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Positive Illusions, Perceived Control and the Free Will DebateEmail this article to a colleague. Save this article to My Clippings. Discuss or comment on this article.
It is a common assumption among both philosophers and psychologists that having accurate beliefs about ourselves and the world around us is always the epistemic gold standard. However, there is gathering data from social psychology that suggest that illusions are quite prevalent in our everyday thinking and that some of these illusions may even be conducive to our overall well being. In this paper, we explore the relevance of these so-called 'positive illusions' to the free will debate. More specifically, we use the literature on positive illusions as a springboard for examining Saul Smilansky's so-called 'free will illusi...
Source: Mind and Language - October 27, 2009 Category: Psychiatry & Psychology Authors: THOMAS NADELHOFFER, TATYANA MATVEEVA Tags: Original Articles Source Type: journals

Index to Volume 24Email this article to a colleague. Save this article to My Clippings. Discuss or comment on this article.
(Source: Mind and Language)
Source: Mind and Language - October 26, 2009 Category: Psychiatry & Psychology Tags: Original Articles Source Type: journals

The Vernacular Concept of InnatenessEmail this article to a colleague. Save this article to My Clippings. Discuss or comment on this article.
The proposal that the concept of innateness expresses a 'folk biological' theory of the 'inner natures' of organisms was tested by examining the response of biologically naive participants to a series of realistic scenarios concerning the development of birdsong. Our results explain the intuitive appeal of existing philosophical analyses of the innateness concept. They simultaneously explain why these analyses are subject to compelling counterexamples. We argue that this explanation undermines the appeal of these analyses, whether understood as analyses of the vernacular concept or as explications of that concept for the p...
Source: Mind and Language - October 26, 2009 Category: Psychiatry & Psychology Authors: PAUL GRIFFITHS, EDOUARD MACHERY, STEFAN LINQUIST Tags: Original Articles Source Type: journals

The Pervasive Impact of Moral JudgmentEmail this article to a colleague. Save this article to My Clippings. Discuss or comment on this article.
A series of recent studies have shown that people's moral judgments can affect their intuitions as to whether or not a behavior was performed intentionally. Prior attempts to explain this effect can be divided into two broad families. Some researchers suggest that the effect is due to some peculiar feature of the concept of intentional action in particular, while others suggest that the effect is a reflection of a more general tendency whereby moral judgments exert a pervasive influence on folk psychology. The present paper argues in favor of the latter hypothesis by showing that the very same effect that has been observed...
Source: Mind and Language - October 26, 2009 Category: Psychiatry & Psychology Authors: DEAN PETTIT, JOSHUA KNOBE Tags: Original Articles Source Type: journals

The Meaning of 'Most': Semantics, Numerosity and PsychologyEmail this article to a colleague. Save this article to My Clippings. Discuss or comment on this article.
The meaning of 'most' can be described in many ways. We offer a framework for distinguishing semantic descriptions, interpreted as psychological hypotheses that go beyond claims about sentential truth conditions, and an experiment that tells against an attractive idea: 'most' is understood in terms of one-to-one correspondence. Adults evaluated 'Most of the dots are yellow', as true or false, on many trials in which yellow dots and blue dots were displayed for 200 ms. Displays manipulated the ease of using a 'one-to-one with remainder' strategy, and a strategy of using the Approximate Number System to compare of (approxima...
Source: Mind and Language - October 26, 2009 Category: Psychiatry & Psychology Authors: PAUL PIETROSKI, JEFFREY LIDZ, TIM HUNTER, JUSTIN HALBERDA Tags: Original Articles Source Type: journals

The Nature of Symbols in the Language of ThoughtEmail this article to a colleague. Save this article to My Clippings. Discuss or comment on this article.
The core of the language of thought program is the claim that thinking is the manipulation of symbols according to rules. Yet LOT has said little about symbol natures, and existing accounts are highly controversial. This is a major flaw at the heart of the LOT program: LOT requires an account of symbol natures to naturalize intentionality, to determine whether the brain even engages in symbol manipulations, and to understand how symbols relate to lower-level neurocomputational states. This paper provides the much-needed theory of symbols, and in doing so, alters the LOT program in significant respects. (Source: Mind and Language)
Source: Mind and Language - October 26, 2009 Category: Psychiatry & Psychology Authors: SUSAN SCHNEIDER Tags: Original Articles Source Type: journals

The Neuropsychology of Proper NamesEmail this article to a colleague. Save this article to My Clippings. Discuss or comment on this article.
The difference between common and proper names seems to derive from specific semantic characteristics of proper names. In particular, proper names refer to specific individual entities or events, and unlike common names, rarely map onto more general semantic characteristics (attributes, concepts, categories). This fact makes the link proper names have with their reference particularly fragile. Processing proper names seems, as a consequence, to require special cognitive and neural resources. Neuropsychological findings show that proper names and common names follow functionally distinct processing pathways. These pathways ...
Source: Mind and Language - August 26, 2009 Category: Psychiatry & Psychology Authors: CARLO SEMENZA Tags: PROPER NAMES Source Type: journals

Indexical PredicatesEmail this article to a colleague. Save this article to My Clippings. Discuss or comment on this article.
We discuss the challenge to truth-conditional semantics presented by apparent shifts in extension of predicates such as 'red'. We propose an explicit indexical semantics for 'red' and argue that our account is preferable to the alternatives on conceptual and empirical grounds. (Source: Mind and Language)
Source: Mind and Language - August 25, 2009 Category: Psychiatry & Psychology Authors: DANIEL ROTHSCHILD, GABRIEL SEGAL Tags: PROPER NAMES Source Type: journals

Experimental Philosophy and the Theory of ReferenceEmail this article to a colleague. Save this article to My Clippings. Discuss or comment on this article.
It is argued on a variety of grounds that recent results in 'experimental philosophy of language', which appear to show that there are significant cross-cultural differences in intuitions about the reference of proper names, do not pose a threat to a more traditional mode of philosophizing about reference. Some of these same grounds justify a complaint about experimental philosophy as a whole. (Source: Mind and Language)
Source: Mind and Language - August 25, 2009 Category: Psychiatry & Psychology Authors: MAX DEUTSCH Tags: PROPER NAMES Source Type: journals

A Strictly Millian Approach to the Definition of the Proper NameEmail this article to a colleague. Save this article to My Clippings. Discuss or comment on this article.
A strictly Millian approach to proper names is defended, i.e. one in which expressions when used properly ('onymically') refer directly, i.e. without the semantic intermediaryship of the words that appear to comprise them. The approach may appear self-evident for names which appear to have no component parts (in current English) but less so for others. Two modes of reference are distinguished for potentially ambiguous expressions such as The Long Island. A consequence of this distinction is to allow a speculative neurolinguistics of proper ('onymic') and semantic ('non-onymic') reference. A further consequence is that tran...
Source: Mind and Language - August 25, 2009 Category: Psychiatry & Psychology Authors: RICHARD COATES Tags: PROPER NAMES Source Type: journals

Proper Names in Early Word Learning: Rethinking a Theoretical Account of Lexical DevelopmentEmail this article to a colleague. Save this article to My Clippings. Discuss or comment on this article.
There is evidence that children learn both proper names and count nouns from the outset of lexical development. Furthermore, children's first proper names are typically words for people, whereas their first count nouns are commonly terms for other objects, including artifacts. I argue that these facts represent a challenge for two well-known theoretical accounts of object word learning. I defend an alternative account, which credits young children with conceptual resources to acquire words for both individual objects and object categories, and conceptual biases to construe some objects (notably people) as individuals in th...
Source: Mind and Language - August 25, 2009 Category: Psychiatry & Psychology Authors: D. GEOFFREY HALL Tags: PROPER NAMES Source Type: journals

The Significance of NamesEmail this article to a colleague. Save this article to My Clippings. Discuss or comment on this article.
As a class of terms and mental representations, proper names and mental names possess an important function that outstrips their semantic and psycho-semantic functions as common, rigid devices of direct reference and singular mental representations of their referents, respectively. They also function as abstract linguistic markers that signal and underscore their referents' individuality. I promote this thesis to explain why we give proper names to certain particulars, but not others; to account for the transfer of singular thought via communication with proper names; and, more generally, to support a cognitivist, not acqu...
Source: Mind and Language - August 25, 2009 Category: Psychiatry & Psychology Authors: ROBIN JESHION Tags: PROPER NAMES Source Type: journals

Do Children Start Out Thinking They Don't Know Their Own Minds?Email this article to a colleague. Save this article to My Clippings. Discuss or comment on this article.
Various researchers have suggested that below 7 years of age children do not recognize that they are the authority on knowledge about themselves, a suggestion that seems counter-intuitive because it raises the possibility that children do not appreciate their privileged first-person access to their own minds. Unlike previous research, children in the current investigation quantified knowledge and even 5-year-olds tended to assign relatively more to themselves than to an adult (Studies 1 and 2). Indeed, children's estimations were different from ratings made by their mothers: Their mothers sometimes rated themselves as know...
Source: Mind and Language - June 8, 2009 Category: Psychiatry & Psychology Authors: PETER MITCHELL, ULRICH TEUCHER, MARK BENNETT, FENJA ZIEGLER, REBECCA WYTON Tags: Original Articles Source Type: journals

In Defence of a Doxastic Account of ExperienceEmail this article to a colleague. Save this article to My Clippings. Discuss or comment on this article.
Today, many philosophers think that perceptual experiences are conscious mental states with representational content and phenomenal character. Subscribers to this view often go on to construe experience more precisely as a propositional attitude sui generis ascribing sensible properties to ordinary material objects. I argue that experience is better construed as a kind of belief ascribing 'phenomenal' properties to such objects. A belief theory of this kind deals as well with the traditional arguments against doxastic accounts as the sui generis view. Moreover, in contrast to sui generis views, it can quite easily account ...
Source: Mind and Language - June 8, 2009 Category: Psychiatry & Psychology Authors: KATHRIN GLÜER Tags: Original Articles Source Type: journals

Moral Dumbfounding and the Linguistic Analogy: Methodological Implications for the Study of Moral JudgmentEmail this article to a colleague. Save this article to My Clippings. Discuss or comment on this article.
The manifest dissociation between our capacity to make moral judgments and our ability to provide justifications for them, a phenomenon labeled Moral Dumbfounding, has important implications for the theory and practice of moral psychology. I articulate and develop the Linguistic Analogy as a robust alternative to existing sentimentalist models of moral judgment inspired by this phenomenon. The Linguistic Analogy motivates a crucial distinction between moral acceptability and moral permissibility judgments, and thereby calls into question prevailing methods used in the study of moral judgment. Indeed, the judgments that are...
Source: Mind and Language - June 8, 2009 Category: Psychiatry & Psychology Authors: SUSAN DWYER Tags: Original Articles Source Type: journals

Clarity and the Grammar of SkepticismEmail this article to a colleague. Save this article to My Clippings. Discuss or comment on this article.
Why ever assert clarity? If It is clear that p is true, then saying so should be at best superfluous. Barker and Taranto (2003) and Taranto (2006) suggest that asserting clarity reveals information about the beliefs of the discourse participants, specifically, that they both believe that p. However, mutual belief is not sufficient to guarantee clarity (It is clear that God exists). I propose instead that It is clear that p means instead (roughly) 'the publicly available evidence justifies concluding that p'. Then what asserting clarity reveals is information concerning the prevailing epistemic standard that determines whet...
Source: Mind and Language - June 1, 2009 Category: Psychiatry & Psychology Authors: CHRIS BARKER Tags: Original Articles Source Type: journals

Speech Acts, the Handicap Principle and the Expression of Psychological StatesEmail this article to a colleague. Save this article to My Clippings. Discuss or comment on this article.
Abstract: One oft-cited feature of speech acts is their expressive character: Assertion expresses belief, apology regret, promise intention. Yet expression, or at least sincere expression, is as I argue a form of showing: A sincere expression shows whatever is the state that is the sincerity condition of the expressive act. How, then, can a speech act show a speaker's state of thought or feeling? To answer this question I consider three varieties of showing, and argue that only one of them is suited to help us answer our question. I also argue that concepts from the evolutionary biology of communication provide one source ...
Source: Mind and Language - April 1, 2009 Category: Psychiatry & Psychology Authors: MITCHELL S. GREEN Tags: Original Articles Source Type: journals

Mirroring, Simulating and MindreadingEmail this article to a colleague. Save this article to My Clippings. Discuss or comment on this article.
Abstract: Pierre Jacob (2008) raises several problems for the alleged link between mirroring and mindreading. This response argues that the best mirroring-mindreading thesis would claim that mirror processes cause, rather than constitute, selected acts of mindreading. Second, the best current evidence for mirror-based mindreading is not found in the motoric domain but in the domains of emotion and sensation, where the evidence (ignored by Jacob) is substantial. Finally, simulation theory should distinguish low-level simulation (mirroring) and high-level simulation (involving pretense or imagination). Jacob implies that bi-...
Source: Mind and Language - March 30, 2009 Category: Psychiatry & Psychology Authors: ALVIN I. GOLDMAN Tags: Original Articles Source Type: journals

On Testing the 'Moral Law'Email this article to a colleague. Save this article to My Clippings. Discuss or comment on this article.
This article challenges their interpretation of the data. It does so by explicating some methodological problems in the Turiel tradition that Kelly et al. themselves in a way inherit and by drawing on new evidence coming from a partial replication of their research. (Source: Mind and Language)
Source: Mind and Language - March 30, 2009 Category: Psychiatry & Psychology Authors: PAULO SOUSA Tags: Original Articles Source Type: journals

The (Multiple) Realization of Psychological and other Properties in the SciencesEmail this article to a colleague. Save this article to My Clippings. Discuss or comment on this article.
Abstract: There has recently been controversy over the existence of 'multiple realization' in addition to some confusion between different conceptions of its nature. To resolve these problems, we focus on concrete examples from the sciences to provide precise accounts of the scientific concepts of 'realization' and 'multiple realization' that have played key roles in recent debates in the philosophy of science and philosophy of psychology. We illustrate the advantages of our view over a prominent rival account (Shapiro, 2000 and 2004) and use our work to rebut recent objections to the long-standing claim that psychological...
Source: Mind and Language - March 30, 2009 Category: Psychiatry & Psychology Authors: KENNETH AIZAWA, CARL GILLETT Tags: Original Articles Source Type: journals

Is the 'Trade-off Hypothesis' Worth Trading For?Email this article to a colleague. Save this article to My Clippings. Discuss or comment on this article.
Abstract: Recently, the experimental philosopher Joshua Knobe has shown that the folk are more inclined to describe side effects as intentional actions when they bring about bad results. Edouard Machery has offered an intriguing new explanation of Knobe's work[mdash]the 'trade-off hypothesis'[mdash]which denies that moral considerations explain folk applications of the concept of intentional action. We critique Machery's hypothesis and offer empirical evidence against it. We also evaluate the current state of the debate concerning the concept of intentionality, and argue that, given the number of variables at play, any par...
Source: Mind and Language - March 30, 2009 Category: Psychiatry & Psychology Authors: MARK PHELAN, HAGOP SARKISSIAN Tags: Original Articles Source Type: journals

Natural Compatibilism versus Natural Incompatibilism: Back to the Drawing BoardEmail this article to a colleague. Save this article to My Clippings. Discuss or comment on this article.
Abstract: In the free will literature, some compatibilists and some incompatibilists claim that their views best capture ordinary intuitions concerning free will and moral responsibility. One goal of researchers working in the field of experimental philosophy has been to probe ordinary intuitions in a controlled and systematic way to help resolve these kinds of intuitional stalemates. We contribute to this debate by presenting new data about folk intuitions concerning freedom and responsibility that correct for some of the shortcomings of previous studies. These studies also illustrate some problems that pertain to all of ...
Source: Mind and Language - January 23, 2009 Category: Psychiatry & Psychology Authors: ADAM FELTZ, EDWARD T. COKELY, THOMAS NADELHOFFER Tags: Original Articles Source Type: journals

Illocutionary Forces and What Is SaidEmail this article to a colleague. Save this article to My Clippings. Discuss or comment on this article.
Abstract: A psychologically plausible analysis of the way we assign illocutionary forces to utterances is formulated using a 'contextualist' analysis of what is said. The account offered makes use of J. L. Austin's distinction between phatic acts (sentence meaning), locutionary acts (contextually determined what is said), illocutionary acts, and perolocutionary acts. In order to avoid the conflation between illocutionary and perlocutionary levels, assertive, directive and commissive illocutionary forces are defined in terms of inferential potential with respect to the common ground. Illocutionary forces are conceived as au...
Source: Mind and Language - January 21, 2009 Category: Psychiatry & Psychology Authors: M. KISSINE Tags: Original Articles Source Type: journals

Dreaming and ImaginationEmail this article to a colleague. Save this article to My Clippings. Discuss or comment on this article.
Abstract: What is it like to dream? On an orthodox view, dreams involve misleading sensations and false beliefs. I argue, on philosophical, psychological, and neurophysiological grounds, that orthodoxy about dreaming should be rejected in favor of an imagination model of dreaming. I am thus in partial agreement with Colin McGinn, who has argued that we do not have misleading sensory experiences while dreaming, and partially in agreement with Ernest Sosa, who has argued that we do not form false beliefs while dreaming. Rather, on my view, dreams involve mental imagery and propositional imagination. I defend the imagination ...
Source: Mind and Language - January 21, 2009 Category: Psychiatry & Psychology Authors: JONATHAN ICHIKAWA Tags: Original Articles Source Type: journals

The Causal Inefficacy of ContentEmail this article to a colleague. Save this article to My Clippings. Discuss or comment on this article.
Abstract: The paper begins with the assumption that psychological event tokens are identical to or constituted from physical events. It then articulates a familiar apparent problem concerning the causal role of psychological properties. If they do not reduce to physical properties, then either they must be epiphenomenal or any effects they cause must also be caused by physical properties, and hence be overdetermined. It then argues that both epiphenomenalism and over-determinationism are prima facie perfectly reasonable and relatively unproblematic views. The paper proceeds to argue against Kim's (Kim, 2000, 2005) attempt ...
Source: Mind and Language - January 21, 2009 Category: Psychiatry & Psychology Authors: GABRIEL M. A. SEGAL Tags: Original Articles Source Type: journals

Scalar Implicature and Local PragmaticsEmail this article to a colleague. Save this article to My Clippings. Discuss or comment on this article.
Abstract: The Gricean theory of conversational implicature has always been plagued by data suggesting that what would seem to be conversational inferences may occur within the scope of operators like believe, for example; which for bona fide implicatures should be an impossibility. Concentrating my attention on scalar implicatures, I argue that, for the most part, such observations can be accounted for within a Gricean framework, and without resorting to local pragmatic inferences of any kind. However, there remains a small class of marked cases that cannot be treated as conversational implicatures, and they do require a l...
Source: Mind and Language - January 21, 2009 Category: Psychiatry & Psychology Authors: BART GEURTS Tags: Original Articles Source Type: journals

Asymmetries in Judgments of Responsibility and Intentional ActionEmail this article to a colleague. Save this article to My Clippings. Discuss or comment on this article.
We present the results of several new studies that provide empirical evidence in support of this account while disconfirming various currently prominent alternative accounts. We end by discussing some implications of this account for folk psychology. (Source: Mind and Language)
Source: Mind and Language - January 21, 2009 Category: Psychiatry & Psychology Authors: JENNIFER COLE WRIGHT, JOHN BENGSON Tags: Original Articles Source Type: journals

Pretence as Individual and Collective IntentionalityEmail this article to a colleague. Save this article to My Clippings. Discuss or comment on this article.
Abstract: Focusing on early child pretend play from the perspective of developmental psychology, this article puts forward and presents evidence for two claims. First, such play constitutes an area of remarkable individual intentionality of second-order intentionality (or 'theory of mind'): in pretence with others, young children grasp the basic intentional structure of pretending as a non-serious fictional form of action. Second, early social pretend play embodies shared or collective we-intentionality. Pretending with others is one of the ontogenetically primary instances of truly cooperative actions. And it is a, perhap...
Source: Mind and Language - October 14, 2008 Category: Psychiatry & Psychology Authors: HANNES RAKOCZY Tags: PRETENCE AND IMAGINATION Source Type: journals

Index to Volume 23Email this article to a colleague. Save this article to My Clippings. Discuss or comment on this article.
(Source: Mind and Language)
Source: Mind and Language - October 13, 2008 Category: Psychiatry & Psychology Tags: INDEX Source Type: journals

Semantic Externalism, Language Variation, and Sociolinguistic AccommodationEmail this article to a colleague. Save this article to My Clippings. Discuss or comment on this article.
Abstract: Chomsky (1986) has claimed that the prima facie incompatibility between descriptive linguistics and semantic externalism proves that an externalist semantics is impossible. Although it is true that a strong form of externalism does not cohere with descriptive linguistics, sociolinguistic theory can unify the two approaches. The resulting two-level theory reconciles descriptivism, mentalism, and externalism by construing community languages as a function of social identification. This approach allows a fresh look at names and definite descriptions while also responding to Chomsky's (1993, 1995) challenge to articu...
Source: Mind and Language - October 13, 2008 Category: Psychiatry & Psychology Authors: DANIEL LASSITER Tags: ORIGINAL ARTICLE Source Type: journals

The Evolution Of Pretence: From Intentional Availability To Intentional Non-ExistenceEmail this article to a colleague. Save this article to My Clippings. Discuss or comment on this article.
Abstract: I address the issue of how pretence emerged in evolution by reviewing the (mostly negative) evidence about pretend behaviour in non-human primates, and proposing a model of the type of information processing abilities that humans had to evolve in order to be able to pretend. Non-human primates do not typically pretend: there are just a few examples of potential pretend actions mostly produced by apes. The best, but still rare, examples are produced by so-called 'enculturated' apes (reared by humans) and among them specially those that have been systematically trained to use symbols (so-called 'linguistic' apes). ...
Source: Mind and Language - October 13, 2008 Category: Psychiatry & Psychology Authors: JUAN-CARLOS GÓMEZ Tags: PRETENCE AND IMAGINATION Source Type: journals

Alief in Action (and Reaction)Email this article to a colleague. Save this article to My Clippings. Discuss or comment on this article.
Abstract: I introduce and argue for the importance of a cognitive state that I call alief. An alief is, to a reasonable approximation, an innate or habitual propensity to respond to an apparent stimulus in a particular way. Recognizing the role that alief plays in our cognitive repertoire provides a framework for understanding reactions that are governed by non-conscious or automatic mechanisms, which in turn brings into proper relief the role played by reactions that are subject to conscious regulation and deliberate control. (Source: Mind and Language)
Source: Mind and Language - October 13, 2008 Category: Psychiatry & Psychology Authors: TAMAR SZABÓ GENDLER Tags: PRETENCE AND IMAGINATION Source Type: journals

William James, 'The World Of Sense' and Trust in TestimonyEmail this article to a colleague. Save this article to My Clippings. Discuss or comment on this article.
Abstract: William James argued that we ordinarily think of the objects that we can observe[mdash]things that belong to 'the world of sense'[mdash]as having an unquestioned reality. However, young children also assert the existence of entities that they cannot ordinarily observe. For example, they assert the existence of germs and souls. The belief in the existence of such unobservable entities is likely to be based on children's broader trust in other people's testimony about objects and situations that they cannot directly observe for themselves. (Source: Mind and Language)
Source: Mind and Language - October 13, 2008 Category: Psychiatry & Psychology Authors: PAUL L. HARRIS, REBEKAH A. RICHERT Tags: PRETENCE AND IMAGINATION Source Type: journals

Imagination and the IEmail this article to a colleague. Save this article to My Clippings. Discuss or comment on this article.
Abstract: Thought experiments about the self seem to lead to deeply conflicting intuitions about the self. Cases imagined from the 3rd person perspective seem to provoke different responses than cases imagined from the 1st person perspective. This paper argues that recent cognitive theories of the imagination, coupled with standard views about indexical concepts, help explain our reactions in the 1st person cases. The explanation helps identify intuitions that should not be trusted as a guide to the metaphysics of the self. (Source: Mind and Language)
Source: Mind and Language - October 13, 2008 Category: Psychiatry & Psychology Authors: SHAUN NICHOLS Tags: PRETENCE AND IMAGINATION Source Type: journals

Fractured Phenomenologies: Thought Insertion, Inner Speech, and the Puzzle of ExtraneityEmail this article to a colleague. Save this article to My Clippings. Discuss or comment on this article.
Abstract: How it is that one's own thoughts can seem to be someone else's? After noting some common missteps of other approaches to this puzzle, I develop a novel cognitive solution, drawing on and critiquing theories that understand inserted thoughts and auditory verbal hallucinations in schizophrenia as stemming from mismatches between predicted and actual sensory feedback. Considerable attention is paid to forging links between the first-person phenomenology of thought insertion and the posits (e.g. efference copy, corollary discharge) of current cognitive theories. I show how deficits in the subconscious mechanisms reg...
Source: Mind and Language - August 27, 2008 Category: Psychiatry & Psychology Authors: PETER LANGLAND-HASSAN Tags: Original Articles Source Type: journals

Vision, Action, and Make-PerceiveEmail this article to a colleague. Save this article to My Clippings. Discuss or comment on this article.
Abstract: In this paper, I critically assess the enactive account of visual perception recently defended by Alva Noë (2004). I argue inter alia that the enactive account falsely identifies an object's apparent shape with its 2D perspectival shape; that it mistakenly assimilates visual shape perception and volumetric object recognition; and that it seriously misrepresents the constitutive role of bodily action in visual awareness. I argue further that noticing an object's perspectival shape involves a hybrid experience combining both perceptual and imaginative elements[mdash]an act of what I call 'make-perceive'. (Source: Mind and Language)
Source: Mind and Language - August 25, 2008 Category: Psychiatry & Psychology Authors: ROBERT EAMON BRISCOE Tags: Original Articles Source Type: journals

Free Enrichment or Hidden Indexicals?Email this article to a colleague. Save this article to My Clippings. Discuss or comment on this article.
Abstract: A current debate in semantics and pragmatics is whether all contextual effects on truth-conditional content can be traced to logical form, or 'unarticulated constituents' can be supplied by the pragmatic process of free enrichment. In this paper, I defend the latter position. The main objection to this view is that free enrichment appears to overgenerate, not predicting where context cannot affect truth conditions, so that a systematic account is unlikely (Stanley, 2002a). I first examine the semantic alternative proposed by Stanley and others, which assumes extensive hidden structure acting as a linguistic trigg...
Source: Mind and Language - August 25, 2008 Category: Psychiatry & Psychology Authors: ALISON HALL Tags: Original Articles Source Type: journals

Taking Type-B Materialism SeriouslyEmail this article to a colleague. Save this article to My Clippings. Discuss or comment on this article.
Abstract: Type-B materialism is the thesis that though phenomenal states are necessarily identical with physical states, phenomenal concepts have no a priori connections to physical or functional concepts. Though type-B materialists have invoked this conceptual independence to counter a number of well-known arguments against physicalism (e.g. the conceivability of zombies, the ignorance of Mary, the existence of an 'explanatory gap'), anti-physicalists have raised objections to this strategy. My aim here is to defend type-B materialism against these objections, by arguing that they share the common problem of not taking th...
Source: Mind and Language - August 25, 2008 Category: Psychiatry & Psychology Authors: JANET LEVIN Tags: Original Articles Source Type: journals

Précis of The Architecture of the Mind: Massive Modularity and the Flexibility of ThoughtEmail this article to a colleague. Save this article to My Clippings. Discuss or comment on this article.
This article outlines the main themes and motivations of Carruthers, 2006. Its purpose is to provide some background for the critical commentaries of Cowie, Machery, and Wilson (this volume). (Source: Mind and Language)
Source: Mind and Language - June 1, 2008 Category: Psychiatry & Psychology Authors: PETER CARRUTHERS Tags: Original Articles Source Type: journals

Précis of The Architecture of the Mind: Massive Modularity and the Flexibility of ThoughtEmail this article to a colleague. Save this article to My Clippings. Discuss or comment on this article.
This article outlines the main themes and motivations of Carruthers, 2006. Its purpose is to provide some background for the critical commentaries of Cowie, Machery, and Wilson (this volume). (Source: Mind and Language)
Source: Mind and Language - May 14, 2008 Category: Psychiatry & Psychology Tags: article Source Type: journals

Minimal Semantics - by Emma BorgEmail this article to a colleague. Save this article to My Clippings. Discuss or comment on this article.
Mind & Language, Volume 23, Issue 3, Page 359-367, June 2008. (Source: Mind and Language)
Source: Mind and Language - May 14, 2008 Category: Psychiatry & Psychology Tags: article Source Type: journals

Us, Them and It: Modules, Genes, Environments and EvolutionEmail this article to a colleague. Save this article to My Clippings. Discuss or comment on this article.
Mind & Language, Volume 23, Issue 3, Page 284-292, June 2008. Abstract: The Architecture of Mind is an ambitious and informative work, surveying an impressive range of empirical literature and arguing that the mind is massively modular. However, it suffers from two major theoretical flaws. First, Carruthers’ concept ... (Source: Mind and Language)
Source: Mind and Language - May 14, 2008 Category: Psychiatry & Psychology Tags: article Source Type: journals

Expressive Perception as Projective ImaginingEmail this article to a colleague. Save this article to My Clippings. Discuss or comment on this article.
Mind & Language, Volume 23, Issue 3, Page 329-358, June 2008. Abstract: I argue that our experience of expressive properties (such as the joyfulness or sadness of a piece of music) essentially involves the sensuous imagination (through simulation) of an emotion-guided process which would result in the production of ... (Source: Mind and Language)
Source: Mind and Language - May 14, 2008 Category: Psychiatry & Psychology Tags: article Source Type: journals

Real Narrow ContentEmail this article to a colleague. Save this article to My Clippings. Discuss or comment on this article.
Mind & Language, Volume 23, Issue 3, Page 304-328, June 2008. Abstract: The purpose of the present paper is to develop and defend an account of narrow content that would neutralize the commonplace charge that narrow content ‘is not real content’. On the account I offer, a concept’s narrow content consists in its ... (Source: Mind and Language)
Source: Mind and Language - May 14, 2008 Category: Psychiatry & Psychology Tags: article Source Type: journals

Massive Modularity and the Flexibility of Human CognitionEmail this article to a colleague. Save this article to My Clippings. Discuss or comment on this article.
Mind & Language, Volume 23, Issue 3, Page 263-272, June 2008. Abstract: In The Architecture of the Mind, Carruthers proposes a new and detailed explanation for how human cognition could be both flexible and massively modular. The combinatorial nature of our linguistic faculty and our capacity to engage in inner ... (Source: Mind and Language)
Source: Mind and Language - May 14, 2008 Category: Psychiatry & Psychology Tags: article Source Type: journals

The Drink You Have When You’re Not Having a DrinkEmail this article to a colleague. Save this article to My Clippings. Discuss or comment on this article.
Mind & Language, Volume 23, Issue 3, Page 273-283, June 2008. Abstract: The Architecture of the Mind is itself built on foundations that deserve probing. In this brief commentary I focus on these foundations—Carruthers’ conception of modularity, his arguments for thinking that the mind is massively modular in ... (Source: Mind and Language)
Source: Mind and Language - May 14, 2008 Category: Psychiatry & Psychology Tags: article Source Type: journals

On Fodor-Fixation, Flexibility, and Human Uniqueness: A Reply to Cowie, Machery, and WilsonEmail this article to a colleague. Save this article to My Clippings. Discuss or comment on this article.
Mind & Language, Volume 23, Issue 3, Page 293-303, June 2008. Abstract: This paper argues that two of my critics (Cowie and Wilson) have become fixated on Fodor’s notion of modularity, both to their own detriment and to the detriment of their understanding of Carruthers, 2006. The paper then focuses on the supposed ... (Source: Mind and Language)
Source: Mind and Language - May 14, 2008 Category: Psychiatry & Psychology Tags: article Source Type: journals

Intentions, Gestures, and Salience in Ordinary and Deferred Demonstrative ReferenceEmail this article to a colleague. Save this article to My Clippings. Discuss or comment on this article.
Mind & Language, Volume 23, Issue 2, Page 145-164, April 2008. Abstract: In debates about the proper analysis of demonstrative expressions, ostensive gestures and speaker intentions are often seen as competing for primary importance in securing reference. Underlying some of these debates is the mistaken assumption ... (Source: Mind and Language)
Source: Mind and Language - March 12, 2008 Category: Psychiatry & Psychology Tags: article Source Type: journals

Knobe versus Machery: Testing the Trade-Off HypothesisEmail this article to a colleague. Save this article to My Clippings. Discuss or comment on this article.
Mind & Language, Volume 23, Issue 2, Page 247-255, April 2008. Abstract: Recent work by Joshua Knobe has established that people are more likely to describe bad but foreseen side-effects as intentionally performed than good but foreseen side-effects (this is sometimes called the ‘Knobe effect’ or the ‘side-effect ... (Source: Mind and Language)
Source: Mind and Language - March 12, 2008 Category: Psychiatry & Psychology Tags: article Source Type: journals

The Folk Concept of Intentional Action: Philosophical and Experimental IssuesEmail this article to a colleague. Save this article to My Clippings. Discuss or comment on this article.
Mind & Language, Volume 23, Issue 2, Page 165-189, April 2008. Abstract: Recent experimental findings by Knobe and others (Knobe, 2003; Nadelhoffer, 2006b; Nichols and Ulatowski, 2007) have been at the center of a controversy about the nature of the folk concept of intentional action. I argue that the significance of ... (Source: Mind and Language)
Source: Mind and Language - March 12, 2008 Category: Psychiatry & Psychology Tags: article Source Type: journals