiV 124: Viruses that make you better</title>
            <link>http://www.medworm.com/index.php?rid=4605548&amp;cid=t_107096_139_f&amp;fid=38879&amp;url=http%3A%2F%2Ftraffic.libsyn.com%2Ftwiv%2FTWiV124.mp3</link>
            <description>Hosts: Vincent Racaniello, Dickson Despommier, Alan Dove, Rich Condit, and Grant McFadden
On episode #124 of the podcast This Week in Virology, Vincent, Dickson, Alan, Rich, and Grant discuss a tanapoxvirus protein that inhibits tumor necrosis factor, purging tumors with myxoma virus, and destruction of the last known stocks of smallpox virus.
Right click to download TWiV #124 (74 MB .mp3, 103 minutes).
Subscribe to TWiV (free) in iTunes , at the Zune Marketplace, by the RSS feed, by email, or listen on your mobile device with the Microbeworld app.
Links for this episode:

Interaction of tumor necrosis factor with tanapox virus protein
Viron Therapeutics Inc
Oncolytic viral purging with myxoma virus
Why not destroy remaining smallpox stocks? (editorial)
US should agree to destroy s...</description>
            <author>virology blog</author>
            <type>blogs</type>
        <comments>http://www.medworm.com/rss/comments.php?id=4605548</comments>
            <pubDate>Sun, 13 Mar 2011 12:45:48 +0100</pubDate>
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        <item>
            <title>TWiV 112: Creating a killer poxvirus</title>
            <link>http://www.medworm.com/index.php?rid=4277636&amp;cid=t_107096_139_f&amp;fid=38879&amp;url=http%3A%2F%2Fmedia.rawvoice.com%2Fpmn_twiv%2Ftraffic.libsyn.com%2Ftwiv%2FTWiV112.mp3</link>
            <description>Hosts: Vincent Racaniello, Alan Dove, and Rich Condit
On episode #112 of the podcast This Week in Virology, Vincent, Alan, and Rich review the making of a virulent poxvirus by insertion of the gene encoding IL-4, and severe 2009 H1N1 influenza due to pathogenic immune complexes.
Download TWiV #112 (71 MB .mp3, 98 minutes). To download, right-click or control-click on the link, then select save as.
Subscribe to TWiV (free) in iTunes , at the Zune Marketplace, by the RSS feed, or by email, or listen on your mobile device with Stitcher Radio.
Links for this episode:

Expression of IL-4 makes a killer poxvirus
Additional studies on poxvirus-IL-4 recombinants
Creation of killer poxvirus could have been predicted
Interleukin regulation of Th responses
Severe pandemic H1N1 disease due to immune...</description>
            <author>virology blog</author>
            <type>blogs</type>
        <comments>http://www.medworm.com/rss/comments.php?id=4277636</comments>
            <pubDate>Sun, 19 Dec 2010 18:45:01 +0100</pubDate>
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        <item>
            <title>Synthetic Life Created: The First “Micro-Avatar”</title>
            <link>http://www.medworm.com/index.php?rid=3629636&amp;cid=t_107096_87_f&amp;fid=39187&amp;url=http%3A%2F%2Fgetbetterhealth.com%2Fsynthetic-life-created-the-first-micro-avatar%2F2010.06.03</link>
            <description>For the first time in history, a living organism has been manufactured with the help of a computer-generated genome. Dr. Jon LaPook reports on the groundbreaking discovery&amp;#8217;s widespread implications.

Watch CBS News Videos Online
The First Micro-Avatar
Craig Venter and his team of scientists recently announced that they had created the first “synthetic cell” &amp;#8212; a bacterium controlled by genetic material that they had designed on a computer and concocted from four bottles of chemicals. This is the closest thing to creating life that has happened outside of a science-fiction movie. If it doesn’t fire your imagination, then you should fire your imagination.
Basically, what Venter et al did was remove the “brain” (the genetic material that runs the cell) from one species o...</description>
            <author>Better Health</author>
            <type>blogs</type>
        <comments>http://www.medworm.com/rss/comments.php?id=3629636</comments>
            <pubDate>Thu, 03 Jun 2010 19:51:56 +0100</pubDate>
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        <item>
            <title>Kansas: what a great place to put a lab full of incredibly infectious cattle virus</title>
            <link>http://www.medworm.com/index.php?rid=2649032&amp;cid=t_107096_99_f&amp;fid=34593&amp;url=http%3A%2F%2Ffeedproxy.google.com%2F%7Er%2Fscienceblogs%2FAyaJ%2F%7E3%2FefEPKw8uNXQ%2Fkansas_what_a_great_place_to_p.php</link>
            <description>When the Bush Administration awarded a construction grant to put a Level 4 laboratory in Galveston, Texas to work on the most dangerous biological agents, a lot of people, including we here at Effect Measure, thought it was pretty stupid siting. Isn't Galveston open to Gulf hurricanes? Wasn't it the site of one of the most devastating storm floods in US history? Then came Hurricane Ike. It didn't seem that a hazardous agents lab could be more stupidly sited than Galveston (see here and here). That was an error in judgement on our part.

The thing about a lot of agents used in Level 4 labs is that while they are extremely dangerous if you get infected with them (Ebola is an example), most of them aren't that contagious. There may be no cure and no vaccine for them and they may be highly vir...</description>
            <author>Effect Measure</author>
            <type>blogs</type>
        <comments>http://www.medworm.com/rss/comments.php?id=2649032</comments>
            <pubDate>Wed, 29 Jul 2009 12:25:35 +0100</pubDate>
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        <item>
            <title>The Age of Innocence</title>
            <link>http://www.medworm.com/index.php?rid=2511167&amp;cid=t_107096_109_f&amp;fid=34750&amp;url=http%3A%2F%2Fpsychcentral.com%2Fblog%2Farchives%2F2009%2F06%2F15%2Fthe-age-of-innocence%2F</link>
            <description>You know, I can still remember being very young and how much fun it was. Or at least I think I remember it being fun. I felt safe, lacking stress or pressure, and was interested in what the great outdoors had to reveal.
Now, you have to know that I lived in a pretty nice neighborhood, where the family ate dinner together, we all went to church on Sunday, and where it was OK to play in the street, ride your bicycle, climb trees and build forts. If you skinned your knee, the neighbor called your mom, and by the time you got home she had the bandage and tincture of iodine ready. 
I did my homework, the dishes, and played. Period. Oh, yeah, I had my sports (I rode horses), played golf, figure-skated, bowled, played badminton and croquet, and was on the rifle team. But did I run from activity t...</description>
            <author>World of Psychology</author>
            <type>blogs</type>
        <comments>http://www.medworm.com/rss/comments.php?id=2511167</comments>
            <pubDate>Mon, 15 Jun 2009 11:10:56 +0100</pubDate>
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        <item>
            <title>Don’t Fear Attacks on the Food Supply</title>
            <link>http://www.medworm.com/index.php?rid=2416794&amp;cid=t_107096_87_f&amp;fid=36438&amp;url=http%3A%2F%2Ffeedproxy.google.com%2F%7Er%2FCato-at-liberty%2F%7E3%2F3JbSLucKSsM%2F</link>
            <description>Bruce Schneier, a participant in our January counterterrorism conference, reviews a recent report and discusses the possibility of attacks on the food supply in a post on his blog:
The quantities involved for mass poisonings are too great, the nature of the food supply too vast and the details of any plot too complicated and unpredictable to be a real threat. That becomes crystal clear as you read the details of the different incidents: it&amp;#8217;s hard to kill one person, and very hard to kill dozens. Hundreds, thousands: it&amp;#8217;s just not going to happen any time soon. The fear of bioterror is much greater, and the panic from any bioterror scare will injure more people, than bioterrorism itself. (Source: Cato-at-liberty)</description>
            <author>Cato-at-liberty</author>
            <type>blogs</type>
        <comments>http://www.medworm.com/rss/comments.php?id=2416794</comments>
            <pubDate>Mon, 18 May 2009 21:13:27 +0100</pubDate>
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            <title>Is biotech a security problem?</title>
            <link>http://www.medworm.com/index.php?rid=2348178&amp;cid=t_107096_99_f&amp;fid=34593&amp;url=http%3A%2F%2Ffeedproxy.google.com%2F%7Er%2Fscienceblogs%2FAyaJ%2F%7E3%2FvHTtR7s1RtA%2Fis_biotech_a_security_problem.php</link>
            <description>A Reuters piece under the headline, &quot;Biotechnology Boom Raises Security Fears: Mild Diseases Could Be Turned Into Deadly Ones, Experts Caution&quot; we see the biotech Frankenstein/terrorist bogeyman raised once again by &quot;experts&quot; in the area at a scientific conference in Casablanca. The weekend conference was run by a tiny group (budget of less than $250K) with a big name, the International Council for the Life Sciences (ICLS). Their sole mission is biological biosecurity, so it is understandable that their conclusion is that this is a big problem. But is it? Read the rest of this post... | Read the comments on this post... (Source: Effect Measure)</description>
            <author>Effect Measure</author>
            <type>blogs</type>
        <comments>http://www.medworm.com/rss/comments.php?id=2348178</comments>
            <pubDate>Wed, 08 Apr 2009 12:05:10 +0100</pubDate>
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            <title>Ebola and the henhouse</title>
            <link>http://www.medworm.com/index.php?rid=2310017&amp;cid=t_107096_99_f&amp;fid=34593&amp;url=http%3A%2F%2Ffeedproxy.google.com%2F%7Er%2Fscienceblogs%2FAyaJ%2F%7E3%2FCLmjlWd0Pac%2Febola_and_the_henhouse.php</link>
            <description>When an Ebola virus related lab accident in German occurred, special pathogens researchers girded themselves for bad news. Working with agents for which there is currently no treatment of vaccine requires high containment laboratories, often touted as being virtually fail safe. While engineering and procedural controls can be instituted to minimize accidents, the wild card is always the human element, so accidents in these laboratories happen. There has already been an Ebola related death in such circumstances, and when the German woman pricked her finger with a needle containing Ebola virus, there was fear of another. While there is no vaccine for Ebola currently in use, several are in development, and one was tried on an emergency basis. The incubation period is now past and the lab work...</description>
            <author>Effect Measure</author>
            <type>blogs</type>
        <comments>http://www.medworm.com/rss/comments.php?id=2310017</comments>
            <pubDate>Mon, 06 Apr 2009 13:57:45 +0100</pubDate>
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        <item>
            <title>Organized public health: bland and toothless</title>
            <link>http://www.medworm.com/index.php?rid=2310018&amp;cid=t_107096_99_f&amp;fid=34593&amp;url=http%3A%2F%2Ffeedproxy.google.com%2F%7Er%2Fscienceblogs%2FAyaJ%2F%7E3%2FK_lF0AmoD6M%2Forganized_public_health_bland.php</link>
            <description>My public health colleague DemFromCT continues his public health interview series on the front page of DailyKos today, talking to Dr. Georges Benjamin, Executive Director of the American Public Health Association (APHA). Dem clearly likes Dr. Benjamin, which is not a surprise. He is a very likable person. I have been a member of APHA (on and off; I keep forgetting to renew) for over 40 years, have served on one of its top policy boards and been a member of its Governing Council. But in recent years I have had little to do with APHA, and Dem's interview today illustrates one of the reasons. Read the rest of this post... | Read the comments on this post... (Source: Effect Measure)</description>
            <author>Effect Measure</author>
            <type>blogs</type>
        <comments>http://www.medworm.com/rss/comments.php?id=2310018</comments>
            <pubDate>Sun, 05 Apr 2009 19:01:11 +0100</pubDate>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">2310018</guid>        </item>
        <item>
            <title>The Week in Review</title>
            <link>http://www.medworm.com/index.php?rid=2017826&amp;cid=t_107096_87_f&amp;fid=35052&amp;url=http%3A%2F%2Ffeeds.feedburner.com%2F%7Er%2FWomensBioethicsBlog%2F%7E3%2F477034875%2Fweek-in-review.html</link>
            <description>Embryo adoption reopens controversy. Back to the question of when does human life begin, and so what are our responsibilities toward all those frozen embryos out there.Sports gene test available for little kids. So little Johnny has the genes to be a sprinter, push him in that direction (whether he enjoys it or not)? One can also think of more disturbing uses, like using such a test for embryo election (excuse me, I’ve been in a reproductive rights course this semester, so these issues are top of mind!).Overseas clinical trials under the microscope—concern whether medical and ethical practices are being adhered to in developing countries. Out of sight, out of mind?Studies show arrogance and abusive behavior by doctors contributes tomedical mistakes, preventable complications, and even ...</description>
            <author>Women's Bioethics Blog</author>
            <type>blogs</type>
        <comments>http://www.medworm.com/rss/comments.php?id=2017826</comments>
            <pubDate>Sat, 06 Dec 2008 23:31:25 +0100</pubDate>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">2017826</guid>        </item>
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            <title>Worthless advice on bioterrorism to the new administration</title>
            <link>http://www.medworm.com/index.php?rid=1947060&amp;cid=t_107096_99_f&amp;fid=34593&amp;url=http%3A%2F%2Ffeeds.feedburner.com%2F%7Er%2Fscienceblogs%2FAyaJ%2F%7E3%2F448367375%2Fworthless_advice_on_bioterrori.php</link>
            <description>One resource the incoming Obama administration is certainly to find no shortage of is advice. We don't know whom they will listen to, although we know much of it -- maybe most of it -- is likely to be of the self-serving variety. How to separate the wheat from the chaff will be a delicate task. Powerful people who give lousy advice still get bent out of shape when it isn't followed. So we'll have to see. Meanwhile we will be scanning whatever advice is made public. An example is a report from the Defense Science Board, issued on Election Day, no less. It purports to give the next administration a list of priorities on how to prepare for a possible bioterrorism incident: Read the rest of this post... | Read the comments on this post... (Source: Effect Measure)</description>
            <author>Effect Measure</author>
            <type>blogs</type>
        <comments>http://www.medworm.com/rss/comments.php?id=1947060</comments>
            <pubDate>Mon, 10 Nov 2008 12:18:08 +0100</pubDate>
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            <title>Galveston high security laboratory: dumb and dumber</title>
            <link>http://www.medworm.com/index.php?rid=1926375&amp;cid=t_107096_99_f&amp;fid=34593&amp;url=http%3A%2F%2Ffeeds.feedburner.com%2F%7Er%2Fscienceblogs%2FAyaJ%2F%7E3%2F437950976%2Fgalveston_high_security_labora.php</link>
            <description>The last time we looked at the high containment laboratory in Galveston, Texas, it was directly in the path of Hurricane Ike. Flooding from Ike devastated Galveston but it was a comparatively weak storm, Category 2 on the Sumner Simpson scale. Katrina was a Cat 4. The worst storms are the huge Category 5 affairs. So Galveston got off pretty well as far as storm intensity goes, although the water damage was catastrophic. To remind you, our post on that previous occasion was, &quot;Why would any sane person put a Level 4 biodefense lab in Galveston?&quot; It turns out that now that the storm has passed, others are asking the same question: Read the rest of this post... | Read the comments on this post... (Source: Effect Measure)</description>
            <author>Effect Measure</author>
            <type>blogs</type>
        <comments>http://www.medworm.com/rss/comments.php?id=1926375</comments>
            <pubDate>Fri, 31 Oct 2008 12:10:26 +0100</pubDate>
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            <title>Why would any sane person put a Level 4 biodefense lab in Galveston?</title>
            <link>http://www.medworm.com/index.php?rid=1790199&amp;cid=t_107096_99_f&amp;fid=34593&amp;url=http%3A%2F%2Ffeeds.feedburner.com%2F%7Er%2Fscienceblogs%2FAyaJ%2F%7E3%2F391480504%2Fwhy_would_any_sane_person_put.php</link>
            <description>It's not like no one thought Galveston could ever be hit by a monster storm. The city was almost destroyed in The Great Storm of 1900 which struck on September 8 of that year and killed 6000 people. The Thomas Edison Company has historic film footage of the destruction. So it seems a bit odd (I understate) that the geniuses at the Department of Homeland Security and NIH decided that Galveston was a good place for one of the first two high containment biodefense laboratories to be built after 9/11 (the other is situated in a densely populated neighborhood in Boston, another sterling choice). But put in Galveston they did and now it's almost built. And another monster storm (track it in real time here) is bearing down on Galveston so the lab is being evacuated before it goes under water. Som...</description>
            <author>Effect Measure</author>
            <type>blogs</type>
        <comments>http://www.medworm.com/rss/comments.php?id=1790199</comments>
            <pubDate>Sat, 13 Sep 2008 12:16:15 +0100</pubDate>
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            <title>Military biodefense labs try to look safe</title>
            <link>http://www.medworm.com/index.php?rid=1738996&amp;cid=t_107096_99_f&amp;fid=34593&amp;url=http%3A%2F%2Ffeeds.feedburner.com%2F%7Er%2Fscienceblogs%2FAyaJ%2F%7E3%2F377047653%2Fmilitary_biodefense_labs_try_t.php</link>
            <description>Civilian scientists are still trying to get used to the hysterical nonsense around &quot;biodefense&quot; that the homeland security apparatchiks imposed as Act I. in their Security Theater, bullshit that included indicting an artist and a respected scientist for shipping a harmless bacterium (see here, here). Meanwhile the Army has claimed the only serious bioterror attack on US soil with actual biowarfare agents was done by one of their guys. Whether it was the guy they fingered or not we may never know, since he conveniently is dead, but whether he was or wasn't the claim has revealed they operate with the usual principle of authoritarian regimes: do as we say, not as we do: Read the rest of this post... | Read the comments on this post... (Source: Effect Measure)</description>
            <author>Effect Measure</author>
            <type>blogs</type>
        <comments>http://www.medworm.com/rss/comments.php?id=1738996</comments>
            <pubDate>Thu, 28 Aug 2008 12:12:48 +0100</pubDate>
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            <title>Where's the best place for a new high tech biodefense lab? MIssissippi, where else?</title>
            <link>http://www.medworm.com/index.php?rid=1700612&amp;cid=t_107096_99_f&amp;fid=34593&amp;url=http%3A%2F%2Ffeeds.feedburner.com%2F%7Er%2Fscienceblogs%2FAyaJ%2F%7E3%2F362864815%2Fwheres_the_best_place_for_a_ne.php</link>
            <description>We've argued before that the US biodefense laboratory effort -- whose planning principle seems to be based on &quot;more&quot; -- was making us less safe, not more safe. Whatever else you say about the anthrax attacks, they are a perfect illustration of this. The weapon and the culprit(s) came directly from the US weapons labs. A case of blowback if there ever was one. But the Bush administration, undeterred, wants to keep building these facilities. The highest level of containment for working with the most dangerous agents for which there is no vaccine or cure (BSL4 labs) were four in number in 2002. Now there are 15. Labs designated BSL3, despite their slightly lower level of containment, often handle even more dangerous agents like SARS, 1918 and avian influenza and anthrax. No one knows exactly ...</description>
            <author>Effect Measure</author>
            <type>blogs</type>
        <comments>http://www.medworm.com/rss/comments.php?id=1700612</comments>
            <pubDate>Tue, 12 Aug 2008 12:21:02 +0100</pubDate>
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            <title>Anthrax investigation: what's that aroma?</title>
            <link>http://www.medworm.com/index.php?rid=1688944&amp;cid=t_107096_99_f&amp;fid=34593&amp;url=http%3A%2F%2Ffeeds.feedburner.com%2F%7Er%2Fscienceblogs%2FAyaJ%2F%7E3%2F358330585%2Fanthrax_investigation_whats_th.php</link>
            <description>The anthrax story just gets weirder and weirder. More than weird, some of it reeks. A circumstantial public case first via media leaks and now via a press conference by the Justice Department is being built against Bruce Ivins, the Army scientist who reportedly committed suicide as federal prosecutors were closing in on him. Reporter Larissa Alexandrovna (at-Largely) has raised a number of significant questions about some of the sources, especially the supposed therapist Jean Duley who is the one who has accused Ivins of stalking her and alleging he was a homicidal maniac who had already tried to kill people. You can read about Duley and make your own judgments. Ivins's friends and colleagues have also questioned the media portrayal, saying they don't recognize him in these descriptions. I...</description>
            <author>Effect Measure</author>
            <type>blogs</type>
        <comments>http://www.medworm.com/rss/comments.php?id=1688944</comments>
            <pubDate>Thu, 07 Aug 2008 12:24:31 +0100</pubDate>
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            <title>Project Bioshield comes up dry again</title>
            <link>http://www.medworm.com/index.php?rid=1615902&amp;cid=t_107096_99_f&amp;fid=34593&amp;url=http%3A%2F%2Ffeeds.feedburner.com%2F%7Er%2Fscienceblogs%2FAyaJ%2F%7E3%2F333473945%2Fproject_bioshield_comes_up_dry.php</link>
            <description>We've had occasion to discuss the boondoggle, Project Bioshield a number of times (here, here, here, here, here, here, here, here). Maybe I should have said, quite a number of times. REally, though, it's hardly worth mentioning. Via the Clinician's Biosecurity Briefing, this: Read the rest of this post... | Read the comments on this post... (Source: Effect Measure)</description>
            <author>Effect Measure</author>
            <type>blogs</type>
        <comments>http://www.medworm.com/rss/comments.php?id=1615902</comments>
            <pubDate>Sat, 12 Jul 2008 12:39:49 +0100</pubDate>
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            <title>The biodefense boondoggle</title>
            <link>http://www.medworm.com/index.php?rid=1484826&amp;cid=t_107096_99_f&amp;fid=34593&amp;url=http%3A%2F%2Ffeeds.feedburner.com%2F%7Er%2Fscienceblogs%2FAyaJ%2F%7E3%2F302511014%2Fthe_biodefense_boondoggle.php</link>
            <description>Republicans are supposed to be the tight fisted fiscal conservatives and Democrats the ones who think that problems can be solved by throwing federal money at it. In reality it is just the opposite, a triumph for Republican image makers but a disaster for the rest of us who have lived through a decade of Republican Congressional and then Bush administration profligacy, with nothing to show for it but a widening gap between the favored plutocrats and everyone else. One sees it everywhere, most spectacularly in the Iraq debacle, which has enriched Bush - Cheny cronies while wreaking violence on hapless Iraqis and US soldiers. But it has slopped over into science and science policy as well. Recently the American Institute for Biological Science (AIBS), no radical group by any means, wondered ...</description>
            <author>Effect Measure</author>
            <type>blogs</type>
        <comments>http://www.medworm.com/rss/comments.php?id=1484826</comments>
            <pubDate>Sun, 01 Jun 2008 20:30:20 +0100</pubDate>
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        <item>
            <title>The Bush administration: keeping us safe (from subversive art)</title>
            <link>http://www.medworm.com/index.php?rid=1396135&amp;cid=t_107096_99_f&amp;fid=34593&amp;url=http%3A%2F%2Ffeeds.feedburner.com%2F%7Er%2Fscienceblogs%2FAyaJ%2F%7E3%2F277146736%2Fthe_bush_administration_keepin.php</link>
            <description>The art professor is finally cleared but a distinguished biologist was still punished by a ridiculous, mindless, cruel and utterly reckless use of raw power by the Bush administration: Read the rest of this post... | Read the comments on this post... (Source: Effect Measure)</description>
            <author>Effect Measure</author>
            <type>blogs</type>
        <comments>http://www.medworm.com/rss/comments.php?id=1396135</comments>
            <pubDate>Thu, 24 Apr 2008 20:34:22 +0100</pubDate>
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        <item>
            <title>Latest version of GIDEON - press release</title>
            <link>http://www.medworm.com/index.php?rid=1314193&amp;cid=t_107096_10_f&amp;fid=35345&amp;url=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.gideononline.com%2Fblog%2F2008%2F03%2F19%2Flatest-version-of-gideon-press-release%2F</link>
            <description>346 INFECTIOUS DISEASES AND 7,316 OUTBREAKS INCLUDED IN NEW VERSION OF GIDEON ONLINE
&amp;#8211; Features the most current information and decision support tools to assist medical professionals in diagnosis and treatment of infectious diseases and bioterrorism agents&amp;#8211; 
LOS ANGELES, Calif., March 19, 2008 – GIDEON Informatics (www.gideononline.com) today announced a new version of its Web-based solution, with data on 346 infectious diseases, 7,316 outbreaks, 219 signs and symptoms and 80,000 medical notes. Providing comprehensive and accurate information on infectious diseases, GIDEON helps medical professionals worldwide improve the diagnosis and treatment of infectious diseases.
 (more&amp;#8230;)
ShareThis (Source: GIDEON blog)</description>
            <author>GIDEON blog</author>
            <type>blogs</type>
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            <pubDate>Wed, 19 Mar 2008 19:43:22 +0100</pubDate>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">1314193</guid>        </item>
        <item>
            <title>Bioterrorism program victim</title>
            <link>http://www.medworm.com/index.php?rid=956020&amp;cid=t_107096_99_f&amp;fid=34593&amp;url=http%3A%2F%2Ffeeds.feedburner.com%2F%7Er%2Fscienceblogs%2FAyaJ%2F%7E3%2F170796515%2Fbioterrorism_program_victim.php</link>
            <description>The US bioterrorism program has claimed another victim. Not from a lab accident. Not from an attack. But from a ridiculous and mindless application of regulations meant to protect us from malefactors but which have instead punished scientists who may (or may not) have made missteps in this new Alice-in-Wonderland that is the biodefense world. The latest tragedy involves A highly regarded geneticist, Robert Ferrell at the University of Pittsburgh, who has just pled guilty to failing to follow proper mailing procedures. The actual charge he pled guilty to was &quot;mailing an injurious article&quot;, although no injurious article was ever involved. Details, details. He pled guilty not because he thought he was guilty of a crime but because, as his daughter said, he was exhausted after fighting the mor...</description>
            <author>Effect Measure</author>
            <type>blogs</type>
        <comments>http://www.medworm.com/rss/comments.php?id=956020</comments>
            <pubDate>Tue, 16 Oct 2007 21:02:15 +0100</pubDate>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">956020</guid>        </item>
        <item>
            <title>Terror in the kitchen</title>
            <link>http://www.medworm.com/index.php?rid=931049&amp;cid=t_107096_99_f&amp;fid=34593&amp;url=http%3A%2F%2Ffeeds.feedburner.com%2F%7Er%2Fscienceblogs%2FAyaJ%2F%7E3%2F165862289%2Fterror_in_the_kitchen.php</link>
            <description>Someday people will look back on the period of terrorism hysteria with wonder, maybe even wry amusement. There are terrorists, to be sure. Some of them work for sovereign states and are part of their military or police. Some of them work for &quot;non state&quot; entities. Those are the ones governments like to call terrorists. Terminology is important, I guess. Governments and terrorists have several things in common. Both have the objective of terrorizing and frightening people as a matter of policy. That's why we call them terrorists. Governments add the extra fillip of frightening their own citizens that there is potentially a terrorist under every bed (presumably giving the Bush administration a reason to invade your bedroom). It keeps the citizenry in line and ready to obey. For both the weapo...</description>
            <author>Effect Measure</author>
            <type>blogs</type>
        <comments>http://www.medworm.com/rss/comments.php?id=931049</comments>
            <pubDate>Fri, 05 Oct 2007 20:58:19 +0100</pubDate>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">931049</guid>        </item>
        <item>
            <title>A research agenda without foresight or prudence</title>
            <link>http://www.medworm.com/index.php?rid=925217&amp;cid=t_107096_99_f&amp;fid=34593&amp;url=http%3A%2F%2Ffeeds.feedburner.com%2F%7Er%2Fscienceblogs%2FAyaJ%2F%7E3%2F164881405%2Fa_research_agenda_without_fore.php</link>
            <description>If you increase spending for research on the world's most dangerous microbes you might want to also increase your surveillance and safety oversight. Since 2001 NIH expenditirues for biodefense research have increase over 40 times. And oversight? Read the rest of this post... | Read the comments on this post... (Source: Effect Measure)</description>
            <author>Effect Measure</author>
            <type>blogs</type>
        <comments>http://www.medworm.com/rss/comments.php?id=925217</comments>
            <pubDate>Wed, 03 Oct 2007 21:44:55 +0100</pubDate>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">925217</guid>        </item>
        <item>
            <title>Sucking up to the feds</title>
            <link>http://www.medworm.com/index.php?rid=917899&amp;cid=t_107096_99_f&amp;fid=34593&amp;url=http%3A%2F%2Ffeeds.feedburner.com%2F%7Er%2Fscienceblogs%2FAyaJ%2F%7E3%2F163866279%2Fsucking_up_to_the_feds.php</link>
            <description>George Mason University in Virginia is a good school. Slightly on the conservative side, politically, but with astute thinkers in economics, political science and many other fields, including molecular biology. It also has a National Center for Biodefense and Infectious Diseases. It has just announced it will be building a high containment research lab &quot;aimed at thrusting the university into the forefront of the nation's counter-bioterrorism efforts&quot; (Examiner.com). Read the rest of this post... | Read the comments on this post... (Source: Effect Measure)</description>
            <author>Effect Measure</author>
            <type>blogs</type>
        <comments>http://www.medworm.com/rss/comments.php?id=917899</comments>
            <pubDate>Mon, 01 Oct 2007 20:54:34 +0100</pubDate>
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        <item>
            <title>Let them eat anthrax vaccine</title>
            <link>http://www.medworm.com/index.php?rid=915304&amp;cid=t_107096_99_f&amp;fid=34593&amp;url=http%3A%2F%2Ffeeds.feedburner.com%2F%7Er%2Fscienceblogs%2FAyaJ%2F%7E3%2F163365420%2Flet_them_eat_anthrax_vaccine.php</link>
            <description>Bioterrorism defense dollars seem to be devoted mainly to procurement. This follows President Bush's prescription for how all Americans could defeat the terrorists after September 11: go shopping. Practicing what they preach, the federal government has gone on another buying spree for something we don't need: anthrax vaccine: Read the rest of this post... | Read the comments on this post... (Source: Effect Measure)</description>
            <author>Effect Measure</author>
            <type>blogs</type>
        <comments>http://www.medworm.com/rss/comments.php?id=915304</comments>
            <pubDate>Sun, 30 Sep 2007 19:17:23 +0100</pubDate>
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        <item>
            <title>Don't ask, don't tell at CDC</title>
            <link>http://www.medworm.com/index.php?rid=905998&amp;cid=t_107096_99_f&amp;fid=34593&amp;url=http%3A%2F%2Ffeeds.feedburner.com%2F%7Er%2Fscienceblogs%2FAyaJ%2F%7E3%2F161668178%2Fdont_ask_dont_tell_at_cdc.php</link>
            <description>The Department of Defense is not the only Bush agency with a &quot;Don't Ask, Don't Tell&quot; policy. Apparently CDC has one too: Read the rest of this post... | Read the comments on this post... (Source: Effect Measure)</description>
            <author>Effect Measure</author>
            <type>blogs</type>
        <comments>http://www.medworm.com/rss/comments.php?id=905998</comments>
            <pubDate>Wed, 26 Sep 2007 21:02:24 +0100</pubDate>
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            <title>The biodefense lab iceberg</title>
            <link>http://www.medworm.com/index.php?rid=888498&amp;cid=t_107096_99_f&amp;fid=34593&amp;url=http%3A%2F%2Ffeeds.feedburner.com%2F%7Er%2Fscienceblogs%2FAyaJ%2F%7E3%2F159169632%2Fthe_biodefense_lab_iceberg.php</link>
            <description>OJ Simpson is back in the news, following hard on the heels of other celebrities in legal entanglements: Paris Hilton, Britney Spears, Martha Stewart, etc., etc. Yawn. Were they treated more harshly beacuse they were celebrities? Yawn. The other side of the coin, of course, is the privilege of the famous and powerful. We know they often get off when lesser mortals wouldn't. So what does that have to do with what we usually talk about here, public health, infectious disease, bird flu, research? This. Read the rest of this post... | Read the comments on this post... (Source: Effect Measure)</description>
            <author>Effect Measure</author>
            <type>blogs</type>
        <comments>http://www.medworm.com/rss/comments.php?id=888498</comments>
            <pubDate>Thu, 20 Sep 2007 21:23:11 +0100</pubDate>
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        <item>
            <title>What's under the biodefense rock?</title>
            <link>http://www.medworm.com/index.php?rid=885309&amp;cid=t_107096_99_f&amp;fid=34593&amp;url=http%3A%2F%2Ffeeds.feedburner.com%2F%7Er%2Fscienceblogs%2FAyaJ%2F%7E3%2F158702555%2Fwhats_under_the_biodefense_lab.php</link>
            <description>Biodefense laboratories at Texas universities operated for years without a single reported incident of laboratory acquired infection or even exposure. That is absolutely true and it sounds reassuring and it is similar to biodefense laboratores elsewhere. Don't worry. Be happy. But when it comes to claims of safety in biodefense laboratories -- multiplying like mosquitoes after the Bush administration rained dollars on their terrorist obsession -- you need to parse the statements carefully: &quot;without a single reported incident&quot; doesn't mean there were no incidents. It means none were reported. That was then. This is now: Read the rest of this post... | Read the comments on this post... (Source: Effect Measure)</description>
            <author>Effect Measure</author>
            <type>blogs</type>
        <comments>http://www.medworm.com/rss/comments.php?id=885309</comments>
            <pubDate>Wed, 19 Sep 2007 21:21:50 +0100</pubDate>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">885309</guid>        </item>
        <item>
            <title>Nightmare at Texas A&amp;M</title>
            <link>http://www.medworm.com/index.php?rid=869445&amp;cid=t_107096_99_f&amp;fid=34593&amp;url=http%3A%2F%2Ffeeds.feedburner.com%2F%7Er%2Fscienceblogs%2FAyaJ%2F%7E3%2F156085925%2Fnightmare_at_texas_am.php</link>
            <description>Texas A&amp;M's work on agents of interest to biodefense has its two month suspension continued by CDC because of persistent and extensive violation of safety rules (posts here, here, here, here and here). Read the rest of this post... | Read the comments on this post... (Source: Effect Measure)</description>
            <author>Effect Measure</author>
            <type>blogs</type>
        <comments>http://www.medworm.com/rss/comments.php?id=869445</comments>
            <pubDate>Thu, 13 Sep 2007 12:45:29 +0100</pubDate>
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            <title>Biodefense lab accident -- again</title>
            <link>http://www.medworm.com/index.php?rid=803533&amp;cid=t_107096_99_f&amp;fid=34593&amp;url=http%3A%2F%2Fscienceblogs.com%2Feffectmeasure%2F2007%2F08%2Fbiodefense_lab_accident_again.php</link>
            <description>Either there are more lab accidents in biodefense laboratories or we are hearing about them more (see here, here, here, here, here.). Since there are always lab accident but there is a lot more &quot;biodfense&quot; laboratory work, it is probably both. I think we can look forward to the Bush administration solving this problem by declaring lab accidents in biodefense labs a state secret. That way we won't have to worry about hearing about them any more. But until that happens, we can look forward to more of stuff like this: Read the rest of this post... | Read the comments on this post... (Source: Effect Measure)</description>
            <author>Effect Measure</author>
            <type>blogs</type>
        <comments>http://www.medworm.com/rss/comments.php?id=803533</comments>
            <pubDate>Thu, 16 Aug 2007 21:47:39 +0100</pubDate>
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        <item>
            <title>The UK has BSL4 labs, too. Happy?</title>
            <link>http://www.medworm.com/index.php?rid=792776&amp;cid=t_107096_99_f&amp;fid=34593&amp;url=http%3A%2F%2Fscienceblogs.com%2Feffectmeasure%2F2007%2F08%2Fthe_uk_has_bsl4_labs_too_happy.php</link>
            <description>We've written a lot about US high containment laboratories for potential biowarfare agents and extremely dangerous pathogens for which there is no vaccine or cure. But the UK likes to build these labs, too. In fact they have five of them. Where? Nah, nah. The UK's Health and Safety Executive is not gonna tell you. The terrorists might find out, and I'm sure there's no way they could obtain that information -- unless of course, they read the UK's TimesOnLine, which says they &quot;include the Health Protection Agency Centre for Infections at Colin-dale, northwest London, the Centre for Emergency Preparedness and Response at Porton Down, Wiltshire, the military Defence Science and Technology Laboratory at Porton Down, and the National Institute for Biological Standards and Control in South Mimms,...</description>
            <author>Effect Measure</author>
            <type>blogs</type>
        <comments>http://www.medworm.com/rss/comments.php?id=792776</comments>
            <pubDate>Fri, 10 Aug 2007 21:11:13 +0100</pubDate>
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        <item>
            <title>Lab accident</title>
            <link>http://www.medworm.com/index.php?rid=780630&amp;cid=t_107096_99_f&amp;fid=34593&amp;url=http%3A%2F%2Fscienceblogs.com%2Feffectmeasure%2F2007%2F08%2Flab_accident.php</link>
            <description>I wrote the post on Texas A&amp;M that appears below while sitting in an airport lounge, sans connection. In the car on the way home from the airport late last night I heard on the BBC World Service the following story, to which I found links provided by two kind readers upon being reconnected (hat tip PM and KR). 

Consider this BBC story a preamble to the Texas A&amp;M post that follow it: Read the rest of this post... | Read the comments on this post... (Source: Effect Measure)</description>
            <author>Effect Measure</author>
            <type>blogs</type>
        <comments>http://www.medworm.com/rss/comments.php?id=780630</comments>
            <pubDate>Sun, 05 Aug 2007 21:05:16 +0100</pubDate>
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            <title>Biodefense labs: more of a bad thing</title>
            <link>http://www.medworm.com/index.php?rid=729772&amp;cid=t_107096_99_f&amp;fid=34593&amp;url=http%3A%2F%2Fscienceblogs.com%2Feffectmeasure%2F2007%2F07%2Fbiodefense_labs_more_of_a_bad_1.php</link>
            <description>Oh, good. We're going to have more high containment (BSL4) laboratories to handle the world's most dangerous organisms, the ones for which there is no cure and usually no vaccine. Also bioweapons agents like anthrax and smallpox. Lovely. Where? We don't know yet. The list of candidates was narrowed to five for $450 million in federal dollars for a national lab to replace the one in Plum Island, NY. The ones that didn't make it are all states with a poor science infrastructure. You know, states like California, Oklahoma, Maryland, Missouri, Wisconsin and Kentucky/Tennessee. The ones that did? Well, Texas, for one. They've already got three BSL4 labs. They need another. Also Georgia, Kansas, Mississippi and North Carolina. Texas has real experience, of course. Texas A&amp;M is the only place we ...</description>
            <author>Effect Measure</author>
            <type>blogs</type>
        <comments>http://www.medworm.com/rss/comments.php?id=729772</comments>
            <pubDate>Thu, 12 Jul 2007 12:45:34 +0100</pubDate>
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        <item>
            <title>CDC halts research at biodefense lab in Texas</title>
            <link>http://www.medworm.com/index.php?rid=713063&amp;cid=t_107096_99_f&amp;fid=34593&amp;url=http%3A%2F%2Fscienceblogs.com%2Feffectmeasure%2F2007%2F07%2Fcdc_halts_research_at_biodefen.php</link>
            <description>A year may not seem like a long time, but everything's relative. For Texas A&amp;M University a year was 51 weeks too long since they were required to report potential breaches of laboratory safety protections in the federally financed biodefense lab they ran within seven days. This &quot;failure to communicate&quot; happened twice, once when researchers got ill with brucellosis and almost at the same time when it was found other lab workers had become infected with Q fever (see our posts here and here). We know about this because of The Sunshine Project, a citizen watchdog group that discovered the events from documents they obtained. Without The Sunshine Project we would never know about these safety violations in a biodefense laboratory, so kudos to them. Meanwhile the predictable hammer has fallen o...</description>
            <author>Effect Measure</author>
            <type>blogs</type>
        <comments>http://www.medworm.com/rss/comments.php?id=713063</comments>
            <pubDate>Tue, 03 Jul 2007 21:41:27 +0100</pubDate>
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        <item>
            <title>Still another lab accident at the same bioweapons facility</title>
            <link>http://www.medworm.com/index.php?rid=699209&amp;cid=t_107096_99_f&amp;fid=34593&amp;url=http%3A%2F%2Fscienceblogs.com%2Feffectmeasure%2F2007%2F06%2Fstill_another_lab_accident_at.php</link>
            <description>Q-fever is an acute febrile disease which presents, as do so many infectious diseases, with &quot;flu-like symptoms.&quot; It isn't cause by a flu virus, however, or any virus. It's caused by a bacterium, Coxiella burnetii. It is class B biowarfare agent, meant to cause debilitating illness amongst its targets. It rarely causes death, although it can, on occasion. It can also linger as a fairly serious chronic disease. You get it from exposure to infected livestock or dried materials from infected livestock. It doesn't take a lot of C. burnetii organisms to infect you. Typically the disease is seen in slaughter house workers and around slaughter houses. It is also being seen in US soldiers in Iraq, where some 30 cases have been diagnosed.

And oh, yes. We almost forgot. You can also get Q fever if y...</description>
            <author>Effect Measure</author>
            <type>blogs</type>
        <comments>http://www.medworm.com/rss/comments.php?id=699209</comments>
            <pubDate>Wed, 27 Jun 2007 12:00:32 +0100</pubDate>
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            <title>WHO contemplates fate of smallpox virus</title>
            <link>http://www.medworm.com/index.php?rid=623647&amp;cid=t_107096_87_f&amp;fid=35057&amp;url=http%3A%2F%2Fblogs.orlandosentinel.com%2Ffeatures_healthblog%2F2007%2F05%2Fwho_contemplate.html</link>
            <description>The World Health Organization announced Friday that it will offer guidance in 2010 to scientists who are pondering the destruction of the last remaining smallpox vials on the planet. According to this article from Reuters, WHO plans to conduct a... (Source: Health Check the Blog)</description>
            <author>Health Check the Blog</author>
            <type>blogs</type>
        <comments>http://www.medworm.com/rss/comments.php?id=623647</comments>
            <pubDate>Fri, 18 May 2007 13:59:36 +0100</pubDate>
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            <title>DoD Awarded Grant to Cleveland BioLabs for Development of Radiation Countermeasure Compound, Protectan CBLB502</title>
            <link>http://www.medworm.com/index.php?rid=500832&amp;cid=t_107096_97_f&amp;fid=35050&amp;url=http%3A%2F%2Ffeeds.feedburner.com%2F%7Er%2FPharmaGazette%2F%7E3%2F104402596%2Fdod_awarded_grant_to_cleveland.html</link>
            <description>Cleveland BioLabs, Inc. (Nasdaq: CBLI) has recently received a development fund (between $1.3 and $2.4 million) from Defense Threat Reduction Agency (DTRA) of the Department of Defense (DoD) for the development leading to the acquisition of its radiation countermeasure compound, Protectan CBLB502, in collaboration with the Armed Forces Radiobiology Research Institute (AFRRI). Protectan CBLB502 demonstrated outstanding efficacy as a single therapy in non-human primates, enabling survival of 70% of the animals that received whole-body radiation, versus the control group, in which 25% of the animals survived. CBLB502 is the first compound to provide protection from both gastrointestinal and hematopoietic radiation-induced damage when administrated before or after irradiation.Cleveland BioLabs...</description>
            <author>PharmaGazette</author>
            <type>blogs</type>
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            <pubDate>Mon, 26 Mar 2007 04:35:52 +0100</pubDate>
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